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Zusammenfassung 
Das externe Rechnungswesen ist ein komplexes System aus Standards, Regeln und Insti-
tutionen, die mit dessen Ausgestaltung und Durchsetzung befasst sind. In der vorliegen-
den Arbeit wird dieses komplexe Konstrukt aus drei Sichtweisen betrachtet.  
Der erste Teil (Students) rückt die Personen, die künftig in diesem und verwandten Be-
reichen arbeiten werden in den Mittelpunkt. Im Rahmen einer Befragung von Studieren-
den wurde der Zusammenhang von Studien- und Karriereplänen sowie Persönlichkeits-
zügen untersucht. Studierende des externen Rechnungswesens, insbesondere der Steuer-
lehre, zeigen Charakteristika, die dem „Erbsenzähler“-Stereotypen entsprechen. Ihre 
KommilitonInnen in Controlling und Unternehmensfinanzierung zeigen hingegen kaum 
Unterschiede zu Studierenden anderer Fachbereiche. Hinsichtlich des Berufseinstiegs ist 
das externe Rechnungswesen deutlich beliebter als die entsprechende Studienvertiefung. 
Allerdings übersetzt sich dies nicht in die Absicht ein Berufsexamen zu absolvieren. Die 
diesbezüglichen Ergebnisse entsprechen denen der Studienwahl.  
Im zweiten Teil (Standards) wird eine regulierungsorientierte Perspektive eingenommen. 
Während Unternehmen bestimmte rechnungslegungsbezogene Leistungen in Anspruch 
nehmen müssen (z.B. Abschlussprüfung), können sie durch die Nachfrage zusätzlicher 
Leistungen (z.B. Steuerberatung) ihren Nutzen aus der Rechnungslegung maximieren. 
Vorliegend wird dieser Zusammenhang für 18 Europäische Länder empirisch untersucht. 
Es zeigt sich, dass die Kosten der Unternehmen zwischen den einzelnen Ländern stark 
variieren. Unternehmen scheinen durchaus opportunistisch zu handeln. Allerdings finden 
sich auch Anzeichen dafür, dass die unternehmensseitigen Kosten im Wesentlich durch 
die Umsetzung regulatorischer Vorgaben verursacht werden. Opportunistisches Verhal-
ten könnte dann primär steuerlich induziert sein. Ein starker nationaler Rechts- und Re-
gulierungsrahmen hat einen mäßigenden Einfluss auf diesen Zusammenhang. 
Der abschließende dritte Teil (Survivors) fokussiert auf den Begutachtungsprozess in der 
Rechnungslegungsforschung. Untersucht wird die Zeitdauer, die notwendig ist, um die-
sen Prozess erfolgreich zu überstehen. Es zeigen sich Unterschiede zwischen drei führen-
den Zeitschriften und einigen Charakteristika der Artikel. Eine detaillierte Analyse für 
The Accounting Review deutet darauf hin, dass der Prozess zwar insgesamt effizient ist, 
Bedenken bezüglich dessen Fairness aber möglicherweise begründet sind. 
  
  
  
Abstract 
Financial Accounting is a complex system framed and enforced by numerous standards, 
rules and institutions. In this dissertation, I analyze this complex construct through three 
distinct “lenses”. 
In the first part (Students), the persons who will most likely work in financial accounting 
or related areas are the center of attention. Based on a survey of German business students, 
the relation between personality traits as well as academic and occupational choices is 
analyzed. Students majoring in financial and, particularly, tax accounting show charac-
teristics similar to the “bean counter” stereotype. In contrast, managerial accounting and 
corporate finance students are closer to other business economics students. Since financial 
accounting is much more popular as a choice for the first job than as a major field of 
study, distinct personality traits diminish. However, this finding does not translate into 
the intention to pursue professional examinations. In this case, results are comparable to 
those for the choice of the major field of study. 
In the second part (Standards), the analysis shifts to a regulatory perspective. It is based 
on the notion that companies have different incentive to spend on accounting-related ser-
vices. Some of those costs are necessary to comply with rules and regulations (e.g., stat-
utory audit) but other spending is discretionary and rooted in an intent to maximize com-
panies’ benefits (e.g., tax advisory). For a sample of 18 European countries, we show that 
the costs of accounting-related services vary strongly between countries. Even though we 
find some evidence on opportunistic spending, most of the costs seem to be related to the 
compliance with rules and regulations. Hence, companies’ observed opportunistic behav-
ior could result from tax incentives. This effect is mitigated by stronger country-level 
governance mechanisms. 
The third and final part (Survivors) focuses on the peer review process in academic ac-
counting. A comparative analysis of three leading North-American accounting journals 
shows differences in the duration of the peer review process, which are partly attributable 
to the underlying characteristics of the articles. A detailed analysis for The Accounting 
Review further indicates a certain efficiency of the process. However, reasonable con-
cerns regarding the fairness of the peer review process remain. 
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INTRODUCTORY SUMMARY 
3 
Nobel Prize laureates Akerlof and Shiller (2009) refer to accountants as “heroes of capi-
talism” who “are the cool minded sheriffs of its Wild West” (p. 29). In their high praise 
for the accounting profession, they break down the complex system of standards, rules, 
and institutions into individual persons working behind the curtain. Even though the ad-
vent of Big Data and artificial intelligence is changing the landscape of the accounting 
and auditing professions (Financial Times 2016), it is still a “people’s business,” relying 
heavily on human knowledge and expertise. In the auditing profession, this becomes ob-
vious when looking at the professional standards. ISA 200.7 requires “that the auditor 
exercise[s] professional judgment and maintain[s] professional skepticism.” By referring 
to mindset (skepticism), training, and knowledge (judgement), the individual, not an or-
ganization, becomes the focal point. 
Akerlof’s and Shiller’s charming trick to focus on “accountants” neglects many other 
parties involved in the accounting process. Accountants themselves work in “accounting 
practice,” preparing financial reports for several types of internal (e.g., management) or 
external users (e.g., shareholders, tax authorities). The latter, in particular, demands a 
neutral and unbiased insight towards the financial position of a company. To ensure com-
parability and a level playing field between companies, financial reporting is regulated 
by numerous accounting standards and policies.1 Political factors and economic condi-
tions may affect this standard setting or legislative process (Wolk et al. 2013). During the 
process, a multitude of interested parties exerts influence on the outcome. Research on 
the political economy of standard setting (e.g., Gipper et al. 2014; Fülbier and Klein 2015) 
identified other standard setters, professional organizations, auditors, users, and preparers 
of financial statements, as well as academics as notable contributors. Some of the partic-
ipants have dual roles. Companies are preparers and users (e.g., to check on customers) 
of financial statements. Auditors exercise a control function over companies but also pro-
vide accounting-related advisory and consulting services. However, the costs of imple-
menting and adopting new policies are usually concentrated at companies; benefits are 
widespread between the users. The design of socially optimal standards, taking the total 
amount and distribution of profits into consideration, would require profound knowledge 
of the preferences and means of all affected parties (Sunder 1988). Nevertheless, socially 
optimal does not imply individually optimal. Companies, for example, could still engage 
                                                 
1  These can be designed at the national (e.g., United States Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, 
US-GAAP; German Commercial Code, HGB), supranational (e.g., Accounting Directives of the Euro-
pean Union), and international (e.g., International Financial Reporting Standards, IFRS) level. 
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in impression management (Brennan and Merkl-Davies 2013), accrual-based earnings 
management (Dechow et al. 2010), or real activities manipulation (Roychowdhury 2006; 
Cohen et al. 2008) to maximize their benefits from given policies. 
Academic research is one possible avenue to mitigate these concerns. Oler et al. (2010) 
define accounting research as “research into the effect of economic events on the process 
of summarizing, analyzing, verifying, and reporting standardized financial information, 
and on the effects of reported information on economic events” (p. 639). Their definition 
comprises ex ante research on the potential effects (Schipper 1994) and ex post research 
to examine the actually desired and unintended consequences of policies (Brüggemann et 
al. 2013). However, when a problem occurs or a new policy project comes up, standard 
setters need research results in a timely manner (Fülbier et al. 2009). Hence, the long-
term character of the academic research and publication could impede evidence-based 
standard setting as called for by researchers (e.g., Gassen and Günther 2014) and practi-
tioners (e.g., IASB Research Forum). Nonetheless, academic research in accounting is 
not limited to projects with direct implications for accounting standard-setters, as this 
thesis may further prove. 
In this thesis, I have a further look at accounting through the three “lenses” elaborated 
above: educational, policy, and academic. Each “lens” constitutes one part of the thesis. 
Part A covers the educational “lens” by analyzing the personality traits of future account-
ants; Part B focuses on companies’ benefits gained from increased costs incurred for ac-
counting-related services, offering a more policy-related research question; and Part C is 
grounded in the academic sphere, providing empirical evidence on the peer review and 
publication process in academic accounting. All parts share a common quantitative, econ-
ometrical or “main stream” (Chua 1986) methodology. Since the choice of research 
method depends on the research question (Smith 2015), each part offers distinct features 
in the research design and data. The first analysis is grounded in survey research (van der 
Stede et al. 2005), the second is based on archival data (the predominant method in ac-
counting research, cf. Merchant 2010; Oler et al. 2010), and the third on a hand-collected 
data and quantitative content analysis (Krippendorf 2012). The thesis is structured as fol-
lows. 
Part A (Students) takes an educational perspective. In this joint project with Jan Krüger, 
Thomas R. Loy, and Christian Scharf, we follow Akerlof’s and Shiller’s implicit focus 
on accountants as individual persons and analogously ask: “What does it take to be a 
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sheriff?” We analyze, precisely, how the career aspirations of students in financial, man-
agerial, and tax accounting, as well as corporate finance (FACT), relate to distinct per-
sonality traits. To our knowledge, we are the first to provide Continental European evi-
dence for accounting-related students. Personality traits are measured using the Big Five 
Inventory commonly used in human resources and psychology. Prior research suggests 
that individual characteristics are potential predictors for academic and vocational 
choices. We build upon Social Identification Theory and the stereotype literature to ex-
plain the relation between personality traits and academic and/or career aspirations in the 
FACT-related subfields. Based on this view of the profession, students would either con-
form to the dull and boring but trustworthy “bean counter” stereotype or the more talka-
tive and risk-affine “business professional” stereotype. 
Our results indicate that FACT students can be separated into two distinct groups. Stu-
dents majoring in managerial accounting and corporate finance show personality traits 
closer to business, management, and economics students with other (non-FACT) majors. 
Financial and tax accounting students form the second group and show characteristics 
related to ethical and responsible behavior as well as conservative values and judging in 
conventional terms. Results are more pronounced for students major in tax accounting 
who, additionally, have lower levels of extraversion. Taken together, the results indicate 
that tax accounting students are closest to the “bean counter” stereotype, followed by 
students in financial accounting. Repeating the analysis for students’ first job preferences, 
we report consistent results. Interestingly, the share of students with occupational aspira-
tions in financial accounting is much higher than the share of students majoring in this 
sub-field. However, the relative share of students interested in a professional examination 
is lower for tax accounting than auditing. Focusing on personality traits, we find person-
ality traits similar and partly more pronounced than for the choice of the major field of 
study. Our results should be interpreted cautiously. The low explanatory power of our 
multivariate analysis and diminishing results in the sample with the lowest share of FACT 
students suggests that personality traits alone are a weak predictor of occupational out-
comes. Additionally, the reported differences are statistically significant, but the magni-
tude of the differences is rather small. Nonetheless, in line with prior research, inferences 
drawn from personality traits are helpful in understanding the underlying factors of aca-
demic and vocational outcomes. 
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Part B (Standards) relates to the regulatory perspective of accounting by examining the 
costs and benefits of accounting-related services for European companies. This part is a 
joint project with Thomas R. Loy. It builds upon the notion that firms incur certain una-
voidable costs of accounting and tax regulation (e.g., statutory audits) but can voluntarily 
increase their spending (costs) to maximize their benefits in terms of accounting (earnings 
quality) and taxation (tax expenses) outcomes. The European Union provides an interest-
ing setting to test this relation since accounting and tax laws are harmonized to a different 
extent. Furthermore, since our analysis does not rely on country- and not firm-level data, 
it extends prior literature by including small- and medium-sized companies. We hypoth-
esize that the degree to which companies benefit from accounting-related services varies 
with the country-level spending on those services. Furthermore, drawing from the finan-
cial economics literature, we expect that these benefits are mitigated by country-level 
governance mechanisms as well as the quality of accounting and tax regulation. To cap-
ture the broad array of potential incentives and implementation forms with regard to ac-
counting-related services, we employ three different measures for the potential benefits: 
(1) accrual-based earnings management measured by discretionary accruals, (2) real ac-
tivities management estimated by abnormal cash flows, and (3) taxation operationalized 
by the difference between companies’ effective and statutory tax rates. 
Costs of accounting-related services vary between US $5.39 in Estonia and 
US $12.76  per 1m US-$ of GDP in the Netherlands. Our results show a significantly 
negative relation between spending on accounting-related services and earnings quality. 
However, lower earnings quality does not translate into lower tax rates. Taken together, 
the primary results indicate that firms use accrual-based earnings as well as real activities 
management to create a less bumpy, smoother earnings path. This result is in line with 
prior literature highlighting the different financial reporting and tax incentives of private 
companies as opposed to listed firms. Furthermore, we find modest evidence on the mit-
igating effect of country-level governance mechanisms on the relation between spending 
on accounting-related services and earnings quality. Contrariwise, higher quality finan-
cial reporting and taxation systems have virtually no effect. Our results are robust to al-
ternative specifications of the dependent variables as well as tests for endogeneity. 
Part C (Survivors) covers the third “lens” on accounting emphasized previously, namely 
research. Accounting research stands at the crossroads of the two areas addressed in parts 
A and B. Dealing with the determinants, process, and (economic) effects of accounting 
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regulation, publications prepared, reviewed, and edited by researchers – single research-
ers or academic accountants – are the ample result of this “lens.” Articles published in 
(top tier) journals are the most prominent forms of publication. Research results are not 
only of interest to the research community, standard setters, and accounting practitioners 
— the publication itself is of mere importance to the researchers (Survivors). Tenure de-
cisions, research grants, and other outcomes are linked to publications. However, the pub-
lication process in academic accounting is oftentimes considered exhaustive and lengthy. 
In an explorative analysis, this part deals with a certain element of the publication process: 
peer review, which is the distinguishing feature of academic journals. It covers the peer 
review process’ duration for three leading journals: The Accounting Review (TAR), Jour-
nal of Accounting and Economics (JAE), and Journal of Accounting Research (JAR). For 
TAR, it further investigates determinants and fairness (editorial favoritism) of the peer 
review process. 
The results show a median duration of the peer review process of 487 days. TAR and JAR 
show similar durations: 457.5 and 450.0 days, respectively. For JAE, the median duration 
is 590.5 days. Top accounting journals did indeed increase the available journal space to 
meet increasing publication demand from scholars. The observed increase in the duration 
of the peer review process may, hence, be a strategic reaction to address remaining excess 
demand in publication space by the scholarly community. Besides these overall trends, 
certain other- and article-specific factors seem to relate to the duration of the peer review 
process. Particularly, conference-based papers benefit from an accelerated process. Dis-
sertation-based papers usually take longer (at least for JAE and JAR). Co-authorships are 
beneficial in TAR but show diminishing returns for JAE and JAR. Detailed analysis for 
TAR suggests that the peer review process is certainly efficient, i.e., not fundamentally 
influenced by characteristics of article or authors. Noticeably, high-quality articles which 
received more citations following publication pass the process faster. Additionally, the 
effect of fairness indicators is also investigated. If institutional bonds between the accept-
ing editor and one of the authors exist, the time spent in peer review apparently decreases. 
This result, however, should be interpreted with caution, as it could simply reflect a self-
selection of high-quality faculty into high-quality journals. Furthermore, mentioning 
members of the editorial staff (e.g., associate editors) in the acknowledgements is associ-
INTRODUCTORY SUMMARY 
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ated with a significant decrease in peer review duration. Although this could induce stra-
tegic behavior by the authors, quality feedback from a member of the editorial team is 
also a possible criterion for improving the paper in a timely fashion 
 
  
PART A: 
STUDENTS 
German Business Students’ Career Aspirations  
in Accounting, Taxation & Finance 
– The Relation to Personality Traits 
 
A b s t r a c t  
We analyze the interrelation between personality traits and German busi-
ness students’ propensity to select financial accounting, managerial ac-
counting, tax accounting, or corporate finance as their major field of study, 
to seek a first job in one of these areas as well as their intention to pursue a 
professional examination in audit or tax. The study is based on a survey of 
428 students from a German university. Personality traits are measured us-
ing the Big Five Inventory, commonly used in psychology and human re-
sources. In contrast to prior studies, we differentiate between students in 
managerial, financial, and tax accounting, as well as finance. Our results 
indicate different personality traits for students interested in managerial ac-
counting and corporate finance compared to those interested in financial 
and tax accounting. The latter, in particular, conform to the precise and 
trustworthy but dull and boring “bean counter” stereotype. We find weaker 
effects for financial accounting students, which are closer to tax accounting 
regarding the choice of the major field of study and more diverse with re-
gard to the intention of a first job. Students interested in professional ex-
aminations display “bean counter”-like personality traits as well. 
This part of the thesis is a joint project with Jan Krüger, Thomas R. Loy, and Christina Scharf.  
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1 Introduction 
Accounting scholars have long been concerned with the question of why students choose 
to major or pursue a career in accounting. The perception of accounting, the experience 
in the first accounting course, as well as the impact of job-related attributes like monetary 
compensation and prestige have been identified as potential reasons (e.g., Paolillo and 
Estes 1982; Tan and Laswad 2009). A second stream of research examines personality 
types of accounting compared to non-accounting students. Results from psychology and 
research in human resources indicate the interrelation of personality types/traits and aca-
demic or vocational outcomes (Rottinghaus et al. 2002; Nieken and Störmer 2010). Prior 
studies in accounting often rely on the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI; e.g., Wheeler 
2001). Undergraduate students are more introverted, rely less on intuition and feeling, 
and are more apt to make decisions based on judging than perception. A longitudinal 
study by Swain and Olsen (2012) provides additional evidence. The respective personal-
ity is more likely to join and remain in the accounting profession. Put differently, prior 
research documents attributes typically connected to the “bean counter” stereotype. For 
US students, these attributes have become more pronounced in recent years (Kovar et al. 
2003).  
The stereotype literature distinguishes between two basic images of accountants in the 
public sphere (Carnegie and Napier 2010). The traditional type, or “bean counter,” is 
characterized as trustworthy and reliable but dull and boring. In the early 2000s, a second 
stereotype evolved: the “business professional.” More sharply dressed, consulting-like, 
and focused on the clients’ business, she contrasts the traditional view of accounting as a 
profession. However, subsequent to the Enron scandal, the image has shifted towards a 
“villain” associated with earnings manipulation and window dressing. Social identifica-
tion theory (Tajfel and Turner 1986) explains that stereotypes cannot be reduced to how 
a group of people, in our case accountants, is perceived by others. Rather, individuals 
prefer to enter groups with a stereotype they can relate to. Through such a social filtering 
process, stereotypes, expressed as group members’ personal characteristics, may rein-
force themselves. 
We build upon the notion that personal characteristics matter for job selection (Barrick et 
al. 2001). Our study focuses on the interrelation of personality traits and students’ deci-
sions to major or work in accounting. In particular, we are not primarily interested in the 
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reasons to study accounting (i.e., the why?-question) but in the persons who do (i.e., the 
who?-question). Following Dalton et al. (2014), we do not expect accounting students to 
be a homogenous group. We distinguish between managerial, financial, as well as tax 
accounting and add students interested in (corporate) finance as a fourth group with a 
potential interest in accounting. Due to distinctive historical traditions for each discipline, 
Germany is an ideal setting to study such differences. We refer to all four groups as FACT 
(Finance, Accounting, Controlling [German term for managerial accounting, Messner et 
al. (2008)], Taxation). Students’ decisions investigated comprise the decision to major in 
one of the four sub-disciplines, the intent to choose the first job there, and the desire to 
pursue a professional examination in auditing and/or taxation. 
To examine these questions, we conducted a paper-based survey during the 2015 and 
2016 summer term. Overall, we received 1,103 analyzable questionnaires from students 
of one German university. The final sample consists of 428 respondents (38.8%). To ad-
dress potential biases (e.g., socially desirable responses from non-FACT students in 
FACT lectures), we construct two propensity score-matched samples based on the demo-
graphic, academic, and family background of the respondents. The two additional sam-
ples encompass students majoring in at least one FACT-related sub-field (matched majors 
sample, n = 384) and students surveyed in non-FACT lectures (matched lectures sample, 
n = 112). 
We measure personality traits using the Big Five Inventory (BFI). These personality traits 
are useful to predict vocational choices and hierarchical outcomes (e.g., De Fruyt and 
Mervielde 1997, 1999). In our study, we apply a modified 37-item version of the German 
translation by Rammstedt and John (2005). The five personality traits are extraversion 
(e.g., sociable, talkative), neuroticism (e.g., anxious, depressed), agreeableness (e.g., 
trusting, cooperative), consciousness (e.g., responsible, hardworking), and openness to 
experience (e.g., curious, broad-minded). As our study is explorative in nature, we have 
no expectations regarding characteristics of the students interested in the different fields 
of accounting (i.e., sub-disciplines). 
With regard to the sub-disciplines, the German setting allows us to exploit some particu-
larities. First, there is not one accounting profession in Germany (Vieten 1995; Hellmann 
et al. 2010). Separate professional examinations exist for auditing (“Wirtschaftsprüfer”) 
and taxation (“Steuerberater”). If differences in personality traits matter for the decision 
to choose accounting as an occupation, showing interest in the professional examinations 
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already during the course of studies should be a good measure to identify highly involved 
students. Second, managerial, financial, and tax accounting are separate but closely re-
lated sub-fields in the German business economics tradition (Busse von Colbe 1996). In 
the second half of the 20th century, differences became even more pronounced. A further 
link with regard to some topics (e.g., valuation; fair value measurement; risk manage-
ment) exists to (corporate) finance. Students usually specialize in more than one sub-
discipline. Hence, the overlap in groups may work against any findings.  
Our results indicate that FACT students can be separated into two distinct groups. Stu-
dents majoring in managerial accounting and corporate finance show personality traits 
closer to business, management, and economics students with other (non-FACT) majors. 
Managerial accounting students show significantly lower values of extraversion (more 
introvert personalities), and corporate finance students score lower in neuroticism (calm, 
clear-cut, and objective personalities). Financial and tax accounting students form the 
second group. They show distinct characteristics: higher scores in consciousness (ethical 
and responsible behavior) as well as lower scores in openness to experience (conservative 
values and judging in conventional terms), and neuroticism. Results are more pronounced 
for students major in tax accounting who, additionally, have lower levels of extraversion. 
Taken together, the results indicate that tax accounting students are closest to the “bean 
counter” stereotype, followed by students in financial accounting. Repeating the analysis 
for students’ first job preferences, we report consistent results. Students interested in a 
first job in tax accounting still show the strongest differences compared to all other stu-
dents. Interestingly, the share of students with occupational aspirations in financial ac-
counting is much higher than the share of students majoring in this sub-field. Financial 
accounting, in general, and auditing, in particular, seem to be interesting areas to gain 
first professional experience, develop technical skills, and become acquainted with vari-
ous industries. Distinct personality traits for students seeking a first job in financial ac-
counting are, hence, less pronounced than in the prior analysis. Accordingly, the relative 
share of students interested in a professional examination is lower than for tax accounting. 
Audit firms enjoy the benefit of having a broader and more diverse field of students to 
choose from than tax advisors. Students tend to delay the decision to seek a long-term 
career in auditing until they are “on the job,” whereas future tax accountants commit dur-
ing their studies. Hence, social identification is more important for tax accounting than 
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any other of the FACT-related sub-fields. Focusing on the intention to pursue a profes-
sional examination in auditing or tax accounting, we find personality traits similar and 
partly more pronounced than for the choice of the major field of study. 
The observed differences diminish in the matched lectures sample, which features the 
highest share of non-FACT students. In conformity with the low explanatory power of 
our multivariate analysis, this suggests that personality traits alone are a weak predictor 
of occupational outcomes. Students with similar traits obviously choose different jobs. 
Even though the reported differences are statistically significant, the magnitude of the 
differences is rather small (around one-fourth to one-fifth of a standard deviation). Thus, 
cautious interpretation is advised. Nonetheless, inferences drawn from personality traits 
are helpful in understanding the underlying factors of academic and vocational outcomes. 
Our study makes three major contributions. First, prior studies find that perceptions of 
accounting jobs differ between students interested in taxation or auditing (Dalton et al. 
2014). In turn, the decision to remain in or leave the accounting profession can partly be 
explained through differences in personality traits (Swain and Olsen 2012). Combing both 
results, we are the first to examine whether personality traits interrelate with academic 
and vocational interests in the different facets of accounting. We further add managerial 
accounting and (corporate) finance to the analyzed set of sub-disciplines. Second, to the 
best of our best knowledge, we are the first to provide evidence on the nature and inten-
tions of European accounting students in general, and German students in particular. Prior 
studies mainly focused on the US (e.g., Cohen and Hanno 1993; Kovar et al. 2003; Swain 
and Olsen 2012; Dalton et al. 2014) as well as Hong Kong (Law and Yuen 2012), Malay-
sia (Said et al. 2004; Germanou et al. 2009), or New Zealand (Tan and Laswad 2009). 
Third, from a methodological perspective, we consider a previously unused instrument. 
The BFI is commonly used in human resource research for comparable studies (e.g., Bor-
ges and Savickas 2002; Rottinghaus et al. 2002), but so far has not been applied in an 
accounting context. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 contains a brief introduction into particular-
ities and institutional features of the German accounting profession as well as higher ed-
ucation. In Section 3, we provide a short overview of the relevant literature and method-
ologies at the intersection of accounting and psychology. Our data gathering and sample 
selection procedures are described in Section 4. Section 5 contains the results which are 
further discussed in Section 6. Section 7 closes with some concluding remarks. 
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2 German Accounting Profession 
Our study focuses on Germany, Europe’s largest and most populous economy, which 
provides a distinct setting to follow Dalton et al. (2014) and deepen our understanding of 
differences associated with accounting’s various sub-disciplines. In contrast to Anglo-
saxon countries, no single, unified accounting profession exists. Likewise, the term “ac-
countant” refers to a “financial statement preparer, tax accountant, bookkeeper, auditor, 
or cost accountant” (Hellmann et al. 2010:111), depending on his or her actual work. The 
profession comprises four major groups: managerial accountants, financial accountants, 
tax accountants, and auditors. Two types of professional examinations are available for 
the latter two groups (Vieten 1995). Tax accountants have the option to become qualified 
tax advisors (“Steuerberater”). After the certification, tax advisors are permitted to pre-
pare tax returns and financial statements for tax and commercial purposes (Coenenberg 
et al. 1999). The certification consists of three written and one oral exam, covering topics 
like procedural law, value added and inheritance taxes, valuation law, income taxes, ac-
counting, and transaction tax. Two years of professional experience prior to the examina-
tion is required. 
Auditors (“Wirtschaftsprüfer”) are a distinct group within the German financial reporting 
landscape. They own the exclusive right to audit and certify financial statements. In con-
trast, preparers of financial statements for commercial purposes do not have to be mem-
bers of any professional organizations or hold any specific qualification. In order to be-
come an auditor, three (for candidates with a Master’s or Diploma degree) or four years 
(for candidates with a Bachelor’s degree) of professional experience prior to the exami-
nation is mandatory. The professional examination consists of seven written exams (two 
in auditing, two in applied business and economics, one in commercial law, and two in 
tax law), and an oral exam covering all aspects. Examinees, who previously passed the 
qualified tax advisor examination, are exempt from the tax law exams. 
Both professional groups, tax advisors and auditors, are regulated by law and are obliged 
to be members of their respective public organizations (chambers, “Kammern”). Profes-
sional organizations for “high-status professions” usually have limited self-control re-
garding supervision, training, and professional practice (Neal and Morgan 2000). Unlike 
Anglo-saxon countries (Watts and Zimmerman 1983), the regulation of tax advisors and 
auditors is a combination of self- and state-regulation (Vieten 1995). Both groups enjoy 
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full responsibility for the professional examinations. As outlined above, the prerequisites 
for admission to both professions are higher, more extensive, and more time-consuming 
compared to other European countries (Baker et al. 2001; Evans and Honold 2007). To 
streamline the process without simultaneously lowering the requirements, parts of the 
audit examination can be moved up to the course of studies (§§ 8a, 13b WPO). Selected 
universities and polytechnics offer appropriate courses in applied business and economics 
as well as commercial law. All courses are subject to accreditation by the auditors’ pro-
fessional body. There is no comparable facilitation for the qualified tax examination. 
Besides these cases, most business economics courses in Germany are not specifically 
designed to meet the need of the auditing or any of the accounting professions (Coenen-
berg et al. 1999). Financial, tax, and managerial accounting were closely related but sep-
arate disciplines since the early beginning of business economics in Germany. One reason 
may have been the lack of a common theoretical underpinning. Financial accounting is 
considered to be the root of business economics (Busse von Colbe 1996). Attributable to 
the authoritative principle (“Maßgeblichkeitsprinzip”), which links financial statements 
for tax and commercial purposes, tax and financial accounting are closely related (Haller, 
1992; Pfaff and Schröer 1996). These two sub-disciplines were “influenced and shaped 
by a technical-legal perspective” (Becker and Messner 2005:419). Managerial accounting 
evolved as a separate discipline in academia, education, and practice since the 1950s – 
and nowadays even has its own name: “Controlling” (Becker and Messner 2005). The 
ongoing emancipation of “Controlling” was based on the divergent purposes of and the 
traditional tax link of financial accounting that distorts decision-relevant management ac-
counting. Regarding questions of capital budgeting and funding, it partly overlaps with 
(corporate) finance. In contrast, questions of appraisal and valuation are traditionally 
within the scope of auditors and largely swayed by tax matters. Apparently, the sub-dis-
ciplines of managerial, financial, and tax accounting, as well as finance, are interrelated, 
albeit taking different evolutionary paths in recent decades. Taking the two types of pro-
fessional examinations into account, the particularities of the German business economics 
tradition offers a unique setting to investigate differences within the interested students. 
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3 Prior Literature 
Students’ intentions to major or work in accounting have been broadly discussed in the 
accounting literature. Early studies focused especially on the timing of the decision to 
work in accounting and the influential job-related factors like compensation and prestige 
(Paolillo and Estes 1982). More recently, studies have built upon the theory of reasoned 
action and the theory of planned behavior (Cohen and Hanno 1993; Tan and Laswad 
2009; Law and Yuen 2012; Dalton et al. 2014). Both theories hypothesize that each be-
havior is the result of individuals’ evaluations of their outcomes (i.e., attitudes toward the 
behavior) and the social pressure from peers (i.e., social norms). The theory of planned 
behavior adds a third component: perceived behavioral control, which is usually opera-
tionalized through individuals’ assessment of the difficulty of the behavior. Both theories 
are well suited to answer the question of why students want to pursue a study program or 
career in accounting. The theory of reasoned action and its successors broadened the 
scope of factors considered to influence study- and vocation-related decisions.  
The psychology literature already went one step further and examined the underlying 
characteristics of a person (i.e., the who?-question). These personality types or traits 
translate into interests and vocational choices of individuals (Holland 1973). Personality 
traits are measured through various instruments, most notably the NEO-PI-R (McCrae 
and Costa 1987), the Big Five Inventory (BFI), and the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator 
(MBTI). Personality traits, as measured by the BFI, affect academic, occupational, and 
professional decisions. As such, Rottinghaus et al. (2002) document a comparably higher 
explanatory power of personality traits compared to self-efficiency and vocational inter-
ests for the propensity to achieve higher academic degrees. Similarly, Nieken and Störmer 
(2010) provide evidence on differences in Big Five personality traits for different occu-
pational groups in Germany. For example, managers show significantly higher scores on 
extraversion and lower scores on conscientiousness than manual workers. Clerks, on the 
other hand, exhibit a significantly lower score in conscientiousness. As mentioned before, 
personality traits transform into vocational decisions. Prior studies show a considerable 
empirical overlap of the BFI-measures and vocational types (De Fruyt and Mervielde 
1997, 1999; Hogan and Blake 1999; Larson et al. 2002; Larson and Borgen 2002). Taken 
together, literature indicates a certain relation between the BFI-personality traits (or the 
who-question) and academic as well as vocational choices. 
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Contrarily, the MBTI is quite popular in accounting. Wheeler (2001) provides an over-
view of 16 studies on the personality of accounting students and accountants as well as 
the potential influence on their performance. All studies rely on students or professionals 
from the United States.2 He distinguishes two similarity groups. Undergraduates are 
closer to professional accountants regarding their personality types, whereas graduate stu-
dents are comparable to accounting faculty. Undergraduates score lower in extraversion, 
intuition, feeling, and perceiving. Like the professional accountants, they show traits 
closer to the “bean counter” stereotype. Kovar et al. (2003) confirm these results. In their 
eight-year longitudinal study, the personality types of students attracted in accounting 
programs are stable, with a tendency to less diversity and more “bean counter”-like pref-
erences. These results also translate into job selection and progress (Swain & Olsen 2012). 
Future accountants are more introvert-type personalities who gather information based on 
concrete experience rather than intuition and make structured decisions rather than delay-
ing them.  
Another stream of research investigates the perceptions of accounting jobs from the stu-
dents’ and practitioners’ perspectives. Students commonly overestimate the importance 
of technical capabilities compared to soft skills and “real world” experience (Usoff and 
Feldmann 1998). Kavanagh and Drennan (2008) exhibit comparable results for Australia. 
Nevertheless, students have a more positive view of the accounting profession than ac-
counting practitioners. The perception of both groups differs regarding advancement, 
training, supervision, ethical standards, and support in the professional exams (Carcello 
et al. 1991). Dalton et al. (2014) further divide the accounting puzzle into two jigsaw 
pieces: tax and audit. Their results indicate that career expectations in accounting are not 
homogenous. Students who pursue a career in auditing have other expectations regarding 
the nature and benefit of their jobs than students who want to work in taxes. We expect 
these differences in perception to be interrelated with differences in personality traits.  
                                                 
2  The only exemption are Vaassen et al. (1993) who administered their study in the Netherlands. 
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According to the Social Identification Theory (Tajfel and Turner 1986), individuals will 
choose to join social groups with a positive image and high social status. Stereotypes 
resemble a heuristic of sorts to assess society’s attitude toward certain groups. The sim-
plified views and beliefs about people and events related to groups define the stereotypes. 
For accounting, two opposing stereotypical views prevail (Carnegie and Napier 2010). 
The traditional or “bean counter” stereotype has mixed connotations, being dull and bor-
ing but precise and trustworthy. In recent years, the image shifted towards the contempo-
rary accountant, or “business professional,” who is more open-minded and shows a more 
business-focused and customer-centric attitude. Nevertheless, this stereotype also relates 
to the accounting scandals at the beginning of the 21st century. Acceptance or even par-
ticipation in earnings management, money laundering, and fraud constitute a “villain” in 
the public opinion. Richardson et al. (2015) systematically analyzed 31 peer reviewed 
journal articles on accounting stereotypes. As a result, they further decompose each of 
Table 1: 
Characterization of Accounting Stereotypes 
Positive Negative  Positive Negative 
Bookkeeper-Scorekeeper  Accountant-Guardian 
Vigilant, honest, en-
trusted, accepts obliga-
tion to society, disci-
plined, articulate, law-
abiding, independent, 
objective, dedicated, 
immersed 
conservative and pru-
dent, uncreative, obses-
sive, concerned with 
small details, dull and 
boring 
 managerial and analyti-
cal skills and critical 
judgement, precision 
and numerical accuracy, 
professional skepticism, 
personal sophistication, 
sensitive, caring, sin-
cere and honest, gener-
ous, funny 
 
Bookkeeper-Beancounter  Accountant-Entrepreneur 
 Dull, boring, unimagi-
native, shallow, weak, 
passive, lifeless, aloof, 
obedient, introvert, 
spineless, frowning, 
tight-fisted, unattrac-
tive, low social interest 
and esthetic sensitivity 
  Corrupt, suspicious, in-
volved in or associated 
with fraud, ‘liar’ and 
‘bullshitter’ 
 
Source: Richardson et al. (2015) 
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the two prior stereotypes into a positive and negative interpretation (Table 1). The “score-
keeper” is the positive interpretation of the traditional accountant. He is characterized as 
methodical, conservative, and trustworthy. Highly ethical conduct but a low-service ori-
entation distinguishes him from the “bean counter.” The latter is the anti-accountant, com-
pletely lacking competence and warmth. Contrariwise, the contemporary “guardian” 
characterizes the perfect accountant through highly ethical, professional, and versatile 
conduct. His antagonist, the “entrepreneur,” shares the same skills as well as social and 
service attitudes, but lacks ethical values. Overall, third-party perception of accountants 
and their actions shape the stereotypes.3 
Most of the studies previously mentioned focus on the US (Paolillo and Estes 1982; Car-
cello et al. 1991; Cohen and Hanno 1993; Usoff and Feldmann 1998; Wheeler 2001; Ko-
var et al. 2003; Swain and Olsen 2012; Dalton et al. 2014). Their results are, however, 
subject to some limitations and not easily transferrable to other countries. Personality 
traits vary across the world (Schmitt et al. 2007). While this may be partially explained 
through translation problems, cultural and socio-demographic differences alike have 
some effect. For instance, regarding vocational decisions in accounting, students from 
Hong Kong or Mainland China were mainly influenced by parental advice (Law and Yuen 
2012). One potential explanation is the strong influence of Confucian norms on the Chi-
nese society (Hofstede and Bond 1988; Hofstede 2001). For US students, other reference 
groups such as friends and professors are equally important (Cohen and Hanno 1993). 
Auyeung and Sands (1997) observe similar differences between Australian and Hong 
Kong/Taiwanese students at Australian universities. Deviant perceptions of accounting 
as a profession could provide a possible explanation. For a mixed sample of English and 
Malaysian students, Germanou et al. (2009) report significant differences for the percep-
tion of social and economic benefits, job security, chance of achievement, and the nature 
of an accounting job itself. As a result, cultural differences seem to affect the career 
choices. To our knowledge, no study provides evidence on intentions and motivations of 
(Continental) Europeans, especially German students. Our study is a first attempt at clos-
ing this gap. 
                                                 
3  Graves et al. (1992) and Nelson et al. (2008) offer a longitudinal view on the change of accounting 
students characteristics aside from personality traits. 
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4 Research Design 
4.1 Measuring Personality Traits 
We utilize the Big Five Inventory (BFI) to measure differences in personality traits. The 
BFI is based on the NEO-PI-R model developed by McCrae and Costa (1987). It consists 
of five dimensions, which are addressed through multiple positive and negative state-
ments in the questionnaire. Each statement has to be rated on a five- or seven-point Likert-
scale, ranging from “I fully disagree” to “I fully agree.” The BFI-personality traits are 
neuroticism, extraversion, openness to experience, conscientiousness, and agreeableness. 
Table 2 includes a short characterization of the five traits. In a meta-analysis, Barrick and 
Table 2: 
Characteristics related to the Big Five Personality Traits 
Lower Scores Higher Scores  Lower Scores Higher Scores 
Agreeableness  Conscientiousness 
• Critical, sceptical 
• Shows condescending 
behaviour 
• Tries to push limits 
• Expresses hostility di-
rectly 
• Critical, sceptical 
• Shows condescending 
behaviour 
• Tries to push limits 
• Expresses hostility 
directly 
 • Eroticizes situations 
• Unable to delay grati-
fication 
• Self-indulgent 
• Engages in fantasy, 
daydreams 
• Behaves ethically 
• Dependable, respon-
sible 
• Productive 
• Has high aspiration 
levels 
Extraversion  Neuroticism 
• Emotionally bland 
• Avoids close relation-
ship 
• Overcontrol of im-
pulses 
• Submissive 
• Talkative 
• Gregarious 
• Socially poised 
• Behaves assertively 
 • Calm, relaxed 
• Satisfied with self 
• Clear-cut personality 
• Prides self on objec-
tivity 
• Sympathetic, consid-
erate 
• Warm, Compassion-
ate 
• Arouses liking 
• Behaves in a giving 
away 
Openness to experience    
• Favours conservative 
values 
• Judges in conven-
tional terms 
• Uncomfortable with 
complexities 
• Moralistic 
• Favours conservative 
values 
• Judges in conven-
tional terms 
• Uncomfortable with 
complexities 
• Moralistic 
   
Source: McCrae and Costa (2003); Ham et al. (2009) 
 
PART A: STUDENTS 
22 
Mount (1991) identify conscientiousness and extraversion as particularly good predictors 
for occupational choices. Conscientiousness contains two facets. Dependability is being 
careful, thorough, responsible, and organized; volitional values are hardworking, achieve-
ment-oriented, and persevering. Extraversion relates to managerial and sales positions, as 
Table 3: 
Principal Component Analysis for the Big Five Personality Traits 
   E  C  N  O  A 
Extraversion (E)           
6 Is reserved  0.46  0.01  -0.04  -0.05  0.00 
16 Generates a lot of enthusiasm  0.36  -0.02  0.01  0.07  0.00 
21 Tends to be quiet  0.47  0.02  0.01  -0.02  -0.04 
36 Is outgoing, sociable  0.44  -0.06  0.00  0.00  0.08 
Conscientiousness (C)           
3 Does a thorough job  0.00  0.35  0.00  -0.02  -0.01 
8 Can be somewhat careless  -0.06  0.39  0.05  -0.02  0.06 
13 Is a reliable worker  -0.07  0.37  0.02  0.03  0.01 
18 Tends to be disorganized  -0.04  0.32  0.07  -0.04  0.02 
23 Tends to be lazy  0.15  0.33  0.04  -0.06  0.03 
28 Perseveres until the task is fin-
ished 
 -0.04  0.24  -0.09  0.08  -0.06 
33 Does things efficiently  0.09  0.24  -0.06  0.04  -0.01 
38 Makes plans and follows through 
with them 
 0.13  0.26  -0.03  0.04  -0.11 
43 Is easily distracted  0.01  0.30  -0.12  -0.01  -0.01 
Neuroticism (N)           
4 Is depressed, blue  -0.03  -0.01  0.45  0.03  -0.06 
9 Is relaxed, handles stress well  0.08  0.04  0.47  -0.07  0.03 
19 Worries a lot  -0.01  0.02  0.48  0.03  0.01 
39 Gets nervous easily  -0.12  -0.07  0.38  0.02  0.04 
Openness to Experience (O)           
5 Is orginial, comes up with new 
ideas 
 0.10  -0.01  -0.08  0.29  -0.02 
10 Is curious about many different 
things 
 0.11  0.09  -0.03  0.23  0.01 
15 Is ingenious, a deep thinker  0.02  0.02  0.16  0.27  0.00 
20 Has an active imagination  0.05  -0.02  0.02  0.34  0.01 
25 Is incentive  0.08  -0.04  -0.08  0.32  -0.04 
30 Values artistic, aesthetic experi-
ences 
 -0.09  0.02  0.05  0.39  0.04 
35 Prefers work that is routine  0.00  -0.02  -0.17  0.09  -0.07 
40 Likes to reflect, play with ideas  0.08  -0.05  -0.01  0.28  -0.11 
41 Has few artistic interests  -0.11  0.02  0.02  0.39  0.03 
44 Is sophisticated in art, music, or 
literature 
 -0.12  -0.07  -0.04  0.32  -0.01 
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it is being sociable, gregarious, talkative, and active. Based on the characterizations, 
“bean counter” accountants in general should score lower in extraversion, agreeableness, 
and openness. Financial accounting and auditing could relate negatively to openness and 
agreeableness, as professional skepticism and adherence to norms and standards is pro-
foundly necessary. In contrast, higher scores in extraversion and openness would charac-
terize the “business professional” stereotype. 
We employ a modified version of the BFI originally developed by Rammstedt and John 
(2005). Using their instrument has two major advantages. First, it is an already tested 
German version, avoiding further translation problems.4 Second, they offer a 45-item ver-
sion and a shorter version (BFI-K), which consists of 21 items. To circumvent timing 
restrictions when conducting the survey, we substituted 14 items with eight items from 
the shorter version (BFI-K). Our final questionnaire contains 37 statements. Fourteen of 
these are coded reversely to avoid confirmation bias. To assess the factorial validity of 
the combined measure, we repeat the steps from Rammstedt and John (2005). First, we 
conduct a principal component analysis with subsequent varimax rotation for all 37 items.  
                                                 
4  We use the English formulation of the corresponding items from John et al. (1991) in all subsequent 
tables. Authors own translations are marked with an asterisk (*). 
Table 3: 
continued 
   E  C  N  O  A 
Agreeableness (A)           
2 Tends to find fault with others  -0.16  -0.01  -0.12  -0.03  0.30 
7 Is helpful and unselfish with oth-
ers 
 0.05  0.02  0.07  0.10  0.29 
12 Starts quarrels with others  -0.13  0.12  -0.11  0.05  0.27 
17 Has a forgiving nature  0.02  -0.12  -0.16  -0.01  0.26 
22 Is generelly trusting  0.11  -0.14  0.01  -0.02  0.29 
27 Can be cold and aloof  0.05  -0.03  0.03  -0.10  0.34 
32 Is considerate and kind to almost 
everyone 
 0.12  0.06  0.15  0.11  0.34 
37 Is sometimes rude to others  -0.01  0.02  0.02  -0.07  0.39 
42 Likes to cooperate with others  0.03  -0.04  0.00  0.06  0.27 
45 Have trouble with others*  -0.06  0.11  -0.07  0.05  0.31 
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Table 4: 
Mean values and standard deviations as well as the reliability measures for the Big 
Five personality traits 
   Mean  SD  α 
 Extraversion       
6 Is reserved  3.47  1.09   
16 Generates a lot of enthusiasm  3.66  0.84   
21 Tends to be quiet  3.67  1.22   
36 Is outgoing, sociable  3.67  0.91   
 Mean  3.62   1.01  0.867 
 Conscientiousness       
3 Does a thorough job  4.08  0.68   
8 Can be somewhat careless  3.74  0.94   
13 Is a reliable worker  4.24  0.70   
18 Tends to be disorganized  3.65  1.05   
23 Tends to be lazy  3.44  1.02   
28 Perseveres until the task is finished  3.56  0.93   
33 Does things efficiently  3.76  0.76   
38 Makes plans and follows through with 
them 
 
3.81  0.81 
  
43 Is easily distracted  3.33  0.87   
 Mean  3.73   0.86  0.770 
 Neuroticism       
4 Is depressed, blue  2.79  0.99   
9 Is relaxed, handles stress well  3.08  1.02   
19 Worries a lot  3.20  1.10   
39 Gets nervous easily  2.84  0.96   
 Mean  2.98   1.02  0.800 
 Openness to Experience       
5 Is orginial, comes up with new ideas  3.19  0.93   
10 Is curious about many different things  3.92  0.89   
15 Is ingenious, a deep thinker  3.71  0.98   
20 Has an active imagination  3.56  0.92   
25 Is incentive  3.11  0.85   
30 Values artistic, aesthetic experiences  3.16  1.16   
35 Prefers work that is routine  2.61  1.02   
40 Likes to reflect, play with ideas  3.11  1.07   
41 Has few artistic interests  3.24  1.18   
44 Is sophisticated in art, music, or literature  2.77  1.08   
 Mean  3.24   1.01  0.812 
 Agreeableness       
2 Tends to find fault with others  3.21  0.89   
7 Is helpful and unselfish with others  3.86  0.67   
12 Starts quarrels with others  4.43  0.70   
17 Has a forgiving nature  3.50  1.03   
22 Is generelly trusting  3.33  1.05   
27 Can be cold and aloof  2.59  1.07   
32 Is considerate and kind to almost everyone  3.93  0.77   
37 Is sometimes rude to others  2.97  1.10   
42 Likes to cooperate with others  3.80  0.90   
45 Has trouble with others*  4.50  0.69   
 Mean  3.61   0.89  0.804 
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As expected, the eigenvalues decline sharply after the fifth factor.5 These five factors 
explain 47.9% of variance in the sample. Second, we run an additional principal compo-
nent analysis for five factors with subsequent varimax rotation. Table 3 shows the result-
ing unique simple structure. All items, except for item #35, have their highest loading on 
the expected factors. We do not observe any side loadings above 0.3. However, the load-
ings are much lower than those reported by Rammstedt and John (2005). Since the Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin measure of sample adequacy is 0.8054, we have no concerns regarding the 
internal consistency of the instrument. 
We compute the mean value for each of the five personality traits over the single items 
assigned to each factor. If one or more of the values for a certain trait is missing, we drop 
the trait for this observation. The other four traits are still computed, given that there are 
no missing values (Schmitt et al. 2007). Mean values and the standard deviations for the 
single items as well as the five traits are shown in Table 4. Cronbach’s alpha for the E, C, 
N, O, and A scores are 0.867, 0.770, 0.800, 0.812, and 0.804. Values higher than 0.8 (0.7) 
suggest high (sufficient) reliability (Peterson 1994). The reported values suggest a mostly 
good fit of the instrument. Other studies report similar results (Rubinstein 2005; Schmitt 
et al. 2007). Mean values for the five personality traits are qualitatively comparable to 
prior studies, too. A more detailed discussion can be found in Section 5.1. 
4.2 Data Collection 
We administered a paper-based survey at the beginning of the 2015 summer term at one 
German university. To assure a reasonable number of students interested in accounting, 
we deliberately chose foundational and advanced courses in corporate finance, as well as 
managerial and financial accounting. Four of the courses were part of a Bachelor’s pro-
gram (two foundational, one specialized) and three (all specialized) were part of the Mas-
ter’s program in business administration. To gain a control sample of students who are 
less prone to finance and accounting, we additionally surveyed students in one Bachelor’s 
course and two Master’s courses in international management and marketing at the end 
of the 2016 summer term. Since we surveyed students at one point in time, we cannot 
draw any causal inferences. As our research questions are explorative in nature and aim 
                                                 
5  Eigenvalues for Factor 1: 5.47; Factor 2: 4.01; Factor 3: 3.35; Factor 4: 2.87; Factor 5: 2.03; Factor 6: 
1.37; Factor 7: 1.25 (other results not tabulated). 
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to provide first evidence on the general characteristics of students majoring or pursing a 
first job in accounting, a causal link is not necessary. 
The major advantage of a paper-based survey is the high response rate.6 A potential non-
response bias is minimized (Sax et al. 2003). However, students’ decisions to study at a 
certain university or in a certain program, especially at the Master level, is most likely the 
result of a structured process rather than coincidence. We would expect similar intentions 
and characteristics between students. Socialization at the university could reinforce this 
effect. Furthermore, prior research shows that experience and success in the first account-
ing course influence the decision to specialize or work in accounting (Tan and Laswad 
2009). All these factors are university-specific. We mitigate these concerns by limiting 
our sample to students from one university. Therefore, Prior courses, experience, and so-
cialization should be comparable. However, the narrow sampling approach comes at the 
cost of a potentially limited generalization of the results. 
4.3 Sampling Procedure 
We use three distinct samples to mitigate concerns regarding the generalizability of our 
results and potential biases in the data. The first sample contains all observations with 
complete data for the subsequent analysis and matching procedures. Our initial sample 
consists of 1,103 returned questionnaires. We drop all observations from students in pro-
grams that finish with degrees other than a Bachelor’s and Master’s, e.g., teaching/edu-
cation or legal studies, which typically culminate with a state examination. This way, we 
                                                 
6  In our case, the actual response rate is slightly below 100 % because a very small number of students 
returned blank questionnaires or refused to participate. 
Table 5: 
Sample Selection Process 
 Returned questionnaires 1,103 
./. Study degrees other than Bachelor and Master -88 
./. Missing data on demographic, academic and family background -448 
./. Missing data on career preferences -81 
./. Missing data on personality traits -58 
= Final Sample 428 
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achieve a more homogenous group in terms of students’ curricula and incentives. Exclud-
ing certain groups of students from the analysis may reduce the variance in our sample 
and would, hence, work against any findings. However, as shown in Section 5.1, the sam-
ple still covers the different facets and modes of business and economics education.7 Fur-
thermore, we drop all observations with missing data on demographic, academic and fam-
ily background, career preferences, as well as personality traits.8 Table 5 contains a de-
tailed breakdown of the sample selection process. Our first sample consists of 428 obser-
vations. 
The second and third samples are specifically designed to address potential biases in our 
initial sampling approach. We use propensity score matching (PSM) to construct two 
samples, which contain a similar number of students from the treatment (FACT majors 
or surveyed in a FACT lecture) and control group (non-FACT majors or survey in a non-
FACT lecture). PSM was originally developed to reliably analyze the effect of new med-
icine by comparing the treatment and control groups (Stürmer et al. 2006). In recent years, 
PSM has been introduced in many other disciplines, as it allows for the drawing of causal 
inferences from quasi-experimental settings (Gassen 2014; Ittner 2014; Shipman et al. 
2017). However, we are not primarily interested in determining a possible direction of 
our results, but rather in mitigating systemic differences between the groups of respond-
ents in our sample. In a first step, we estimate a propensity score for each respondent. The 
underlying logit regressions are elaborated in more detail below. We use a broad set of 
covariates to achieve a robust and reliable matching without risking over-identification 
(Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008). In the second step, we use nearest-neighbor matching 
(without replacement) based on the propensity score to assign each respondent from the 
treatment group her closest “twin” from the control group. 
Matching FACT and non-FACT students (matched majors sample): As described above, 
we mainly administered the survey in courses covering topics in accounting and finance. 
Most of the courses were not mandatory. Therefore, students who willingly choose to 
participate in these courses may have an increased interest in an accounting or finance 
                                                 
7  Approximately 70 % of the German auditors have a business and/or economics background 
(Wirtschaftsprüferkammer 2017). Hence, the sample covers the single most important academic disci-
pline with regard to the entry qualification for (future) auditors. 
8  Even though imputation is a commonly used method to handle missing survey data and address a po-
tential non-response bias (Kalton 1983), we did not rely on any such methods since we assume that our 
sample size is still sufficient and inferences drawn without imputation are stronger. 
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career in general as well as the professional examinations in particular. Since we are not 
only interested in whether personality traits differ between FACT and non-FACT students 
but also whether they affect vocational outcome, i.e., starting a career in accounting or 
finance as well pursuing the professional examinations, we match students, who major in 
financial accounting, managerial accounting, tax accounting, or finance, with another stu-
dent who is not a FACT major but similar in her demographic, academic, and family 
background, as well as her personality traits. We add personality traits to isolate their 
marginal effect on vocational choices. If personality traits have an effect, similar students 
– regardless of the major – should, ceteris paribus, be interested in similar occupations. 
To address these questions, we use the following logit regression to match students: 
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 ∙ 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2 ∙ 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵ℎ𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3 ∙ 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4 ∙ 𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖+ 𝛽𝛽5 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽6 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖                              + 𝛽𝛽7 ∙ 𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽8 ∙ 𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑ℎ𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽9 ∙ 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖            + 𝛽𝛽10 ∙ 𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽11 ∙ 𝑜𝑜𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 + � 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 + 𝜀𝜀 
(1) 
FACT is a binary variable, taking the value “1” if a student majors in at least one of the 
FACT subjects (financial accounting, managerial accounting, tax accounting, and fi-
nance). Field is a categorical variable indicating the program of study (business & man-
agement, economics, industrial engineering, health economics, sports economics, other). 
The first set of covariates deals with the academic background of the respondent. Bache-
lor is a binary variable taking the value of “1” if a student is enrolled in a Bachelor’s 
program and “0” for Master’s students. Abroad is a binary variable taking the value of 
“1” if the student stayed in a foreign country for a longer period of time (e.g., semester or 
internship abroad). SchoolGrade is a student’s final grade at school. High school grades 
are a good predictor for academic aptitude (Grove et al. 2006).9 Parents have a strong 
influence on their children’s vocational choices (Schulenberg et al. 1984). This effect is 
especially pronounced in Asian countries (Law and Yuen 2012), but also observable in 
the West (e.g., for the US, Cohen and Hanno 1993). ParEducation is a binary variable 
indicating whether at least one of the parents holds an academic degree (value “1”) or not 
(value “0”). ParAccounting is a binary variable taking the value “1” if at least one of the 
                                                 
9  Please note that “1” is the best, and “5” the worst grade in the German education system. Hence, a 
negative coefficient denotes high-ability students. 
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parents works in tax accounting or auditing. TrainBusiness and TrainOth are binary var-
iables taking the value “1” if the respondent finished a commercial or any other vocational 
training before commencing undergraduate studies, respectively. Prior research has 
shown that men and women differ in their vocational decisions and personality traits (Ru-
binstein 2005). Such differences relate to job attributes (income, leisure time, working in 
teams, etc.) under consideration and the values placed on them in the decision process 
(Konrad et al. 2000). Hence, these may directly affect the decision to major or work in 
accounting or related disciplines. Female takes the value “1” if the student is female, and 
“0” otherwise. Age is a numerical variable representing the age of the respondent in years. 
German takes the value “1” if the respondent is a German native and “0” for any other 
nationality. The final set of variables (Personality) are the BFI-personality traits as de-
scribed in Section 4.1. 
Matching students from FACT and non-FACT lectures (matched lectures sample): Pri-
marily administering the survey in accounting and finance lectures yields another poten-
tial disadvantage. Students could be inclined to answer in favor of the subject in question 
and bias the results upwards, i.e., state a higher likelihood to pursue a career in accounting 
or finance as well as a professional examination than they actually do. This so-called 
social desirability bias is well documented. It particularly occurs when asked about so-
cially sensitive or personal issues (Grimm 2011). Even though is more likely in personal 
interviews than in web surveys (Kreuter et al. 2008), we use a second propensity score 
matching procedure to control for the contingent bias. As outlined above, we administered 
a second round of the survey in courses in subjects other than finance and accounting 
(non-FACT courses). We match each of the respondents from the non-FACT courses with 
its nearest neighbor in the FACT courses population using the following logit regression: 
𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑ℎ𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 ∙ 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2 ∙ 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵ℎ𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3 ∙ 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖                     + 𝛽𝛽4 ∙ 𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽6 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖+ 𝛽𝛽7 ∙ 𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽8 ∙ 𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑ℎ𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽9 ∙ 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖      + 𝛽𝛽10 ∙ 𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽11 ∙ 𝑜𝑜𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 + � 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 ∙ 𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑗𝑗𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 + 𝜀𝜀 
(2) 
Variables are defined as outlined above. The single notable difference to equation (1) is 
the substitution of the personality traits for the students’ majors. Major is an array of 
indicator variables taking the value of “1” if a student indicates to have chosen this major 
and “0” otherwise. Relying on students’ majors instead of personality traits allows us to 
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identify whether students with the same interests and presumptively similar career aspi-
rations give different answers depending on the course in which they were asked. If the  
Table 6: 
Results of the Propensity Score Matching-Regressions 
The table shows the Logit regression results for the estimation of the propensity scores for the matched 
majors (dependent variable: FACT, i.e. student majors at least in one of the following subjects: financial 
accounting, managerial accounting, tax accounting and finance) and matched lectures (dependent 
variable: OtherCourse, i.e. survey was administered in a lecture outside the FACT field). All other 
variables are explained in the text. Field denotes the inclusion of an array of binary variables for the 
respondents’ selected majors. t-values in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1 %, 5 %, 
and 10 % level, respectively. 
  Matched majors  Matched lectures 
       
Field  -0.073 ***  -0.057 ** 
  (-4.841)   (-2.373)  
Bachelor  0.071   -1.248 *** 
  (0.389)   (-4.479)  
Abroad  -0.388 ***  -0.134  
  (-2.614)   (-0.631)  
SchoolGrade  -0.053   0.330  
  (-0.346)   (1.450)  
ParEducation  -0.088   0.547 ** 
  (-0.638)   (2.524)  
ParAccounting  0.166   0.402 * 
  (1.040)   (1.788)  
TrainBusiness  -0.077   0.024  
  (-0.309)   (0.057)  
TrainOth  -0.235   0.082  
  (-0.747)   (0.179)  
Female  -0.444 ***  0.086  
  (-2.936)   (0.428)  
Age  0.116 ***  -0.098  
  (2.905)   (-1.519)  
German  -1.457 **  -0.629  
  (-2.299)   (-0.830)  
Agreeableness  -0.091     
  (-0.706)     
Extraversion  -0.098     
  (-1.111)     
Consciousness  0.222     
  (1.622)     
Neuroticism  -0.096     
  (-1.047)     
Openness to Experience  -0.198 *    
  (-1.761)     
constant  0.144   1.835  
  (0.107)   (1.192)  
Majors  Not included   Included  
       
No. obs.  428   428  
Pseudo-R²  0.146   0.279  
Area under RoC Curve  0.747   0.852  
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social desirability bias is not an issue, we should not find any significant difference be-
tween students in the treatment (Non-FACT courses) and control (FACT courses) group. 
Put differently, students answer should be coherent independent of the course. 
Table 6 shows the results of the logit regressions for the estimation of the propensity 
scores for the matched majors and matched lectures samples. In both models, Field has a 
significant negative relation to the treatment effect. Due to the coding of the categorical 
variable, business & management, the program of study with most students in our sample, 
has an assigned value of “1,” which explains the result. The significant negative coeffi-
cient for Bachelor in the matched lectures sample is a result of surveying approach since 
most of the non-FACT lectures were in the Master’s program. Overall, both models ex-
plain a reasonable portion of the variance (14.6% and 27.9% for the major- and lectured 
matched sample, respectively). The area under the RoC is above 0.5 for both models, 
rejecting the notion that the predictive results for the dependent variable are mere coinci-
dence. Additionally, Table 7 provides the mean values of the covariates in the propensity 
score regressions and their respective differences for the matched and unmatched sam-
ples. For the matched majors sample (Panel A), some significant differences remain after 
the matching. This result is attributable to the comparatively small control group (192 
FACT students vs. 236 non-FACT students), which hampers the likelihood of particularly 
good fits. However, the magnitude of the differences for all, and the level of significance 
for all but one covariate, indicates an overall good performance of the matching proce-
dure. In contrast, we do not observe any significant differences between the covariates 
for the treatment and control group for the lectures matched sample (Panel B). 
Finally, some noteworthy observations: FACT students are less likely to go abroad, are 
older, mostly male, and exhibit a higher share of international students. In contrast to the 
prior literature, we find a negative significant positive coefficient for ParAccounting in 
the matched lectures sample. This indicates that students whose parents work in tax ad-
visory or auditing are more likely to participate in non-FACT lectures. For accountants, 
it appears that she’s sometimes not a chip off the old block. 
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5 Results 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 8, Panel A shows the distribution of the demographic, academic, and family back-
ground variables across the three samples. In general, the full (column 1) and the matched 
majors sample (column 2) are comparable. Roughly a quarter of the students are studying 
in the Master’s program and a little less than a third have been studying or working in a 
foreign country for a longer period of time. More than half the students have at least one 
parent with an academic degree. In combination with the higher share of students who 
finished a vocational training (commercial or other), one can assume that a reasonable 
share of the students are “educational climbers” who are first in their families to obtain 
an academic degree. Most notably, the share of students whose parents work in account-
ing is higher in the matched lectures sample than in the two specifications. This is sur-
prising given the much lower share of FACT students in this sample (Panel D). Students 
possibly try to emancipate from their parents by choosing a different occupational direc-
tion. We observe no notable difference regarding gender, nationality, and age of the stu-
dents in the three samples. Overall, the results show slightly differing characteristics for 
students in the FACT and non-FACT courses. 
A look at the BFI-personality traits leads to a similar conclusion. Mean values for agree-
ableness (3.6), extraversion (3.5), and consciousness (3.7) are virtually identical for all 
three groups (Panel B). Once again, the matched lectures sample shows two notable de-
viations, as students in this sample score higher on average in neuroticism and marginally 
lower in openness to experience. 
The distribution of courses and major fields of study (Panel C and D, respectively) show 
that differences in demographic, academic, and family background, as well as personality 
traits, relate to different major fields of study but not to the courses. Regarding the latter, 
business & management students constitute approximately 70% of all three samples.  
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Table 8: 
Descriptive Statistics 
  Full Sample  Matched Majors  Matched Lectures 
  Abs. %  Abs. %  Abs. % 
Panel A: Academic, Demographic and Family Background 
          
Program          
 Bachelor  316 73.8  275 71.6  62 55.4 
 Master  112 26.2  109 28.4  50 44.6 
Abroad          
 Yes  137 32.0  112 29.2  42 37.5 
 No  291 68.0  272 70.8  70 62.5 
School Grade          
 very good (≥ 1; < 1.5)  35 8.2  31 8.1  7 6.3 
 good (≥ 1.5; < 2.5)  291 68.0  262 68.2  73 65.2 
 sufficient (≥ 2.5; < 3.5)  102 28.8  91 23.7  32 28.5 
ParEducation          
 Yes  250 58.4  221 57.6  85 75.9 
 No  178 41.6  163 42.4  27 24.1 
ParAccounting          
 Yes  91 21.3  88 22.9  32 28.6 
 No  337 78.7  296 77.1  80 71.4 
TrainBusiness          
 Yes  44 10.3  44 11.5  6 5.4 
 No  384 89.7  340 88.5  106 94.6 
TrainOth          
 Yes  23 5.4  21 5.5  6 5.4 
 No  405 94.6  363 94.5  106 94.6 
Gender          
 Female  207 48.4  172 44.8  61 54.5 
 Male  221 51.6  212 55.2  51 45.5 
Age          
 Mean   22.6   22.7   22.6 
Nationality          
 German  420 98.1  376 97.9  109 97.3 
 Other  8 1.9  8 2.1  3 2.7 
Panel B: Personality Traits (Mean values) 
 
         
Agreeableness   3.6   3.6   3.6 
Extraversion   3.5   3.5   3.5 
Consciousness   3.7   3.7   3.7 
Neuroticism   2.8   2.8   3.1 
Openness to Experience   3.2   3.2   3.1 
Panel C: Course of Study          
          
Business & Management  272 63.6  264 68.8  78 69.6 
Economics  15 3.5  15 3.9  9 8 
Industrial Engineering  25 5.8  24 6.3  7 6.3 
Health Economics  24 5.6  17 4.4  3 2.7 
Sports Economics  67 15.7  47 12.2  10 8.9 
Other  25 5.8  17 4.4  5 4.5 
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However, FACT students represent only 27.7% in the matched lectures sample, as op-
posed to 44.9% and 50% for the full and matched majors sample, respectively. Within 
the FACT field, managerial accounting and corporate finance are the most common ma-
jors. This effect is particularly pronounced in the matched lectures sample. Financial and 
tax accounting as well as auditing follow as most common majors, but with a notable gap 
in the matched lectures sample. The popularity of different FACT sub-fields varies with 
students’ overall focus of study. More technical sub-fields like financial and tax account-
ing are common and popular within the FACT field, but students with major fields of 
study outside FACT seem to prefer less rules-based subjects like managerial accounting 
Table 8: 
continued 
  Full Sample  Matched Majors  Matched Lectures 
  Abs. %  Abs. %  Abs. % 
Panel D: Major Fields of Study          
          
Auditing  33 7.7  33 8.6  4 3.6 
Financial Accounting  86 20.1  86 22.4  2 1.8 
Managerial Accounting  98 22.9  98 25.5  19 17.0 
Tax Accounting  66 15.4  66 17.2  6 5.4 
Corporate Finance  94 22.0  94 24.5  9 8.0 
FACT  192 44.9  192 50.0  31 27.7 
Entrepreneurship  17 4.0  16 4.2  0 0.0 
Innovation Management  42 9.8  35 9.1  8 7.1 
International Management  102 23.8  92 24.0  42 37.5 
Marketing  109 25.5  93 24.2  37 33.0 
Organizational Theory  33 7.7  30 7.8  9 8.0 
Human Ressources  78 18.2  67 17.4  17 15.2 
Operations Management & 
Logistics 
 64 15.0  59 15.4  18 16.1 
Statistics / Econometrics  5 1.2  5 1.3  3 2.7 
Strategic Management  70 16.4  63 16.4  14 12.5 
Information Management  23 5.4  23 6.0  8 7.1 
Education / Psychology / 
Sociology 
 22 5.1  16 4.2  9 8.0 
Business Law  14 3.3  13 3.4  2 1.8 
Other  51 11.9  44 11.5  18 16.1 
Management  2 0.5  2 0.5  2 1.8 
Microeconomics  2 0.5  2 0.5  0 0.0 
Macroeconomics  6 1.4  6 1.6  2 1.8 
CSR / Sustainability / Ecology / 
Ethics 
 6 1.4  4 1.0  0 0.0 
Services  11 2.6  10 2.6  7 6.3 
Sport and Health  11 2.6  8 2.1  2 1.8 
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and corporate finance. Hence, any inferences drawn heavily rely on the subgroup of stu-
dents surveyed. As with our focus on career aspirations in accounting and finance, the 
full sample and major matched sample, which consist (nearly) half of non-FACT students, 
should be adequate choices for subsequent analysis. Overall, the results indicate a slight 
relation between personality traits and the major field of study, which are possibly related 
Table 9: 
Big Five Personality Traits for FACT and Non-FACT Students 
  Group = 0  Group = 1  Difference 
  n Mean  n Mean    
Panel A: FACT          
          
Agreeableness  236 3.66  192 3.55  0.11 ** 
Extraversion  236 3.65  192 3.42  0.23 *** 
Consciousness  236 3.70  192 3.78  -0.08  
Neuroticism  236 2.89  192 2.77  0.12  
Openness to Experience  236 3.26  192 3.12  0.14 ** 
Panel B: Financial Accounting          
          
Agreeableness  342 3.62  86 3.55  0.08  
Extraversion  342 3.56  86 3.47  0.09  
Consciousness  342 3.70  86 3.86  -0.16 ** 
Neuroticism  342 2.88  86 2.67  0.21 ** 
Openness to Experience  342 3.22  86 3.09  0.13 * 
Panel C: Managerial Accounting 
          
Agreeableness  330 3.60  98 3.63  -0.03  
Extraversion  330 3.59  98 3.40  0.19 * 
Consciousness  330 3.73  98 3.77  -0.04  
Neuroticism  330 2.83  98 2.87  -0.04  
Openness to Experience  330 3.22  98 3.11  0.11  
Panel D: Tax Accounting          
          
Agreeableness  362 3.62  66 3.54  0.08  
Extraversion  362 3.60  66 3.26  0.34 *** 
Consciousness  362 3.70  66 3.91  -0.21 *** 
Neuroticism  362 2.87  66 2.66  0.21 * 
Openness to Experience  362 3.23  66 3.01  0.22 *** 
Panel E: Corporate Finance          
          
Agreeableness  334 3.62  94 3.57  0.05  
Extraversion  334 3.55  94 3.51  0.04  
Consciousness  334 3.72  94 3.80  -0.09  
Neuroticism  334 2.90  94 2.62  0.28 *** 
Openness to Experience  334 3.18  94 3.24  -0.05  
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to differences in demographic, academic, and family backgrounds.  
5.2 Studying FACT 
In the first analysis, we investigate whether students who choose FACT or any of its sub-
fields as their major field of study show personality traits which are different from those 
of students in other majors. Table 9 shows the mean values for the BFI-personality traits 
for students majoring in FACT compared to all non-FACT students as well as students in 
the FACT sub-fields compared to students in all other fields (FACT and non-FACT). 
FACT students (Panel A) show significantly lower values for agreeableness, extraversion, 
and openness to experience. These results seem to be primarily driven by students major-
ing in financial and tax accounting, who tend to be very similar and exhibit differences to 
the control group. Differences are most pronounced for tax accounting students (Panel D) 
who show significantly lower levels of extraversion, neuroticism, and openness to expe-
rience as well as higher values for consciousness. Financial accounting students show 
similar traits, though extraversion is not significant in their case. In contrast, the person-
ality traits of students majoring in managerial accounting or corporate finance are not 
significantly different from those of students in other major fields of study. This finding 
confirms our prior notion. Managerial accounting and corporate finance attract more stu-
dents from other sub-disciplines in business & management, whereas financial and tax 
accounting are chosen by a more distinct group of students. 
To further analyze the relation between choice of major field of study and personality 
traits, we ran separate logistic regressions for FACT and its sub-fields on the BFI-person-
ality traits: 
𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑗𝑗𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 =  𝛽𝛽0 + � 𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃 + 𝜀𝜀  (3) 
with Major being a binary variable taking the value “1” if a student chooses FACT or any 
of its sub-fields as a major. Personality represents the individual mean values for the BFI-
personality traits. Results for the sub-fields (columns) and the three samples (Panels) are 
shown in Table 10. For the full sample (Panel A), they are consistent, with results from 
the univariate analysis presented above. However, the magnitude is smaller for financial 
and managerial accounting, where only two (instead of three) or no (instead one) person-
ality traits show a significant relation to the choice of the major. Neuroticism shows the 
most persistent pattern, as it is significantly negative related to the probability of majoring 
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in a FACT sub-field in all but one (managerial accounting) specification. Focusing on the 
sub-fields, the personality traits identified before show a significant relation to tax ac-
counting. However, the magnitude is rather small. For example, a one-unit increase 
(which is roughly one standard deviation, Table 4) in extraversion lowers the probability 
to major in tax accounting by 5.8%. The area under RoC curve above 0.5 indicates that 
the predictive power of the model is not sheer coincidence. Explanatory power, however, 
is limited (Pseudo-R² below 15% for all specifications), indicating that the decision to 
choose a certain major is mainly driven by factors other than personality traits. 
As expected, results get weaker in the matched majors (Panel B) and matched lectures 
samples (Panel C). In the matched majors sample, students were matched on demo-
graphic, academic, and family background as well as their personality traits. Hence, we 
would not expect to find any effect of personality traits since each student that majors in 
FACT is balanced by another student with similar personality traits who does not major 
in FACT. Surprisingly, the results obtained for tax accounting and corporate finance re-
main significant with comparable coefficients as before, indicating a very robust relation 
between distinct combinations of personality traits and these two sub-fields. The slightly 
significant negative relation with openness for experience for tax accounting, and neurot-
icism for corporate finance, can also be observed in the matched lectures sample (Panel 
C). Significant relations other than the slightly significant negative coefficient for con-
sciousness in column 1 cannot be observed. This result emphasizes the importance of the 
sample selection for the survey. As shown before, the sample carries only a small share 
of FACT students. The FACT students included are mainly majoring in managerial ac-
countants and corporate finance. But these are precisely the two FACT majors with the 
least differences in personality traits – most likely due to their relative popularity with 
non-FACT students.  
 
 
  
40 
PART A: STUDENTS 
Ta
bl
e 1
0:
 
Lo
gi
t R
eg
re
ss
io
ns
 fo
r t
he
 C
ho
ic
e 
of
 M
aj
or
 F
ie
ld
s o
f S
tu
dy
 
Th
e 
ta
bl
e 
sh
ow
s t
he
 re
su
lts
 o
f f
ol
lo
w
in
g 
Lo
gi
t r
eg
re
ss
io
n:
 
𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑗𝑗
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒=
 𝛽𝛽 0+
�𝑃𝑃
𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒
𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑
𝑃𝑃+𝜀𝜀
  
M
aj
or
 is
 a
 b
in
ar
y 
va
ria
bl
e 
ta
ki
ng
 th
e 
va
lu
e 
“1
” 
if 
th
e 
re
sp
on
de
nt
 h
as
 c
ho
se
n 
th
e 
m
aj
or
 fi
el
d 
of
 st
ud
y 
de
no
te
d 
in
 th
e 
co
lu
m
n 
he
ad
in
g,
 a
nd
 “
0”
 o
th
er
w
is
e.
 A
ll 
ot
he
r v
ar
ia
bl
es
 a
re
 
de
fin
ed
 a
s d
es
cr
ib
ed
 in
 th
e 
te
xt
. C
oe
ffi
ci
en
ts 
ar
e 
m
ar
gi
na
l e
ffe
ct
s. 
z-
St
at
ist
ic
s n
ot
 re
po
rte
d.
 *
**
, *
*,
 a
nd
 *
 d
en
ot
e 
sig
ni
fic
an
ce
 a
t t
he
 1
 %
, 5
 %
, a
nd
 1
0 
%
 le
ve
l, 
re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y.
 
 
 
FA
CT
 
 
 
Fi
na
nc
ia
l  
A
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
 
M
an
ag
er
ia
l  
A
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
 
Ta
x 
 
A
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
 
Co
rp
or
at
e 
 
Fi
na
nc
e 
Pa
ne
l A
: F
ul
l S
am
pl
e 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A
gr
ee
ab
le
ne
ss
 
 
-0
.0
93
 *
* 
 
-0
.0
50
  
 
0.
02
1 
 
 
-0
.0
35
  
 
-0
.0
28
  
Co
ns
ci
ou
sn
es
s 
 
0.
07
6 
* 
 
0.
07
0 
* 
 
0.
03
2 
 
 
0.
09
9 
**
* 
 
0.
03
3 
 
N
eu
ro
tic
is
m
 
 
-0
.0
63
 *
* 
 
-0
.0
53
 *
* 
 
0.
00
0 
 
 
-0
.0
48
 *
* 
 
-0
.0
73
 *
**
 
Ex
tra
ve
rs
io
n 
 
-0
.0
78
 *
**
 
 
-0
.0
26
  
 
-0
.0
39
  
 
-0
.0
58
 *
**
 
 
-0
.0
36
  
O
pe
nn
es
s t
o 
Ex
pe
rie
nc
e 
 
-0
.0
71
 *
 
 
-0
.0
39
  
 
-0
.0
34
  
 
-0
.0
64
 *
* 
 
0.
02
7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N
 
 
42
8 
 
 
42
8 
 
 
42
8 
 
 
42
8 
 
 
42
8 
 
Ps
eu
do
-R
² 
 
0.
03
8 
 
 
0.
02
8 
 
 
0.
01
2 
 
 
0.
08
2 
 
 
0.
02
7 
 
A
re
a 
un
de
r R
oC
 c
ur
ve
 
 
0.
63
5 
  
0.
61
9 
  
0.
57
3 
 
 
0.
70
1 
  
0.
60
5 
 
Pa
ne
l B
: M
at
ch
ed
 M
aj
or
s S
am
pl
e 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A
gr
ee
ab
le
ne
ss
 
 
-0
.0
64
  
 
-0
.0
39
  
 
0.
04
7 
 
 
-0
.0
31
  
 
-0
.0
11
  
Co
ns
ci
ou
sn
es
s 
 
0.
06
3 
 
 
0.
06
8 
 
 
0.
02
3 
 
 
0.
10
4 
**
* 
 
0.
02
6 
 
N
eu
ro
tic
is
m
 
 
-0
.0
40
  
 
-0
.0
45
  
 
0.
01
7 
 
 
-0
.0
46
 *
* 
 
-0
.0
66
 *
* 
Ex
tra
ve
rs
io
n 
 
-0
.0
51
  
 
-0
.0
12
  
 
-0
.0
25
  
 
-0
.0
55
 *
* 
 
-0
.0
23
  
O
pe
nn
es
s t
o 
Ex
pe
rie
nc
e 
 
-0
.0
51
  
 
-0
.0
30
  
 
-0
.0
21
  
 
-0
.0
64
 *
 
 
0.
04
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
n 
 
38
4 
 
 
38
4 
 
 
38
4 
 
 
38
4 
 
 
38
4 
 
Ps
eu
do
-R
² 
 
0.
01
7 
 
 
0.
01
7 
 
 
0.
00
8 
 
 
0.
06
5 
 
 
0.
02
0 
 
A
re
a 
un
de
r R
oC
 c
ur
ve
 
 
0.
59
1 
  
0.
59
1 
  
0.
56
1 
 
 
0.
67
7 
  
0.
59
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
41 
PART A: STUDENTS 
Ta
bl
e 1
0:
 
co
nt
in
ue
d 
 
 
FA
CT
 
 
 
Fi
na
nc
ia
l  
A
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
 
M
an
ag
er
ia
l  
A
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
 
Ta
x 
 
A
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
 
Co
rp
or
at
e 
 
Fi
na
nc
e 
Pa
ne
l C
: M
at
ch
 L
ec
tu
re
s S
am
pl
e 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A
gr
ee
ab
le
ne
ss
 
 
-0
.0
98
  
 
0.
02
8 
 
 
-0
.0
31
  
 
0.
03
2 
 
 
-0
.0
51
  
Co
ns
ci
ou
sn
es
s 
 
-0
.0
10
  
 
-0
.0
39
  
 
0.
07
4 
 
 
0.
01
5 
 
 
-0
.0
58
  
N
eu
ro
tic
is
m
 
 
-0
.0
00
  
 
-0
.0
13
  
 
0.
02
4 
 
 
0.
01
5 
 
 
-0
.0
60
 *
 
Ex
tra
ve
rs
io
n 
 
-0
.0
90
 *
 
 
-0
.0
34
  
 
-0
.0
51
  
 
-0
.0
01
  
 
-0
.0
24
  
O
pe
nn
es
s t
o 
Ex
pe
rie
nc
e 
 
-0
.0
54
  
 
-0
.0
02
  
 
-0
.0
26
  
 
-0
.0
78
 *
 
 
-0
.0
43
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
n 
 
11
2 
 
 
11
2 
 
 
11
2 
 
 
11
2 
 
 
11
2 
 
Ps
eu
do
-R
² 
 
0.
04
9 
 
 
0.
10
0 
 
 
0.
04
1 
 
 
0.
12
1 
 
 
0.
13
2 
 
A
re
a 
un
de
r R
oC
 c
ur
ve
 
 
0.
64
4 
  
0.
78
3 
  
0.
66
4 
 
 
0.
76
3 
  
0.
74
7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART A: STUDENTS 
42 
5.3 Career Aspirations  
In our second analysis, we investigate whether and to which extent students are interested 
in pursuing a first job in any FACT-related sub-field and whether this decision relates to 
a distinct set of personality traits. Panel A of Table 11 shows the absolute number and 
relative share of students interested in picking a first job in any FACT-related area. For 
all three samples, the share of students interested in such a first job (FACT, 55.4% for the 
matched lectures sample to 67.4% for the matched majors sample) is higher than the share 
of FACT students documented in the previous analysis. Put differently, these jobs are also 
attractive to a reasonable share of non-FACT students. Particularly noteworthy is the in-
terest in financial accounting/auditing in the matched lectures sample, which is nearly 
four-times as high as the share of students in the respective major fields of study (Panel 
D of Table 8). Furthermore, managerial accounting is the most popular vocational choice 
by students (between 33.0 and 37.8%), followed by financial accounting/auditing (21.4 
to 35.3%), corporate finance (17.0 to 25.0%), and tax accounting/advisory (8.0 to 14.6%). 
Table 11: 
Interest in and Preferences for a First Job in FACT-related areas 
Panel A: First Job (multiple answers allowed) 
  Full Sample  Matched Majors  Matched Lectures 
  Abs. %  Abs. %  Abs. % 
          
FACT  273 63.8  259 67.4  62 55.4 
Financial Accounting  106 24.8  104 27.1  14 12.5 
Auditing  95 22.2  91 23.7  17 15.2 
Financial Accounting / Auditing  151 35.3  145 37.8  24 21.4 
Managerial Accounting  148 34.6  141 36.7  37 33.0 
Tax Accounting  47 11.0  45 11.7  9 8.0 
Tax Advisory  56 13.1  56 14.6  9 8.0 
Tax Accounting / Advisory  72 16.8  70 18.2  13 11.6 
Corporate Finance  107 25.0  103 26.8  19 17.0 
Panel B: Preference to work in an Auditing, Tax Advisory or Consulting Firm 
  n  Mean  SD  1. Q  Med  2. Q 
             
Full Sample  428  3.48  1.11  3.00  3.00  5.00 
Matched Majors  384  3.52  1.11  3.00  3.00  5.00 
Matched Lectures  112  3.17  .99  2.00  3.00  4.00 
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Observing different patterns for the choices of the major field of study and first job could 
also transfer to differences in personality traits. Table 12 shows the respective mean val-
ues for the BFI-personality traits of the group of students interested in a first job in a 
FACT-related area (Group = 1), and those who are not (Group = 0). Students generally 
interested in any FACT-related first job score significantly lower in agreeableness, extra-
version, and openness to experience. Compared to the study choice, results become more 
pronounced for students interested in a first job in managerial accounting and corporate 
Table 12: 
Big Five Personality Traits and Interest for a First Job in FACT-related areas 
  Group = no  Group = yes  Difference 
  n Mean  n Mean    
Panel A: FACT          
          
Agreeableness  155 3.68  273 3.57  0.11 ** 
Extraversion  155 3.72  273 3.45  0.27 *** 
Consciousness  155 3.70  273 3.75  -0.05  
Neuroticism  155 2.88  273 2.81  0.07  
Openness to Experience  155 3.31  273 3.13  0.17 *** 
Panel B: Financial Accounting / Auditing 
          
Agreeableness  277 3.63  151 3.56  0.07  
Extraversion  277 3.60  151 3.44  0.17 * 
Consciousness  277 3.73  151 3.74  0.00  
Neuroticism  277 2.88  151 2.76  0.12  
Openness to Experience  277 3.25  151 3.10  0.15 ** 
Panel C: Managerial Accounting 
          
Agreeableness  280 3.61  148 3.61  0.00  
Extraversion  280 3.64  148 3.37  0.27 *** 
Consciousness  280 3.72  148 3.77  -0.05  
Neuroticism  280 2.85  148 2.82  0.04  
Openness to Experience  280 3.26  148 3.08  0.18 *** 
Panel D: Tax Accounting / Advisory 
          
Agreeableness  356 3.62  72 3.56  0.05  
Extraversion  356 3.59  72 3.30  0.30 *** 
Consciousness  356 3.71  72 3.85  -0.14 ** 
Neuroticism  356 2.87  72 2.69  0.18 * 
Openness to Experience  356 3.25  72 2.94  0.31 *** 
Panel E: Corporate Finance          
          
Agreeableness  321 3.64  107 3.51  0.14 ** 
Extraversion  321 3.53  107 3.59  -0.06  
Consciousness  321 3.72  107 3.77  -0.05  
Neuroticism  321 2.90  107 2.65  0.25 *** 
Openness to Experience  321 3.17  107 3.28  -0.11  
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finance. For managerial accounting, additional to the lower score in extraversion, a lower 
value for openness to experience can be observed. Students interested in a first job in 
corporate finance show significantly lower scores in agreeableness and neuroticism. The 
latter confirms the finding from the studying choices (Table 9). As noted, the interest in 
a first job in financial accounting/auditing is much higher than that in the respective major 
field of study. This increase is mainly driven by students with divergent characteristics. 
Students who would like to start their professional careers in financial accounting/audit-
ing display significantly lower values for extraversion. The difference is three-times as 
high as for the studying choice. The significant result for openness to experience is com-
parable to the previous one. Differences in consciousness and neuroticism, which were 
significant before, are near zero at hand. The increased interest in financial accounting/au-
diting – compared to the studying choice – led to a partial adjustment towards students 
with “average” personality types observable for business & management in general. In 
contrast, we do not find such an effect for the closely related sub-field of tax accounting. 
Signs, coefficients, and in most cases even the significance levels, remain as previously 
reported. We further investigate this difference in the next step. 
Financial accounting and auditing both primarily deal with financial statements for com-
mercial purposes, whereas tax accounting and advisory are directed towards tax filings 
Table 13: 
Differences in Big Five Personality Traits for Inhouse and External Jobs 
  Inhouse  External  Difference 
  n Mean  n Mean    
Panel A: Financial Accounting (Inhouse) / Auditing (External) 
          
Agreeableness  56 3.67  95 3.50  0.17 ** 
Extraversion  56 3.46  95 3.42  0.04  
Consciousness  56 3.67  95 3.78  -0.10  
Neuroticism  56 2.89  95 2.69  0.21  
Openness to Experience  56 3.05  95 3.12  -0.07  
Panel B: Tax Accounting (Inhouse) / Advisory (External) 
          
Agreeableness  16 3.60  56 3.55  0.05  
Extraversion  16 3.27  56 3.31  -0.04  
Consciousness  16 3.52  56 3.95  -0.43 *** 
Neuroticism  16 2.81  56 2.65  0.16  
Openness to Experience  16 2.99  56 2.93  0.06  
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and financial statements for taxation purposes. So far, we structured the analysis follow-
ing this functional dichotomy. Another way to structure these activities is by whether they 
are “built” or “bought.” That is, financial and tax accounting services are usually per-
formed by firms’ own employees, whereas auditing and tax advisory services are per-
formed by an external third party. Since in-house and external jobs differ with regard to 
their organizational structure (for particularities of professional service firms, e.g., 
Norderflycht 2016) and work arrangement (e.g., increased business travels for employees 
in audit), these may attract different kinds of people as measured by personality traits. To 
further test this notion, Table 13 shows the differences in personality traits for students 
interested in a first job in financial accounting versus auditing (Panel A) as well as tax 
accounting versus tax advisory (Panel B). Students eying a future in auditing exhibit a 
significantly lower level of agreeableness than their fellow students who like to do com-
mercial work in-house. For taxes, consciousness is more pronounced for students who 
prefer to work in tax advisory rather than tax accounting. Students who prefer to work in 
professional service firms also show notably lower – although not significant – levels of 
neuroticism. 
Table 14: 
Preference for a First Job in an Accounting, Auditing, Tax Advisory or Consulting Firm 
The table shows the results of following ordered Logit regression: 𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑 =  � 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1 ∙ 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹  + 𝛽𝛽2 ∙ 𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑ℎ𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹 + � 𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃 + 𝜀𝜀  
Start is an ordinal variable indicating the respondent’s preference to start her career in an auditing, tax 
advisory or consulting firm rated on a scale from 1 (“very unlikely”) to 5 (“very likely”). All other vari-
ables are defined as described in the text. Coefficients are odds ratios. z-Statistics not reported. ***, **, 
and * denote significance at the 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % level, respectively. 
  Full Sample  Matched Majors  Matched Lectures 
          
FACT  1.190 ***  1.252 ***  1.207 *** 
OthCourse  -0.364   -0.351   -0.146  
Agreeableness  -0.526 ***  -0.513 ***  -0.502  
Consciousness  0.265   0.266   -0.037  
Neuroticism  -0.320 ***  -0.381 ***  -0.292  
Extraversion  -0.135   -0.161   -0.086  
Openness to Experience  -0.268 *  -0.240   -0.253  
Constant 1  -4.109 ***  -4.219 ***  -4.817 ** 
Constant 2  -2.315 **  -2.363 *  -2.595  
Constant 3  -1.526   -1.585   -1.788  
  
  
 
  
 
  
n  428   384   112  
Pseudo-R²  0.069   0.072   0.054  
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To further substantiate differences in personality traits for students who prefer to start 
their careers in professional service firms, we run an ordered logit regression with stu-
dents’ preferences as the dependent and personality traits as independent variables: 
𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑 =  � 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1 ∙ 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹  + 𝛽𝛽2 ∙ 𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑ℎ𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹 + � 𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃 + 𝜀𝜀 (4) 
Start is an ordinal variable indicating the preference, with values ranging from “very un-
likely” (1) to “very likely” (5). FACT and OthCourse are indicator variables for students 
majoring in a FACT-related sub-field or surveyed in a non-FACT lecture, respectively. 
Personality are the individual mean values for the BFI-personality traits. Descriptive sta-
tistics for the dependent variable Start are provided in Panel B of Table 11. As observed 
before, results for the full and matched major sample are very similar, with students show-
ing a mean preference of 3.48 and 3.52 (out of 5, SD: 1.11), respectively. Students in 
matched lectures sample show a lower preference (mean: 3.17, SD: 0.99) consistent with 
a lower share of students interested in a first job in accounting, auditing, or tax advisory. 
Results for the ordered logit regression are reported in Table 14. Students majoring in at 
least one FACT-related sub-field (FACT) show a significantly higher preference in all 
three samples. Given the different studying choices, one would assume a negative effect 
for students surveyed in non-FACT lectures. However, OthCourse has the predicted sign 
but is insignificant in all three models. The significantly negative coefficient for agreea-
bleness, neuroticism, and (partly) openness to experience are consistent with the prior 
results obtained from the univariate tests. Interestingly, agreeableness was only signifi-
cant for students interested in a first job in corporate finance but not for financial, mana-
gerial, or tax accounting. We did, however, observe a significantly lower level of agree-
ableness for students starting a career in auditing as opposed to in-house financial report-
ing. This supports the notion that differences in personality traits do not only relate to 
functional but also to the organizational form of an occupation. As before, the results are 
not confirmed in matched lectures sample. Students in non-FACT courses who share sim-
ilar majors and – indirectly – personality traits may have other desires for their jobs. In 
line with the, once again, low explanatory of personality traits in our model (Pseudo-R² 
below 8 % in all specifications), the same subjective characteristics do not necessarily 
lead to the same vocational outcomes. 
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5.4 Professional Examinations 
In our third analysis, we investigate whether and to what extent students are interested in 
pursuing a professional examination in audit or tax advisory as well as whether this in-
tention relates to distinct personality traits. Panel A of Table 15 presents the share of 
students interested in pursuing the auditor, certified tax advisor, or both examinations for 
the three samples. We observe a similar pattern as in prior analysis. That is, results for 
the full and matched samples are roughly comparable. 13.1% (14.3) of the students in full 
(matched major) sample express high or very high intention to pursue any examination. 
The certified tax advisory is slightly more popular than the auditor examination (10.0% 
vs. 9.1% for the full sample). These results correspond to a higher number of entrants in 
Table 15: 
Intentions to Pursue a Professional Examination 
Panel A: Interest in Pursuing a Professional Examination 
  Full Sample  Matched Majors  Matched Lectures 
   Abs.   %   Abs.  %   Abs.  % 
          
Auditor  39 9.1  38 9.9  3 2.7 
Tax Advisor  43 10.0  42 10.9  6 5.4 
Any  56 13.1  55 14.3  8 7.1 
Panel B: Preference to Pursue the Auditor Examination 
  n  Mean  SD  1. Q  Med  3. Q 
             
Full Sample  424  1.72  1.07  1.00  1.00  2.00 
Matched Majors  381  1.77  1.09  1.00  1.00  2.00 
Matched Lectures  112  1.47  0.83  1.00  1.00  1.00 
Panel B: Preference to Pursue the Tax Advisor Examination 
  n  Mean  SD  1. Q  Med  3. Q 
             
Full Sample  424  1.72  1.15  1.00  1.00  2.00 
Matched Majors  381  1.78  1.18  1.00  1.00  2.00 
Matched Lectures  111  1.46  0.92  1.00  1.00  2.00 
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the tax advisor examination (Bundesteuerberaterkammer 2016; Wirtschaftsprüferkam-
mer 2017). However, the interest in the auditor examination is higher than expected.10 
For the matched majors sample, the comparably low interest in the professional exami-
nation is not surprising given the career preferences of students in non-FACT lectures 
laid out above. 
Students with the intent to pursue a professional examination show significantly lower 
scores in extraversion, neuroticism, and openness to experience, as well as higher values 
in consciousness (Panel A of Table 16). This pattern is similar to the one observed for 
                                                 
10  Our sample includes 14 students who participate in a program to move up parts of the audit examination 
to the course of studies (§ 13b WPO). Of these, 13 (92.9 %) want to pursue the audit, and 10 (71.4 %) 
the tax examination, respectively. 
Table 16: 
Big Five Personality Traits and the Intention to Pursue a Professional Examination 
  Group = 0  Group = 1  Difference 
  n Mean  n Mean    
Panel A: Any          
          
Agreeableness  372 3.61  56 3.56  0.05  
Extraversion  372 3.58  56 3.33  0.25 ** 
Consciousness  372 3.71  56 3.92  -0.21 *** 
Neuroticism  372 2.88  56 2.57  0.31 *** 
Openness to Experience  372 3.22  56 3.03  0.19 ** 
Panel B: Auditor 
          
Agreeableness  389 3.61  39 3.54  0.07  
Extraversion  389 3.56  39 3.38  0.18  
Consciousness  389 3.71  39 3.98  -0.27 *** 
Neuroticism  389 2.87  39 2.49  0.38 *** 
Openness to Experience  389 3.21  39 3.02  0.19 * 
Panel C: Tax Advisor 
          
Agreeableness  385 3.61  43 3.62  -0.01  
Extraversion  385 3.57  43 3.28  0.30 ** 
Consciousness  385 3.72  43 3.90  -0.19 ** 
Neuroticism  385 2.86  43 2.66  0.20  
Openness to Experience  385 3.22  43 2.97  0.26 ** 
Panel D: Tax Advisor (Group = 0) / Auditor (Group = 1) 
          
Agreeableness  17 3.61  13 3.39  0.22  
Extraversion  17 3.22  13 3.50  -0.28  
Consciousness  17 3.77  13 3.96  -0.18  
Neuroticism  17 2.74  13 2.25  0.49  
Openness to Experience  17 3.07  13 3.26  -0.20  
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students who choose to major in tax accounting or consider to pick up a first job in this 
sub-field. Interestingly, students who intend to pursue a certified tax advisory examina-
tion (Panel C) show less pronounced differences. Whereas neuroticism is no longer sig-
nificant for future tax advisors (0.20), the difference is nearly twice the size (0.38) for 
students intending to pursue an auditor examination. They also score lower values for 
openness to experience, though slightly less than students interested in the certified tax 
advisor examination. Consciousness reveals an inverse picture: higher values and 
stronger significance for the future auditors. Directly comparing both groups (Panel D) 
reinforces prior findings, though the differences are not significant, with the 0.49 neurot-
icism score for auditors only “economically” meaningful. 
To examine the joint relation of the personality traits on the preference to pursue a pro-
fessional examination in tax or audit, we ran the following ordered logit regression which 
is comparable to equation (4) in Section 5.4: 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑 =  � 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1 ∙ 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹  + 𝛽𝛽2 ∙ 𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑ℎ𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹 + � 𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃 + 𝜀𝜀 (5) 
Examination is an ordinal variable indicating the preference for either the audit or certi-
fied tax advisor examination, with values ranging from “very unlikely” (1) to “very 
likely” (5). FACT and OthCourse are indicator variables for students majoring in a FACT-
related sub-field or surveyed in a non-FACT lecture, respectively. Personality are the 
individual mean values for the BFI-personality traits. Descriptive statistics for the de-
pendent variables are provided in Panels B and C of Table 15. Overall interest in the 
professional examination is remote and virtually identical for the auditor and tax exami-
nation (mean: 1.72 out of 5, SD: 1.07 and 1.15 for the full sample). More than 50% of the 
students indicated that it is “very unlikely” that they pursue the professional examinations 
(even more, 75% of the students in the matched lectures sample for the auditor examina-
tion). As expected, the values are even lower in the matched lectures sample. 
Table 17 shows the results from the ordered logit regression for the audit (Panel A) and 
the tax examination (Panel B). The sample size is slightly reduced due to so some missing 
information about preferences. Overall, the results indicate a negligible relation between 
the preference for the professional examinations and personality traits. Most notably, neu-
roticism is negatively related to the preference for the audit examination, which is con-
sistent with our prior findings. Students who major in at least one FACT-related subject 
are significantly more likely to have a high preference for any examination (except for 
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the audit examination in match lectures sample). In contrast, students surveyed in non-
FACT lectures have a significantly lower preference.  
 
Table 17: 
Preference for Pursuing a Professional Examination 
The table shows the results of following ordered Logit regression: 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑 =  � 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1 ∙ 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹  + 𝛽𝛽2 ∙ 𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑ℎ𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹 + � 𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃 + 𝜀𝜀  
Examination is either the auditor (Panel A) or tax advisor examination (Panel B) rated on a scale from 1 
(“very unlikely”) to 5 (“very likely”). All other variables are defined as described in the text. Coefficients 
are odds ratios. z-Statistic not reported. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % 
level, respectively.  
  Full Sample  Matched Major  Matched Lectures 
Panel A: Audit Examination       
          
FACT  1.156 ***  1.053 ***  0.802  
OthCourse  -1.108 ***  -1.291 ***  -1.429 *** 
Agreeableness  -0.242   -0.281   -0.302  
Consciousness  0.149   0.140   -0.698  
Neuroticism  -0.291 **  -0.257 *  -0.130  
Extraversion  -0.114   -0.071   0.229  
Openness to Experience  0.018   -0.047   0.802  
Constant 1  -0.591   -0.836   0.038  
Constant 2  0.200   -0.031   -2.554  
Constant 3  1.535   1.265   -1.742  
Constant 4  2.909 **  2.642 *  0.270  
  
  
 
  
 
  
n  424   381   112  
Pseudo-R²  0.063   0.060   0.080  
Panel B: Tax Examination          
          
FACT  1.459 ***  1.364 ***  1.405 *** 
OthCourse  -0.926 **  -1.092 ***  -1.100 ** 
Agreeableness  -0.297   -0.311   0.174  
Consciousness  0.270   0.238   -0.618  
Neuroticism  -0.137   -0.104   0.004  
Extraversion  -0.049   -0.019   0.439  
Openness to Experience  -0.204   -0.267   -0.712 * 
Constant 1  -0.108   -0.364   -1.286  
Constant 2  0.708   0.423   -0.265  
Constant 3  1.849   1.557   0.986  
Constant 4  2.508 *  2.218   1.566  
  
  
 
  
 
  
n  424   381   111  
Pseudo-R²  0.080   0.073   0.094  
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6 Discussion 
Students who choose to major in a FACT-related sub-field show some distinct deviations 
from non-FACT students. Lower scores in agreeableness and extraversion relate to a 
skeptical but introvert personality. The decreased levels for openness to experience point 
to conservative persons who are uncomfortable with complexities. However, there are 
notable differences between the sub-fields. Students majoring in corporate finance and 
managerial accounting do, for the larger part, not share these traits. Whereas students in 
corporate finance do at least share the lower values in neuroticism, students majoring in 
management accounting do not show significantly different levels for any of the traits. 
However, their below average score for agreeableness indicates skeptical but more risk-
prone personalities. Put differently, these two groups of students are closer to other stu-
dents in business, management, and economics. In contrast, students majoring in financial 
and tax accounting have widely similar personality traits. Comparable to FACT students 
as a whole, they show lower values in openness to experience. The indicated conservative 
and conventional personality is enriched by productive, responsible, and ethical behavior 
(higher levels of consciousness), as well as calm and objective decision-making. Taken 
together, this distinct combination of personality traits shows certain similarities with a 
“bean counter” stereotype discussed in the accounting literature (see Table 1). Indeed, 
students in financial and tax accounting tend to be honest and trustworthy. However, stu-
dents in tax accounting, especially, also show the negative side of the personality, i.e., a 
possibly duller and more boring personality (Carnegie and Napier 2010; Richardson et al. 
2015), as indicated by the significantly lower levels of extraversion. 
The observed personality does translate into the aspirations for a first job. Students inter-
ested in starting a career in tax accounting, in particular, tend to be typical bean counters. 
Their curiosity for the job seems to be driven by an interest in the technical aspects of the 
field. What looks like good news from employers’ points of view at first sight could be-
come less favorable in the long-term. Larger firms, in particular, appoint young profes-
sionals to more technical but less complex and rather repetitive tasks which require pro-
found but no expert knowledge. To advance their careers, employees need to develop 
other skills like leadership and customer acquisition and relationship management. Per-
sonality traits shown by tax accounting students, in particular, indicate that this transition 
could become very challenging. This conclusion has practical implications for students, 
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employers, and the tax profession as a whole. Students need to be aware of the require-
ments expected to advance their careers. Future tax accountants will have to offer more 
than the mere technical and regulatory aspects of the field, irrespective of their future 
work environments. Kornberger et al. (2011) show that audit firms heavily focus on ac-
quisition and customer relation skills in their partner promotion decisions. Technical ex-
perts have fewer chances to get into leadership positions. Given the close relation to audit 
firms in Germany, this notion can most likely be transferred to the tax accounting field as 
well. However, most certified tax advisors are self-employed.11 Being self-employed re-
quires technical and management skills yielding similar challenges as outlined before. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that tax advisors willing to sell their office (e.g., due to re-
tirement) struggle to find buyers. One potential explanation is the described problem to 
attract job starters who show the necessary knowledge and personality. 
Interestingly, our results indicate a different pattern for students seeking a first job in 
financial reporting or auditing. The differences in personality traits observed for the stud-
ying choice partly diminish with regard to the intention to pick a first job in this field. The 
higher number of students interested in a career as compared to the number of students 
majoring in financial accounting may explain this finding. As observed for corporate fi-
nance and managerial accounting, increased interest translates into personality traits 
closer to “average” business, management, and economics students. Put differently, the 
group of students interested in a first job in financial accounting is more diverse than for 
tax accounting. In general, audit firms and the audit profession face better chances to hire 
talents and create interest in long-term careers, as well as the professional examinations, 
when students already have started working. This may be partly attributable to the idea 
of auditing as a “stepping stone” or “qualification job.” The “Big Four” audit firms, in 
particular, advertised starting a career in auditing as a chance to get to know a broad set 
of industries and technical skills necessary to taking care of the accounting and finance 
function in other companies. This idea seems to appeal even to students outside the 
FACT-related sub-fields. Our results for the intention to pursue a professional examina-
tion provide further evidence for this notion. The share of students who are highly or very 
highly interested in an auditing or tax examination is nearly identical; but the group of 
students majoring in tax accounting or having intentions for a first job in this field is lower 
                                                 
11  Approximately 70 % of German certified tax advisors are self-employed (Bundessteuerberaterkammer 
2016). 
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than for financial accounting. Selecting oneself in a group towards one has a positive 
image and shares common attitudes, as predicted by the social identification theory, is, 
hence, more pronounced for tax accounting. However, students with high or very high 
interest in any of two professional examinations share some common personality traits: 
higher scores in consciousness and lower scores in openness to experience, indicating 
responsible and ethical behavior but conservative values and conventional judgement. 
Students interested in the auditor examination additionally score lower in neuroticism 
(calm, objective), and those interested in the tax examination lower in extraversion (in-
trovert, submissive). Most notably, we find no significant effect for agreeableness where 
lower values would indicate a more skeptical personality, a trait particularly desirable for 
auditors. Professional standards require auditors to exercise “professional skepticism,” 
that is, “[a]n attitude that includes a questioning mind, being alert to conditions which 
may indicate possible misstatement due to error or fraud, and a critical assessment of 
audit evidence” (ISA 200). However, this result does not imply that students interested in 
auditing (or the respective examination) are not skeptical, but only that they are not more 
or less skeptical than other (business) students. Adequate trainings at the university and 
firm level may compensate this effect (Hurtt 2010). Since students interested in financial 
and tax accounting tend to judge in conventional terms and are less open-minded towards 
complexities and change, it seems reasonable to develop and foster such values at early 
stages. Preparing students to deal with the ever-changing regulatory and technological 
environment they operate in would also be beneficial. 
7 Concluding Remarks 
Prior studies for US students (Wheeler 2011; Kovar et al. 2003; Swain and Olsen 2012) 
indicated the predominance of “bean counter”-like personality types for accounting stu-
dents and practitioners. Our results for German students add further modest support on 
this issue. It remains a field for future study to see whether this is an international pattern. 
However, there are some interesting points worth mentioning. Tax accounting students 
were the most distinguished group regarding their personality traits. Financial accounting 
and auditing students show modest references to the “bean counter” stereotype, which 
diminish when focusing on the decision to pick a first job in this sub-field. In contrast, 
students in managerial accounting and corporate finance mostly share the personality 
traits of other business, management, and economics students. Taken together, our results 
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support the observation by Dalton et al. (2014) that accounting students are not a homog-
enous group. Further analysis of the differences and their causes for the three sub-disci-
plines provide a fruitful area for future research. 
Furthermore, our study is subject to some limitations. First, our sample is based on data 
from one university. Socialization and the effect of deliberate choice of the university 
could induce structural differences between the students in our sample and the population 
of (business, management, and economics) students in Germany. However, our approach 
is in line with other studies which mainly focused on one university (e.g., Swain and 
Olsen 2012). To our knowledge, no further studies or official statistics on the character-
istics or major choices of German (business economics) students exist that would allow 
us to cross-check our sample. Hence, the generalizability of our results remains an open 
issue. Second, results are based on a single survey and not a repeated panel-like method-
ology. There is a strong argument that personality traits shape occupational and academic 
decisions (Ham et al. 2009; Nieken and Störmer 2010), but we are cautious about the 
causality of our results. Nevertheless, personality traits themselves tend to be time-invar-
iant, at least in the short run (Cobb-Clark and Schurrer 2012). Third, the actual validity 
of the personality constructs employed, especially conscientiousness and extraversion, is 
potentially underestimated from self-assessment (Mount et al. 1998). Additionally, pos-
sible age effects affect our results (McGrae and Costa 2003). Fourth, the observed differ-
ences diminish in the matched lectures students, which features the highest share of non-
FACT students. In conformity with the low explanatory power of our multivariate analy-
sis, this suggests that personality traits alone are a weak predictor of occupational out-
comes. Students with similar traits obviously choose different jobs. Even though the re-
ported differences are statistically significant, the magnitude of the differences is rather 
small (around one-fifth to one-fourth of a standard deviation), attributable to our rather 
homogenous sample, i.e., business, management, and economics students from one Ger-
man university. 
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Costs and Benefits of Accounting Services 
− Evidence from Europe 
 
A b s t r a c t  
We empirically analyze the benefits associated with the costs of account-
ing-related services in 18 European countries. We use the revenues earned 
from accounting-related services as an estimate of compliance costs and 
explore whether the cross-country and temporal variation of these costs is 
associated with benefits for firms (e.g., in the form of lower corporate tax 
burdens) and/or the public (e.g., through increased earnings quality). Prior 
studies focused on audit and non-audit (e.g., tax advisory) fees paid by 
listed companies. Our dataset also includes SMEs and individuals. Empir-
ical results indicate increased spending on accounting-related services is 
related to decreasing earnings quality, as measured by accrual-based earn-
ings management and real activities management. However, we find no ev-
idence that companies use discretionary spending to decrease their effec-
tive tax rates, indicating that accounting services are primarily used to com-
ply with tax laws. Country-level governance mechanisms partially mitigate 
this relation. Differences in the quality of financial reporting and tax regu-
lation do not alter the benefits from accounting-related services. We attrib-
ute these results to an increased demand in accounting advisory services to 
identify avenues for earnings management and tax planning. Additionally, 
either the advisory effect of accounting regulation supersedes the effect of 
audits, which should restrict earnings management, or companies demand 
accounting services to smooth earnings for tax purposes. 
This part of the thesis is a joint project with Thomas R. Loy.  
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1 Introduction 
Costs and benefits of regulation are a fruitful area of theoretical and empirical research in 
economics.12 However, prior research on accounting regulation focuses on (1) the effects 
of regulatory changes in single countries and (2) audit and non-audit fees of publicly listed 
corporations. Therefore, we introduce a new macro-economic perspective based on a 
novel cross-country dataset from the European Union’s statistical bureau. EuroStat pro-
vides country-level data on revenues from accounting, auditing, and tax advisory ser-
vices13, which arise during a given year. Accounting-related services are tradable goods 
exchanged between two economic subjects. Hence, money spent by a company (or indi-
vidual) on accounting-related services directly translates into revenues earned by an ac-
counting, auditing, or tax advisory firm, or a certified individual. These costs are usually 
rooted in a company’s obligation to adhere to all (tax and accounting) regulations it is 
subject to. However, companies face different incentives when using accounting-related 
services. The concept of compliance costs, as proposed by Johnston (1963), distinguishes 
between unavoidable (mandatory) and avoidable (voluntary) compliance costs. Manda-
tory compliance costs have no directly observable benefits other than conforming to leg-
islation and avoiding enforcement actions and sanctions. In contrast, companies could 
decide to voluntarily increase spending in order to achieve certain beneficial goals, e.g., 
changing earnings quality to better inform or obfuscate shareholders as well as lowering 
its corporate tax burden. We use the revenues earned from accounting-related services as 
an estimate of compliance costs and explore whether the cross-country and temporal var-
iation of these costs14 is associated with benefits for firms (e.g., in the form of lower 
corporate tax burdens) and/or the public (e.g., through increased earnings quality). 
We extend prior literature in a multitude of ways. First, small and medium-sized enter-
prises are considered as the motor of the European economy (European Union 2015). 
Therefore, focusing solely on audit and non-audit fees of publicly listed corporations 
would not properly reflect the European setting, in which Big 4 accounting firms only 
represent a comparably minor share of the total market for accounting, auditing, and tax 
                                                 
12  For an overview of the theoretical foundation, cf. den Hertog (2010), as well as Hahn and Hird (1991) 
for empirical studies. 
13  For parsimony, we refer to accounting-related services hereafter. 
14  We use the terms costs of, revenues from, and spending on accounting-related services interchangeably. 
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advisory services. For instance, while “Big 4” firms dominate the German market for 
auditing of listed firms by large margins15, they only comprise about 19% all revenues 
from accounting, auditing, and tax advisory services (Loy and Heidrich 2017).  
Second, we analyze the cross-country variation in spending on accounting-related ser-
vices. Within the European Union (EU), audit requirements are mostly harmonized re-
garding scope, professional requirements, and procedures (Directive 2006/43/EC). Con-
trariwise, tax laws remain in the discretion of EU member states (European Parliament 
2015). While audit is mandatory, accounting services and especially tax consulting are 
largely voluntary. Nevertheless, managers’ fiduciary duties result in a factual obligation 
to lower the tax burden on behalf of owners and investors. Having said that, tax research 
is uncertain about the extent of costs of tax compliance. It mainly builds on firm-level, 
small-N survey results (for a literature review, e.g., Eichfelder and Vaillancourt 2014). 
As such, like archival public firm audit fee research, it fails to consider the full range of 
costs paid for by listed and private firms as well as individual taxpayers. Hence, the EU 
provides a unique setting to assess macro-economic and industry-specific factors associ-
ated with the level of compliance costs.  
Third, we explore the benefits of accounting regulation and, as such, of committing re-
sources into financial reporting and tax planning. These likely are twofold. On the one 
hand, better financial reporting reduces information asymmetries through increased earn-
ings quality for a wide range of stakeholders, including employees, suppliers, and share-
holders. On the other hand, firms benefit from improved tax planning and, ultimately, 
their owners and shareholders through lowering the corporate tax burden. Tax avoidance 
by individuals as well corporations is well studied (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010). Yet, we 
explore the country-level association of demand for accounting, auditing, and tax con-
sulting services on average tax savings by all firms in the economy. 
Fourth, we investigate whether companies engage in real activities and accrual-based 
earnings management. Prior literature on private firms primarily focused on the latter 
                                                 
15  German “Big 4” firms audit between 79 % (2010) and 89 % (2015) of German index constituents. In 
addition, their market share in all stock market listed clients increased from 64 % (2010) to 68 % (2015). 
However, in terms of revenues from accounting, auditing, and tax advisory, the “Big 4” account for 
only 18.0 % (5,030m €) of the market. Second tier firms (top 5 to 25, Lünendonk 2015) cover 4.7 % 
(€ 1,322m) of the market, leaving 77.2 % (€ 21.547m) of the overall revenues (€ 27.898m) in 2014 to 
other small and medium-sized accounting, auditing, and tax advisory firms or individuals. 
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(e.g., Burgstahler et al. 2006). In light of stricter regulation or other governance mecha-
nisms, companies may refrain from accrual-based measures and switch to real activity 
management, which faces less scrutiny from auditors or regulators. Such behavior is well 
documented for listed companies (Graham et al. 2005; Zang 2012). In addition, we further 
build upon and extend the financial economics literature (e.g., Leuz et al. 2003) by exam-
ining the link between country-level governance and real activities management. 
As mentioned before, costs associated with accounting, audit, and tax legislation are 
mainly compliance costs; hence, the necessary knowledge and infrastructure to meet legal 
obligations (Sandford et al. 1989). Hahn and Hird (1991) further divide regulatory costs 
into transfer payments and changes in net surplus. The former includes wealth transfers 
from losers to profiteers of a piece of regulation; the latter, changes in economic effi-
ciency. Costs and benefits of accounting, audit, and tax rules – on the market as well as 
the firm level – are difficult to estimate (e.g., Ahmed et al. 2013; Brüggemann et al. 2013). 
Therefore, our study focuses on transfer payments from companies and individuals, 
which are subject to these rules, to specialized service providers as well as the aforemen-
tioned benefits for firms and society associated with these payments. In contrast to prior 
studies, our dataset does not rely on estimates but actual revenues earned through man-
datory financial statement audits or tax advisory services necessary to comply with or 
maximize benefits from tax regulation. 
To examine the relationship between the costs and potential benefits of accounting-re-
lated services, we use two different measurement approaches. First, the share of revenues 
from accounting-related services as a percentage of GDP (RevShare). This measure cap-
tures the economic importance of accounting and auditing services in each country. 
Higher regulatory requirements (e.g., extended mandatory audit requirements) or more 
complex regulation (e.g., tax system) may increase the reliance on external advice. To 
isolate country-specific effects, which are not driven by general trends in the economic 
environment, we introduce our second measure. The discretionary or unexpected part of 
revenues from accounting services (RevUnexp) is calculated in a fashion similar to a 
cross-sectional discretionary accrual model, with the level and change in economic de-
velopment as explanatory factors. 
Costs of accounting-related services vary between US $5.39 in Estonia and US $12.76 
per US $1m of GDP in the Netherlands. We hypothesize that the degree to which com-
panies benefit from accounting-related services varies with the country-level spending on 
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those services. Furthermore, drawing from the financial economics literature, we expect 
that these benefits are mitigated by country-level governance mechanisms as well as the 
quality of accounting and tax regulation. To capture the broad array of potential incentives 
and implementation forms with regard to accounting-related services, we employ three 
different measures for the potential benefits: (1) accrual-based earnings management 
measured by discretionary accruals, (2) real activities management estimated by abnor-
mal cash flows, and (3) taxation operationalized by the difference between companies’ 
effective and statutory tax rates. 
Our results show a significantly negative relation between (discretionary) spending on 
accounting-related services and earnings quality. However, lower earnings quality does 
not translate into lower tax rates. This primary results indicate that firms use accrual-
based earnings as well as real activities management to create a less bumpy, smoother 
earnings path. This result is in line with prior literature highlighting the different financial 
reporting and tax incentives of private companies as opposed to listed firms (e.g., 
Burgstahler et al. 2006; Gassen and Fülbier 2015). Furthermore, we find modest evidence 
on the mitigating effect of country-level governance mechanisms on the relation between 
spending on accounting-related services and earnings quality. Contrariwise, higher qual-
ity financial reporting and taxation systems have virtually no effect. Our results are robust 
to alternative specifications of the dependent variables as well as tests for endogeneity. 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 contains a short outline of the differences 
in accounting and tax legislation in the European Union (EU) as well as a theoretical 
framework on the classification and measure of compliance costs. Section 3 develops 
hypotheses. We describe our data and research design in Section 4. Sections 5 and 6 con-
tain the results of our empirical models and robustness checks. Section 7 concludes. 
2 Background 
2.1 Regulation of Accounting, Auditing, and Tax requirements in the EU 
Since 1978, accounting requirements for incorporated companies have been harmonized 
in the EU. As all European companies operate within the European Single Market, the 
harmonization of accounting requirements should enhance the exchange of information 
for cross-border economic activities and establish a level-playing field with regard to the 
legal framework companies are subject to (Directive 78/660/EC, preface; Van Hulle 
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1992). Hence, mandatory requirements are much more exhaustive than in other areas of 
the world (e.g., the United States, cf. Hope and Vyas 2016; Hope et al. 2017). This pecu-
liarity accounts for the distinguished importance of small- and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) in the EU. SMEs account for 67% of the employment and 58% of the total value 
added in the EU28 countries (European Commission 2015). For this reason, the regula-
tory framework for SMEs became one of the cornerstones for European policymaking in 
recent years. The Small Business Act for Europe, in particular, follows a "think small 
first" approach. It aims at cutting red tape and decreasing regulatory costs for SMEs which 
might hinder entrepreneurship.16 The most recent changes in the accounting legislation 
can also be seen in this light. One example of reduced regulation is increased audit ex-
emption thresholds effective for fiscal years beginning January 1, 2016 and following 
Directive 2013/34/EU (FEE 2016). 
The fourth (78/660/EEC) and seventh (83/349/EEC) directives state the minimum re-
quirements for accounting principles, measurement bases, and disclosure of single and 
consolidated financial statements, respectively.17 All incorporated companies must man-
datorily prepare financial statements. The scope differs with respect to a company's size. 
Since EU directives are not self-executing, they must be implemented by member states 
to be rightfully adopted. In this process, member states possess direct (member state op-
tions) and indirect leeway on how to achieve a directive’s goals. In the case of accounting 
requirements, the criteria for size classes (small, medium-sized, and large entities)18 vary 
between countries to account for regional differences in economic development. Besides 
these obvious differences, the requirements draw substantially different interpretations 
between countries. Alexander (1993) as well as Alexander and Eberhartinger (2009), for 
example, document a broad continuum of interpretations of the overriding importance of 
the true and fair view principle in the fourth directive. One notable explanation are dif-
ferences in functions attributed to financial reporting. In many common law-countries, 
financial statements are closely tied to legal consequences (e.g., insolvency, distribution 
of profits) and are even used for the determination of taxable profits (so-called contracting 
or stewardship purpose). In case law countries, financial statements are oftentimes solely 
                                                 
16  For further information, cf. https://goo.gl/rIjUkl. 
17  Both directives have been combined and replaced by directive 2013/34/EU. The new accounting di-
rective had to be implemented by member states until July of 2015. We do not discuss the changes since 
our sample period does only comprise years up to 2014. 
18  Directive 2012/6/EU introduced “micro entities” as a fourth category below the small enterprises. Mem-
ber states have an option to further exempt these entities from certain disclosure requirements. 
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prepared for information purposes of stockholders (and stakeholders) (Bushman et al. 
2006; Gassen and Fülbier 2015). 
Contrariwise, the reporting requirements for listed firms were standardized by the IAS 
regulation (Regulation 1606/2002), with no member state discretion regarding scope and 
content of disclosures. Despite these efforts, the actual reporting behavior of firms still 
differs due to discretion within the accounting standards, differences in accounting tradi-
tions, as well as other institutional settings between countries (Nobes 1998; Nobes 2006; 
Nobes 2011; Daske et al. 2013). 
Auditing requirements are subject to European legislation and harmonization, too. The 
aforementioned accounting directives state mandatory audit requirements for medium-
sized and large companies. Member states possess the option to extend this requirement 
to small companies. Furthermore, directive 2006/43/EC ("auditor directive") contains re-
quirements regarding the necessary qualification of auditors as well as auditing standards 
and procedures.  
Despite the documented shortcomings, we observe a relatively harmonized picture for the 
regulation of accounting and auditing requirements in the European Union. In contrast, 
tax legislation mostly remained within the jurisdiction of the single member states (Eu-
ropean Union 2014). Hence, in this "no taxation thesis," the EU has no genuine or direct 
tax sources and member states mostly retained autonomy. Low-tax countries and the new, 
mostly Eastern European member states, in particular, display little interest in tax harmo-
nization (Wasserfallen 2014). However, even though there is no primary European tax 
legislation in existence, many secondary acts restrict and govern member states' formula-
tions of tax rules. Genschel and Jachtenfuchs (2011) document more than 120 secondary 
acts (regulations, directives, and decisions of the European Court of Justice) with regard 
to tax policy between 1998 and 2007. In conclusion, tax legislation is also somewhat 
harmonized in the EU, but to a lesser extent than accounting and auditing requirements.  
2.2 Compliance Costs 
2.2.1 Theoretical Framework 
There are two potential sources why companies would engage in spending on accounting-
related services. First, an entrepreneur will need accounting-based information to evaluate 
whether and to what extent his expectations of profitable economic activity have been 
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fulfilled. This “exchange guidance demand” (Waymire 2009) even exists in the absence 
of any regulatory requirement. Second, companies may require professional assistance 
for complying with rules and regulations. Sandford (1989) defines these compliance costs 
as “those costs incurred by taxpayers, or by third parties such as businesses, in meeting 
the requirements laid upon them in complying with a given tax structure” (p. 10).19 These 
encompass any costs associated with the preparation of tax returns, gathering, and pro-
cessing the relevant data, as well as calculating taxes on products or profits. Less obvious 
costs are wages and salaries of the personnel employed for these tasks as well as addi-
tional overhead costs for IT systems or storage.  
Compliance costs of tax systems result from four main sources (cf. Eichfelder and Vail-
lancourt 2014). First, a main component is the complexity of the tax system (e.g., the 
number of taxes, frequency of tax law changes, number of tax rates). Second, administra-
tive behavior (e.g., the reliability of administrative statements, availability of tax office 
staff for advising tax payers) is a further, often underestimated, component. Third, the 
need for business and self-employed persons to compute their own tax liabilities leads to 
complex issues surrounding tax accounting. This is even more pronounced in jurisdictions 
without a link between tax and financial accounting. Fourth, international tax issues (e.g., 
transfer pricing, double tax treaties) add another layer of complexity. 
Johnston (1963) further divides compliance costs into unavoidable (mandatory) and 
avoidable (voluntary or discretionary) costs. The former are costs necessary to comply 
with rules and regulations, whereas the latter are additional costs incurred for actions to 
minimize tax payments. While theoretically appealing, it is difficult to strictly disentangle 
compliance costs by those standards (Sandford 1989). It may be possible to separate the 
act of calculating tax expenses and filling the respective returns. However, management 
has the fiduciary duty to minimize tax payments, which requires additional actions (and 
costs). From this point of view, tax compliance (and advisory) costs are mostly voluntary 
in nature but unavoidable in a business sense. A similar reasoning applies to accounting-
related costs and services. Albeit, some costs, like the fee for mandatory audits, are una-
voidable, with companies keeping discretion with regard to earnings management and 
engaging in window dressing or impression management activities, which are also costly. 
                                                 
19  Even though this definition and the following primarily focus on tax compliance costs, we see no reason 
why those should not apply to accounting regulation, too. From economic and legal stands, both areas 
are closely related. 
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Moreover, compliance costs consist of two parts: (1) internal (e.g., in-house time effort) 
and (2) external (e.g., audit and consulting fees) costs (Eichfelder and Vaillancourt 2014). 
Companies face a make-or-buy decision in handling these costs (Coase 1937). Smaller 
companies may strictly rely on external advisors, as this is more cost-efficient than build-
ing up and maintaining the knowledge, systems, and human resources to comply with 
regulatory requirements. Yet, larger companies also might face similar considerations 
when accounting-related tasks reach a certain threshold. In these cases, companies may 
choose to centralize accounting-related functions, e.g., in shared service centers. Central-
ized accounting functions – organized as profit or cost centers (Robinson et al. 2010) – 
can then be transferred to foreign locations (offshoring) or sold to an external service 
provider (outsourcing). Furthermore, in most cases, companies will not be able to hold 
expert-level knowledge in all specialized topics of tax and accounting regulation. Demand 
for accounting-related advisory services will, hence, arise with increased size and com-
plexity of operations (Dunbar and Phillips 2001). Mergers and acquisitions as well as 
foreign subsidiaries, investments, and trade relationships are notable examples. 
In a broader economic sense, all costs incurred through the outsourcing of accounting-
related services are “transfer payments” from companies as losers of accounting and tax 
regulation to accounting, auditing, and tax advisory firms as beneficiaries of the same 
rules (Hahn and Hird 1991). However, this redistribution of profits does not indicate 
whether accounting and tax legislation or the respective regulatory costs incurred by com-
panies outweigh potential benefits. The estimation of costs, let alone “net changes in eco-
nomic efficiency,” is difficult, as outlined in the following section. 
2.2.2 Measurement 
The empirical measurement of compliance costs faces two major challenges. First, the 
conceptual difficulty to determine the nature of “true” or “actual” compliance costs, as 
laid out before. Second, neither companies nor individuals need to account for or disclose 
costs related to tax and accounting requirements. However, in the United States as well 
as in the EU, certain disclosure requirements grant partial insights. Namely, listed com-
panies in the United States, as well as listed and all large private companies in the Euro-
pean Union (Art. 18, Directive 2013/34/EU), must disclose audit and non-audit fees paid 
to the auditor of the statutory audit. Focusing on these fees would provide a misleading 
picture for several reasons. First, the majority of companies (i.e., SMEs) would not be 
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covered. Second, listed and large companies are, by definition, larger and more complex 
than the average SME. Third, the disclosed amounts most likely do not fully cover fees 
paid for accounting-related services. Large firms may also employ firms other than their 
auditor to fulfill accounting-related services, especially since auditors are prohibited from 
providing certain services (e.g., tax advisory) to audit clients (Maijoor and Vanstraelen 
2012). Fourth, any information on the internal costs of accounting compliance is missing. 
As such, it is not surprising that prior literature mainly focused on theoretical considera-
tions regarding accounting-related costs. In general, research determines two main drivers 
of financial transparency costs (Lang and Maffett 2010). First, the adoption of interna-
tional, more transparent, and comparable financial reporting standards (i.e., IFRS), which 
are regularly associated with additional and more detailed disclosures. Second, higher 
audit quality is associated with increased audit fees (Hay et al. 2013). Evidence on the 
actual costs of compliance with higher quality accounting standards is rather scarce. Some 
national standard setters provide survey evidence regarding the one-off implementation 
costs as well as the continuous costs of IFRS adoption (Financial Executives International 
and Canadian Financial Executives Research Foundation 2013; Korea Accounting Stand-
ards Board 2015; Australian Accounting Standards Board 2016). Other studies address 
the costs of IFRS adoption by focusing on changes in audit fees at the time of adoption 
(Griffin et al. 2009; Kim et al. 2012; De George et al. 2013). Another approach focuses 
on companies’ cost avoidance behavior towards regulatory changes. Leuz (2007) docu-
ments a spike in delisting decisions (“going dark”) at the time of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
which featured increases in compliance and disclosure requirements, hence, increasing 
the costs of a public listing. Similar effects are assumed around the mandatory adoption 
of IFRS (Brüggemann et al. 2013).20 
Studies on tax compliance usually rely on small sample surveys (Eichfelder and Vaillan-
court 2014). While this approach offers the advantage to gain insights on the internal and 
external costs associated with tax requirements, the results cover only a small fraction of 
firms, which makes it difficult to draw generalizable conclusions. 
                                                 
20  In a recent working paper, Hitz and Müller-Bloch (2016) provide evidence that enforcement actions are 
another potential cause for going dark decisions. Gutierrez et al. (2017) further substantiate these results 
for a sample of 18 IFRS adoption countries. In line with the results by Hitz and Müller-Bloch (2016), 
delisting decisions are especially pronounced in countries with strong enforcement regimes. However, 
companies may not completely delist but switch to market segments with lower regulatory requirements 
and lower costs (“going grey”), e.g., Leuz et al. (2008). 
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Taken together, prior literature on accounting- and audit-related costs mainly focused on 
listed companies. This is most likely due to the limited data availability for private com-
panies. Research on tax compliance costs took a different stance by directly surveying 
companies on their respective costs (e.g., tax advisory, staff). This approach allows SMEs 
but is restricted to smaller samples. Large scale evidence on the overall economic impact 
and importance of externally provided accounting-related services as well as the nature 
of those costs – mandatory to comply with rules and regulations or voluntary to achieve 
company objectives with regard to tax and accounting outcomes – is, to the best of our 
knowledge, missing.  
3 Hypothesis Development 
Extant literature on earnings management (for a review, cf. Healy and Wahlen 1999) and 
corporate tax avoidance (for a review, cf. Hanlon and Heitzman 2010) stipulates that firms 
have incentives to commit internal and external resources (i.e., accounting, auditing, and 
tax consulting services) to influence the accounting “bottom line” (e.g., earnings, taxes 
payable). For instance, European private and public firms alike shift profits onto subsid-
iaries based in tax havens to lower their effective tax burdens (Jaafar and Thornton 2015), 
with much public blame also directed at large audit firms which provide a number of 
additional non-audit services, such as tax advisory (Finley and Stekelberg 2016). Hence, 
higher spending on accounting-related services should be associated with more compli-
cated tax structures and potentially decreasing auditor independence, which might impair 
the public good of trust in financial reporting. Unsurprisingly, a number of studies find a 
negative association between abnormal accruals (e.g., Frankel et al. 2002) as well as go-
ing-concern opinions (e.g., Kao et al. 2014) with larger fee dependence. 
On the other hand, there is ample evidence on a positive knowledge spillover between 
non-audit services and audit quality in general, and related to tax advisory services in 
particular (e.g., Christensen et al. 2015; Krishnan and Visvanathan 2011). This suggests 
that knowledge-spillovers from offering an increased range of services might supersede 
potentially negative effects of decreased independence associated with collecting higher 
fees. Considering the case of SMEs, external service providers are mainly independent of 
the clients’ internal demands for accounting information and, hence, less likely to engage 
in earnings management activities which show up when handling routine (accounting) 
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tasks. Besides any discretionary behavior, external service providers supply the necessary 
skills to efficiently fulfill the tasks required for compliance. A comparable reasoning ap-
plies to accounting-related expert knowledge purchased for extremely complex and non-
recurring transactions (e.g., M&A actitives). Recent evidence does indeed suggest that 
small companies, which outsourced their accounting activities, provide high-quality earn-
ings (Höglund and Sundvik 2016). However, which theory finally prevails on a country-
level comes down to an empirical question. Hence, we form the following non-directional 
hypotheses: 
H1a: Earnings quality is related to the level of spending on accounting-related services. 
H1b:  Tax expenses are related to the level of spending on accounting-related services. 
Recently, a line of literature emerged which goes beyond the effects of firm-level gov-
ernance in accounting. On the one hand, in a low investor protection and legal enforce-
ment environment, firms benefit from committing more resources into financial reporting 
to send a credible signal to stakeholders in general, and capital providers in particular 
(Doidge et al. 2007). This association is likely most pronounced for financially con-
strained firms that do not have access to the equity capital market and are subject to large 
information asymmetries between outside lenders and entrenched owner-managers (i.e., 
private firms; Hope et al. 2011). The weaker the country-level enforcement mechanisms, 
the more heavily high-quality owner-managers have to invest in third party independent 
financial auditing just to be able to send a costly signal differentiating themselves from 
low quality owner-managers. Indicative of this, higher audit fees are oftentimes regarded 
as increased audit effort and use of specialist auditor and, thus, a sign of higher audit 
quality (Bell et al. 2008). 
On the other hand, in a high enforcement and litigation environment it is beneficial to 
commit more resources to comply with this extensive regulation out of self-preservation. 
As outlined before, spending on accounting-related services is equal to external compli-
ance costs of accounting and tax regulation. Therefore, our estimates are closer to the 
lower bound of the total costs, as we have no direct measure of internal compliance cost. 
However, if rules and their enforcement are stricter in the first place, this in itself raises 
compliance cost. Which theory prevails remains an empirical question. Based on the in-
conclusive theoretical predictions, we form two non-directional hypotheses: 
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H2a:  The relation between earnings quality and spending on accounting-related ser-
vices is mitigated by country-level governance. 
H2b:  The relation between tax expenses and spending on accounting-related services 
is mitigated by country-level governance. 
Numerous studies exhibit positive capital market implications of IFRS adoption in Eu-
rope (for a meta-analysis, Ahmed et al. 2013). Since 2005, the application of IFRS is 
mandatory for publicly listed firms. Yet, newer evidence shows that accounting harmo-
nization in and of itself does not, a priori, contribute to these positive effects (Daske et 
al. 2013). Specifically, these effects are likely attributable to firm-level correlates related 
to corporate governance and reporting incentives, such as, but not limited to, the im-
portance of equity financing, audit quality, and analyst following. Moreover, Christensen 
et al. (2013) exhibit that country-level governance, with a focus on accounting enforce-
ment for publicly listed companies, is equally important. Thus, the literature on the de-
mand for accounting transparency and its contributing factors mainly focuses on listed 
firms. 
In contrast, private firms, which constitute the larger and more important part of the Eu-
ropean economy, are attributable to a different set of stakeholder demands for transpar-
ency (i.e., prevalence of arm’s length debt financing and little separation of ownership 
and control; e.g., Gassen and Fülbier 2015). Hence, private firms presumably invest less 
in accounting-related matters. However, in contrast to the United States, a large propor-
tion of European private firms is subject to extensive audit requirements (Hope et al. 
2013). As a result, European private firms also demand audit as well as tax advisory ser-
vices, much like their publicly listed counterparts. Notwithstanding some relaxation of 
financial reporting and audit duties for smaller private firms, the bulk of the costs associ-
ated with financial and tax regulation is independent of relative wealth or size (Bradford 
2004). Contrariwise, accounting and tax requirements are harmonized to a different ex-
tent, allowing for variation between countries and between both legal frames. In response 
to divergence regarding the quality, complexity, and enforcement of accounting and tax 
regulations, companies may face different incentives (see above) to devote resources to 
either function. Prior evidence suggests that the strength of the national tax enforcement 
regime as well as features of the taxation system influence the degree of tax avoidance 
(Atwood et al. 2012). Furthermore, an aggressive tax policy (e.g., measured through 
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book-tax differences) could be a signal that a company heavily relies on earnings man-
agement, which could be a concern for auditors (Kuo and Lee 2016). Assuming an effec-
tive financial reporting regime, such indication should, ceteris paribus, lead to higher 
audit fees. To account for these dissimilarities and interdependencies, we form the fol-
lowing two non-directional hypotheses: 
H3a:  The impact of spending on accounting-related services varies with the quality of 
financial reporting regulation. 
H3b:  The impact of spending on accounting-related services varies with the quality of 
the taxation system. 
4 Research Design 
4.1 Data and Sample 
In order to derive our variable of interest, the spending on accounting-related services, 
we cannot refer to firm-level data due to the restrictions in data availability outlined in 
Section 2.2.2. Since the buying companies’ costs are always the supplying companies’ 
revenues, we estimate the spending on accounting-related services by the aggregate rev-
enues and fees earned by accounting, auditing, and tax advisory companies. Our variable 
of interest, the actual revenues earned from accounting, auditing, and tax advisory ser-
vices, is based on official European government statistics (EuroStat (NACE Rev. 2 Code 
M6920). EuroStat collects this data for all EU member states, associated countries (e.g., 
Norway and Switzerland), and potential member states (e.g., Turkey). Our sample is lim-
ited to the years 2008 to 2014 in which data for the accounting industry is available.21 
EuroStat’s classification of revenues is based on a company’s primary industry. Many 
accounting, auditing, and tax advisory firms offer general business consulting services as 
additional businesses. These non-accounting revenues could potentially bias our results. 
However, we have no reason to believe that the share of non-accounting services offered 
by accounting firms varies in an unsystematic manner between countries or years. We are 
therefore confident that the scaling and fixed-effects approaches described below are suf-
ficient controls for this effect.  
                                                 
21  Before 2008, statistics were aggregated by NACE Rev. 1 in which revenues from accounting, auditing, 
and tax advisory services were combined with those from the legal industry. 
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We collect data for our country-level variables from a variety of sources. Economic data 
(GDP, population) is from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database. 
Since data from EuroStat (€) and the World Bank (US $) comes in different currencies, 
we convert all nominal money amounts to US dollars, using the last available exchange 
rate for each year in the International Monetary Fund’s exchange rate database.22 From 
the World Bank’s World Governance Indicator database, we collect data on country level 
governance as well as the complexity of the tax systems. The absolute value of state tax 
revenues is from EuroStat. Statutory tax rates are from European Commission (2016), 
and information on a link between commercial and tax financial statements as well as 
audit requirements and respective exemptions are from the European Commission (2009). 
For all parameters used to estimate the firm-level measures (e.g., earnings management), 
we refer to Bureau van Dijk’s Amadeus database. We start with the complete universe of 
company-years in each country and drop all firm-year observations for which at least one 
financial items required for our research design is missing. All variables are winsorized 
at the 5 and 95%-level, respectively. 
Overall, EuroStat contains data for 33 countries and the revenues from accounting, audit, 
and tax advisory services for 28 countries. Due to constraints in the data availability in 
the necessary additional sources and the firm-level data in the Amadeus database, our 
final sample consists of 19 countries and 126 country-year observations.23 Panel B of 
Table 20 contains a breakdown of countries and country-year observations, respectively. 
4.2 Measuring the Costs of Accounting-related Services 
We employ two measures for the costs of accounting-related services. As mentioned be-
fore, accounting-related services are a tradable good exchanged between two economic 
subjects. Hence, money spent by a company (or individual) on accounting related services 
directly translates into revenues earned by an accounting, auditing, or tax advisory firm, 
or certified individual. In reverse, we assume that all revenues earned by accounting, au-
diting, or tax advisory firms are from accounting-related services. Even if we 
                                                 
22  Available online: https://goo.gl/GNRQuR.  
23  For France and Sweden, one country-year observation is missing at the beginning or end of our sample 
period, respectively. With six years each, the continuous time-series is still sufficiently long. We 
dropped Luxembourg from the sample since the country’s fee structure was severely different from any 
other country. For Luxembourg, the share of revenues from accounting-related services to Gross Do-
mestic Product (GDP) is more than three-times as high as the sample average and more than double the 
amount of the country with the second-highest share (Netherlands). 
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acknowledge that the largest accounting firms (e.g., the “Big Four”) are constantly 
strengthening their consulting practices and evolving into multi-business professional ser-
vice firms (Nordenflycht 2010), most of the respective services should be based on ac-
counting, auditing, and tax advisory or related to these areas (e.g., compliance, proper IT 
systems). Nonetheless, a potentially (unobservable) higher share of not accounting-re-
lated services (e.g., operations or strategic consulting) would undermine our basic line of 
thought and, hence, work against any findings. 
Our first measure for the costs of accounting-related services is their share in relation to 
GDP (RevShare). It is defined as: 
𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑 = 𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑−1 ∙ 1,000,000 (6) 
with Revenues being the revenues from accounting, auditing, and tax-advisory services 
in country i in year t. GDPit-1 is lagged gross domestic product. By scaling, we account 
for an observable size effect.24 We use lagged GDP since accounting services, e.g., the 
preparation of tax returns and annual reports or audits, must be deferred until the year is 
complete and, hence, relate to the prior year. For ease of interpretation, we multiply the 
term by one million such that it is Euros spent on accounting-related services per one 
million Euros of GDP. 
Whereas RevShare varies between countries (Figure 1), it is comparatively stable over 
time. To further exploit the cross-country and time-series variation in the accounting and 
tax regulation, we introduce a second measure. RevUnexp is the discretionary or unex-
pected share of revenues from accounting-related services. The intuition behind this 
measure is as follows: As outlined before, companies have a basic demand in accounting 
information and, hence, accounting-related services. From a macro perspective, this de-
mand should mainly depend on the level of and the change in economic prosperity of a 
country. This notion translates into the following cross-country regressions: 
𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑−1 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1 ∙ 1𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑−1 + 𝛽𝛽1 ∙ 𝑜𝑜𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑−1 
+𝛽𝛽2 ∙ ∆𝑜𝑜𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑/𝑑𝑑−1𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑−1 + 𝜀𝜀 
(7) 
                                                 
24  Using current year GDP would not alter our results. In our sample, the Pearson correlation between 
revenues from accounting-related services and GDP is 0.97 for the current as well as prior year. 
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To obtain the country-year specific unexpected revenues from accounting-related ser-
vices, expected revenues, calculated based on the coefficients from regression (7), are 
deducted from the actual revenues. This methodology is similar to the estimation of dis-
cretionary accruals in the earnings management literature (e.g., Jones 1991).  
The average coefficients from the seven yearly regressions are reported in Table 18. Most 
notably, the variation in the share of revenues, based on the population, is mainly influ-
enced by the level of wealth and economic development, as the strongly significant coef-
ficient for GDPt/Populationt-1 suggests. The relation between GDPt and total Populationt 
(GDP per capita) is the common measure for economic development and growth in the 
(financial) economics literature. Wealthier and growing economies have better institu-
tions but are also more complex (Levine 2005). Hence, we expect that revenues from 
accounting services are tied to a country’s economic development. To align our model 
with the lagged value of GDP per capita and its year-to-year change, we include a scaled 
intercept (1/Populationt-1) and divide the dependent variable by lagged population. The 
estimation model seems to be well fitted as it, on average, explains approximately 74% 
of the yearly cross-country variation in the dependent variable. Positive (negative) dis-
cretionary values for the unexpected revenues measure indicate abnormally high (low) 
costs, which could be due to changing incentives of the average firm and/or individual 
Table 18: 
Estimation results for the measure of unexpected revenues  
from accounting-related services 
Table depicts the average results from the following yearly OLS regressions: 𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑−1 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1 1𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑−1 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑜𝑜𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑−1 + 𝛽𝛽2 ∆𝑜𝑜𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑/𝑑𝑑−1𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑−1 + 𝜀𝜀 
The regressions was performed for each year in the sample period. Coefficients, t-statistics and p-values 
are the mean value for the seven-year period. Revenuest are the revenues earned from accounting, auditing 
and tax advisory services in a country. Populationt-1 is total population at beginning of the year in one 
country. GDPt is the gross domestic product for each country. The error term (ε) is referred to as RevUnexp 
in subsequent analysis. ***, ** and * denotes significance at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level, respectively. 
  Coefficient  t-Statistic  p-Value 
        
1/Populationt-1  -119.86159   -1.023  0.3324 
GDPt/Populationt-1  0.00022 ***  5.156  0.0009 
Δ(GDPt/t-1/Populationt-1)  0.00000   0.300  0.5957 
constant  -0.00197 ***  -4.513  0.0019 
        
        
N  18 
R²  0.787 
adj. R²  0.742 
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with regard to their earnings or tax strategy. Other potential causes are regulatory changes 
or unexpected changes in the economic environment. 
4.3 Measuring the Benefits of Accounting-related Services 
In order to analyze the potential benefits of spending on accounting-related services, we 
use a broad set of indicators to disentangle the effects of accounting, auditing, and tax 
advisory services, which are entangled in the dependent variable. Accounting-based in-
dicators are different sets of accrual-based earnings and real activities management 
measures. Prior literature is inconclusive as to whether higher audit fees increase or de-
crease earnings quality (see above). Furthermore, the role of tax advisors with respect to 
earnings quality has yet to be examined. If tax advisors simply help their clients to cut 
through the regulatory fog and comply with law and regulations, one would expect a 
slightly positive relation with earnings quality – if any. Contrariwise, if (tax) advisory 
services are used to help fulfill management’s (earnings) goals, a higher accounting-re-
lated cost should lower earnings quality and tax expenses, alike.  
First, to measure the extent of accrual-based earnings management, we refer to a coun-
try’s yearly mean value of absolute discretionary accruals (|DAcc|). Following DeFond 
and Jiambalvo (1994), we apply a cross-sectional model and calculate discretionary ac-
cruals as the difference between a company’s total accruals and “expected” accruals based 
on the following industry-year regression: 
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑−1 = 𝛽𝛽1 ∙ 1𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑−1 + 𝛽𝛽2 ∙
∆𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑,𝑑𝑑−1 − ∆𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑,𝑑𝑑−1𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑−1 + 𝛽𝛽3 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑−1 + 𝜀𝜀 (8) 
The accrual component (total accruals, TACC) is calculated on the firm-level following 
Dechow et al. (1995): 
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑 = (∆𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑 − ∆𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑) − (∆𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑 − ∆𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑 − ∆𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑) − 𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑 (9) 
With ΔCAit = change in current assets of firm i in period t, δCashit = change in cash and 
cash equivalents, ΔCLit = change in current liabilities, ΔTPit = change in taxes payable, 
and Depit = depreciation and amortization. Due to data restraints, current liabilities do not 
include short-term provisions. The amount of tax payable is not available in the Amadeus 
database. Therefore, we assume these positions to be zero. The other variables are defined 
as follows: Δrevt,t-1 and Δrect,t-1 = year-to-year change in revenues and trade receivables, 
respectively, and PPEt = book value of property, plant, and equipment (fixed assets). The 
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intercept and all values are scaled by one-year lagged total assets (At-1). Industries are 
defined based on two-digit SIC codes. We require a minimum of six observations per 
industry and year.  
Second, we estimate real earnings management based on abnormal cash flows from op-
erations (Roychowdhury 2006; Cohen et al. 2008). |abCFO| is the residual from the fol-
lowing industry-year regressions based on two-digit SIC codes with a minimum of six 
observations: 
CFOitAit−1 = β0 + β1 ∙ 1Ait−1 + β2 ∙ RevitAit−1 + β2 ∙
∆Revit,t−1Ait−1 + εt (10) 
With Revit = sales (revenues), Ait = total assets and CFOit = Cash flow from operations 
calculated indirectly by subtracting the accrual component (TACC) from operating in-
come. Operating income is defined as net income before taxes, financial result, and spe-
cial items. 
Third, as our tax-related measure, we use the difference between the statutory tax rate of 
the country in which a company is residing and its effective corporate tax rate (TaxDiff). 
To calculate TaxDiff, we subtract the effective tax rate from the yearly top statutory cor-
porate income tax for each country as reported by the European Commission (2016). The 
effective corporate tax rate is defined as the tax expenses divided by pretax income 
(Dyreng et al. 2008). 
4.4 Model Specifications 
The standard model applied in the following analysis features the measures for the poten-
tial benefits of accounting-related services as the dependent variable and is defined as 
follows: 
𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 ∙ 𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑 + 𝛽𝛽2 ∙ 𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑 × 𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑+ � 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 ∙ 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝑗𝑗 + 𝛽𝛽4 ∙ 𝑜𝑜𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐺𝐺𝑑𝑑ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+ � 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘 ∙ 𝑌𝑌𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑 + 𝜀𝜀 
(11) 
with Benefitit = one of accrual-based and real earnings management or tax-related 
measures for country i in year t, Costsit = the share or unexpected fraction of revenues 
from accounting-related services, Govit = mean value of z-transformed World Govern-
ance Indicators from the World Bank, and FirmControlj = country-year mean value of 
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five firm-level control variables which control for differences in firm characteristics 
across countries and years (Burgstahler et al. 2006). Firm-level controls comprise (1) Size, 
the natural logarithm of total assets, (2) RoA, the return on assets (profitability) measured 
as operating income divided by lagged total assets, (3) Lev, the relation of non-current 
liabilities to the sum of equity and non-current liabilities, (4) Growth, the year-to-year 
change in revenues divided by lagged revenues, and (5) Cycle, the length of the operating 
cycle measured in days.25 All regressions include year-fixed effects.  
The interaction term Costsit × Govit shows the incremental effect of higher-level govern-
ance on the relation between spending on accounting-related services and the benefits. It 
is only included in the regression aiming to test H2a and H2b.  
To further distinguish between the potentially differing effects of accounting and tax reg-
ulation in the test for H3a and H3b, we disaggregate Govit into two submeasures, which 
capture the varying effects of accounting and tax regulations between countries and over 
time. The extended model reads: 
𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 ∙ 𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑 + 𝛽𝛽2 ∙ 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑 + 𝛽𝛽3 ∙ 𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑  + 𝛽𝛽4 ∙ 𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑× 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑 + 𝛽𝛽5 ∙ 𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑 × 𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑 + � 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 ∙ 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝑗𝑗        + 𝛽𝛽6 ∙ 𝑜𝑜𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐺𝐺𝑑𝑑ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽7 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + � 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘 ∙ 𝑌𝑌𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑 + 𝜀𝜀 
(12) 
FinRepit is the z-transformed value of the measure for financial reporting quality used by 
the World Economic Forum (2015). Precisely, businessmen were asked how they assess 
the quality of financial reporting in their countries of origin. Higher values indicate a 
higher perceived financial reporting quality. Taxit is a score consisting of the sum of the 
yearly z-transformed values for time required to prepare tax filings (in hours), the number 
of taxes, and the total corporate tax rate (as a percentage of all commercial profits) as 
reported by the World Bank (2015). A longer time required for the preparation of tax 
filings, a higher number of taxes, and a higher effective tax rate indicate a more complex 
system of taxation. To circumvent this disparity with Gov and FinRep, we multiply the 
score with -1, such that higher values indicate a less complex system of taxation. All other 
variables remain as defined before. In line with the standard model, we estimate it with 
and without the interaction terms Costsit × FinRepit and Costsit × Taxit. Including the 
                                                 
25  𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 =  ∅𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑,𝑑𝑑−1𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑑𝑑/360 ∙ ∅𝐼𝐼𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑑𝑑,𝑑𝑑−1𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑/360 with Rec = trade receivables, Rev = revenues, Inv = inventories, and 
COGS = cost of goods sold as defined above. 
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interaction terms shows the incremental effect of stronger (more complex) accounting 
(tax) regulation on the relation between costs of accounting-related services and the po-
tential benefits.26 
4.5 Endogeneity Concerns 
For the question at hand, endogeneity can stem from two potential sources (Larcker and 
Rusticus 2007). First, an unobservable factor that jointly determines the dependent and 
independent variables (omitted variable bias), and second, another relation between the 
dependent and independent variables than is suggested by the regression model (reverse 
causality). We further elaborate both causes and point out how we address possible issues. 
It is possible that the spending on accounting-related services and the degree of benefits, 
regardless of which measure (|DAcc|, |abCFO|, TaxDiff) in use, are jointly determined 
by an unobservable common factor. Prior literature documents such relations between 
earnings management and country-level governance mechanisms (Leuz et al. 2003). 
However, since the correlations (Panel C of Table 20) between benefits and country-level 
governane (Gov) are rather small (i.e., all below 0.3), we have no reason to believe that 
such a relationship exists here. Tax and accounting regulation, the supervision of the pro-
fessional groups, and legal environment, which covers accountants and their clients alike, 
are naturally intertwined. Therefore, it is difficult to think of a proper variable which 
would satisfy the conditions for more sophisticated econometric approaches, like a two-
stage least squares estimation with an instrumental variable (Larcker and Rusticus 2010). 
The second issue, reversed causality, would be severe if we had reasonable doubt regard-
ing the direction of the cause-effect relationship. In light of recent regulatory discussion 
regarding tax aggressiveness and avoidance, it could be plausible to assume that compa-
nies would willingly relocate and accept higher accounting- and tax-related fees in coun-
tries with better earnings (tax) management opportunities. However, setting up interna-
tional tax avoidance schemes or even relocating corporate headquarters to a tax haven is 
costly and presumes an international presence. Considering the threshold of group reve-
nues above US $750m, which the OECD (2016) proposed for some their action against 
“Base Erosion and Profit Shifting” (BEPS), most of the companies in our sample are 
much too small to engage in serious international tax avoidance schemes. In a recent 
                                                 
26  A detailed description of all variables can be found in the Appendix. 
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working paper, Schulte Sasse et al. (2017) find that more than two-thirds of the groups in 
their pan-European sample have no subsidiaries in any country which could be considered 
a tax haven. Assuming that our SME-dominated sample mainly consists of firms without 
any group affiliation, we find little reason to acknowledge a serious threat of reversed 
causality. However, to address this issue empirically, we conduct two tests. First, we re-
estimate our standard model using one-year lagged independent variables: 
𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 ∙ 𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑−1 + 𝛽𝛽2 ∙ 𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑−1 + 𝛽𝛽3 ∙ 𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑−1 × 𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑−1+ � 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 ∙ 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝑗𝑗𝑑𝑑−1 + 𝛽𝛽4 ∙ 𝑜𝑜𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐺𝐺𝑑𝑑ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑−1                     + 𝛽𝛽5 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑−1 + � 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘 ∙ 𝑌𝑌𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑 + 𝜀𝜀 
(13) 
All variables are defined as outlined before. Second, we perform another re-estimation of 
the standard model as a difference equation (Cohen et al., 2008), where Δ denotes the 
year-to-year change in the respective variable: 
∆𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑/𝑑𝑑−1 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 ∙ ∆𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑,𝑑𝑑−1 + 𝛽𝛽2 ∙ ∆𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑,𝑑𝑑−1                                    + 𝛽𝛽3 ∙ ∆�𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑,𝑑𝑑−1 × 𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑,𝑑𝑑−1� + � 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝑑𝑑 ∙ ∆𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝑗𝑗𝑑𝑑,𝑑𝑑−1+ 𝛽𝛽4 ∙ ∆𝑜𝑜𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐺𝐺𝑑𝑑ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑,𝑑𝑑−1 + 𝛽𝛽5 ∙ ∆𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑,𝑑𝑑−1 + � 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘 ∙ 𝑌𝑌𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑+ 𝜀𝜀 
(14) 
5 Results 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Costs of accounting regulation, as measured by RevShare, range from US $5.39 (Estonia) 
to US $12.76 per US $1m of GDP in the Netherlands, with a mean value of US $7.79 
(Table 19, Panel A of Table 20). The mean and median values for RevUnexp are difficult 
to interpret since regressions similar to those for discretionary accruals have a median and 
mean value of zero by design. Figure 1 provides a breakdown of the temporal variation 
of RevShare (solid line) and RevUnexp (dashed line) for each of the 18 sample countries. 
Most countries experienced a slight decrease in RevShare in 2009. Since then, the trend 
goes slightly upwards. However, in most countries, RevShare remains comparably stable 
over time. RevUnexp shows less year-specific patterns and has a higher variation between 
countries. 
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Table 19 contains summary statistics. A country-breakdown of the three benefits 
measures and the governance indicators is provided in Panel A of Table 20 as well as for 
the firm- and macro-level controls in Panel B of Table 20. Our sample is heavily domi-
nated by French and Italian companies. For a firm-level analysis, this skewness could 
possess problems. Since we use the country-year level median for our firm controls, the 
distribution of firms does not introduce bias. Panel C of Table 20 reports correlations. 
Some of our variables display correlations above 0.5. However, variance inflation factors 
in our empirical are mostly below 5. Hence, multi-collinearity likely is not an issue.  
Table 19: 
Descriptive Statistics 
This table shows descriptive statistics for variables used in the main analysis for 126 country-year obser-
vations. RevShare is the share of revenues from accounting-related services to GDP. RevUnexp is the 
discretionary measure for unexpected revenues. |DAcc| are absolute discretionary accruals estimated on 
an industry-year basis. |abCFO| are absolute abnormal cash flows calculated on an industry-year basis. 
TaxDiff is the difference between the statutory corporate tax-rate and companies’ effective tax rates. Gov 
is the z-transformed average value of the six World Bank governance indicators. FinRep is the z-trans-
formed value of the Financial Reporting Quality Indicator from the World Economic Forum. Tax is the 
sum of z-transformed yearly values of World Bank’s Doing Business Tax Indicators (time to prepare tax 
returns, number of tax payments, total tax rate as percentage of commercial profits). Size is the country-
year level median value for the natural logarithm of total assets. RoA is operating income divided by 
lagged total assets. Lev is the relation of long-term liabilities to long-term long-term liabilities and equity. 
Cycle is the length of the operating cycle in days. Growth is the year-to-year change in revenues scaled 
by lagged revenues. GDPgrowth is defined as year-to-year change in GDP and Population is the natural 
logarithm of a country’s total population. 
  N  Mean  SD  Q1  Median  Q3 
             
RevShare  126  7.68863  2.17840  6.21557  7.30368  8.46498 
RevUnexp  126  0.00000  0.00008  -0.00004  -0.00001  0.00003 
|DAcc|  126  0.13431  0.02405  0.12070  0.12990  0.1464 
|abCFO|  126  0.06853  0.03373  0.05040  0.07010  0.0821 
TaxDiff  126  0.05275  0.06640  0.00050  0.03948  0.09733 
Gov  126  0.05312  0.92317  -0.59770  0.05722  0.83028 
FinRep  126  0.03643  0.95729  -0.67882  0.24776  0.83808 
Tax  126  -0.13117  1.64126  -0.92379  -0.15328  1.26514 
Size  126  15.63488  1.58506  14.45076  15.37455  16.37961 
RoA  126  0.06567  0.02485  0.04826  0.06399  0.07556 
Lev  126  0.14640  0.12123  0.05584  0.09931  0.21463 
Cycle  126  82.24033  32.52626  54.00000  76.09484  99.74451 
Growth  126  0.03204  0.06465  0.01470  0.04192  0.06044 
Population  126  16.34556  1.25410  15.49973  16.13966  17.65661 
GDPgrowth  126  0.01580  0.09059  -0.05274  0.02438  0.08142 
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Figure 1: 
Temporal and Cross-Country Variation of RevShare and RevUnexp 
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The correlations provide initial evidence on the relation between spending on accounting-
related services and potential benefits. RevShare is weakly but positively correlated with 
all three benefit measures. RevUnexp shows a weak positive correlation with |DAcc| and 
|abCFO| but a modest negative correlation with TaxDiff. Additionally, the correlation 
between RevShare and RevUnexep is only 0.61. Taken together with slightly diverging 
relations to the benefit measures, RevShare and RevUnexp seem to indeed cover different 
aspects of accounting and tax regulation. 
5.2 Relation between Costs and Benefits 
The first set of analyses addresses the relation between different measures of costs and 
benefits of accounting-related services. Models 1(a) and 2(a) in Table 21 show the main 
results. Panel A presents the results for |DAcc|, our measure for accrual-based earnings 
management. The coefficients for RevShare and RevUnexp are positive but strongly sig-
nificant only in the latter case. We report comparable results, with a positive but insignif-
icant coefficient for RevShare and a positive and significant coefficient for RevUnexp 
with regard to real activities management (|abCFO|) in Panel B. Both results imply evi-
dence that companies engage in earnings management more if they increase spending on 
accounting-related services. With view to the contracting theories in the audit literature, 
our results provide some cautious evidence on the predominance of higher fee depend-
ence impairing accounting and audit quality. Furthermore, our results contrast the find-
ings of Höglund and Sundvik (2016), who report better financial reporting quality for 
small Finish companies which rely on outsourced accounting services. Interestingly, com-
panies seem to jointly engage in accrual-based as well as real activities management. Prior 
literature predicts a potential trade-off between both avenues. Ewert and Wagenhofer 
(2005) develop an analytical model in which firms are more likely to engage in real earn-
ings management when their accounting flexibility is reduced. Chi et al. (2011) empiri-
cally document decreased accrual-based and increased real earnings management if a 
company is audited by a higher quality (i.e., Big 5) audit firm. Therefore, stronger over-
sight and stricter rules should increase costs. Not only do larger auditors charge a price 
premium (Hay et al. 2006), but companies may also demand more advisory services to 
maintain and better utilize their remaining discretion. Whereas both effects are counter-
vailing, we document a slight predominance in the demand for additional advisory or, 
alternatively, a decrease in auditors’ discretion-limiting function with increasing fees.  
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Table 21: 
Regression results for the standard model and including interaction terms 
Table depicts the results from the following OLS regression: 𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 ∙ 𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑 + 𝛽𝛽2 ∙ 𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑 × 𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑 + � 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 ∙ 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝑗𝑗  + 𝛽𝛽4 ∙ 𝑜𝑜𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐺𝐺𝑑𝑑ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + � 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘 ∙ 𝑌𝑌𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑 + 𝜀𝜀 
Benefitit is the measure for potential benefits of accounting-related services. Costsit is either the share of 
revenues from accounting-related services to GDP (RevShare) in Model 1 or the discretionary measure 
for unexpected revenues (RevUnexp) in Model 2. Gov is the z-transformed average value of six World 
Bank governance indicators. The interaction term (β3) is only included in Models 1b and 2b. FirmControlj 
encompasses the country-year level median values for the natural logarithm of total assets (Size), the op-
erating income divided by lagged total assets (RoA), the relation of long-term liabilities to long-term lia-
bilities and equity (Lev), the length of the operating cycle in days (Cycle), and the year-to-year growth 
rate of revenues (Growth). GDPgrowth is defined as the year-to-year change in GDP and Population is 
the natural logarithm of a country’s total population. Year-fixed effects are included. Robust standard 
errors are clustered by country. t-values in parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1 %, 5 % and 
10 % level, respectively. 
Panel A: Earnings Management (|DAcc|) 
  Model 1  Model 2 
  (a)  (b)  (a)  (b) 
             
RevShare  0.00255   0.00169        
  (1.02)   (0.64)        
RevShare × Gov     0.00178        
     (0.96)        
RevUnexp        105.34787 ***  127.23866 *** 
        (3.55)   (3.31)  
RevUnexp × Gov           -29.11684  
           (-1.15)  
Size  -0.00398   -0.00291   -0.00402 **  -0.00414 ** 
  (-1.56)   (-0.89)   (-2.51)   (-2.54)  
RoA  -0.03621   -0.03117   -0.04113   -0.07705  
  (-0.13)   (-0.11)   (-0.15)   (-0.28)  
Lev  0.01893   0.02568   0.02601   0.02455  
  (0.46)   (0.54)   (0.65)   (0.61)  
Cycle  -0.00030   -0.00029   -0.00028   -0.00025  
  (-1.24)   (-1.20)   (-1.18)   (-1.06)  
Growth  0.02800   0.03965   0.02854   0.03528  
  (0.63)   (1.10)   (0.73)   (0.98)  
Gov  -0.01242 **  -0.02528 *  -0.01126 ***  -0.01007 *** 
  (-2.28)   (-1.81)   (-3.26)   (-3.36)  
GDPgrowth  0.04700   0.03518   0.05712   0.06184  
  (0.95)   (0.65)   (1.25)   (1.32)  
Population  0.00312   0.00331   0.00493 *  0.00512 * 
  (0.98)   (1.10)   (1.83)   (1.92)  
Constant  0.15304 **  0.13783 *  0.13907 **  0.13781 ** 
  (2.45)   (2.00)   (2.66)   (2.55)  
             
Fixed Effects  Year   Year   Year   Year  
N  126   126   126   126  
R²  0.278   0.297   0.358   0.361  
Adj. R²  0.179   0.194   0.271   0.267  
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Since companies also engage in real activities management at the same time, the first 
explanations seem more reasonable. Real activities management would not be necessary 
if auditors became less conservative. 
The results for the tax effects (Panel C) offer another potential reasoning. Here, the coef-
ficients are negative for both measures (RevShare, Model 1(a) and RevUnexp, Model 
2(a)) and slightly significant for RevUnexp. In most cases, increased spending on account-
ing-related services does not significantly widen the difference between the effective and 
statutory tax rates, i.e., lower the tax bill. Inasmuch as companies spend on accounting-
Table 21 
continued 
Panel B: Real Activities Management (|abCFO|) 
  Model 1  Model 2 
  (a)  (b)  (a)  (b) 
             
RevShare  0.00364   0.00241        
  (1.46)   (0.95)        
RevShare × Gov     0.00253 *       
     (2.01)        
RevUnexp        108.06967 ***  155.53303 *** 
        (3.47)   (4.19)  
RevUnexp × Gov           -63.13082 ** 
           (-2.29)  
Size  -0.00539 *  -0.00387   -0.00473 **  -0.00498 ** 
  (-1.90)   (-1.21)   (-2.55)   (-2.74)  
RoA  0.47987 **  0.48703 **  0.45122 **  0.37334 * 
  (2.52)   (2.46)   (2.35)   (2.05)  
Lev  0.06067 **  0.07027 **  0.06331 **  0.06013 ** 
  (2.64)   (2.49)   (2.83)   (2.86)  
Cycle  -0.00059 **  -0.00058 **  -0.00055 **  -0.00050 * 
  (-2.40)   (-2.35)   (-2.42)   (-2.08)  
Growth  0.02569   0.04223   0.02898   0.04357  
  (0.47)   (0.86)   (0.58)   (0.93)  
Gov  -0.00922   -0.02749 **  -0.00736 **  -0.00477  
  (-1.70)   (-2.86)   (-2.16)   (-1.37)  
GDPgrowth  -0.06982   -0.08661   -0.05198   -0.04175  
  (-1.23)   (-1.73)   (-1.13)   (-0.89)  
Population  0.00038   0.00065   0.00270   0.00310  
  (0.14)   (0.26)   (1.14)   (1.37)  
Constant  0.24731 ***  0.22571 ***  0.22192 ***  0.21917 *** 
  (3.47)   (3.10)   (3.85)   (3.63)  
             
Fixed Effects  Year   Year   Year   Year  
N  126   126   126   126  
R²  0.542   0.567   0.584   0.593  
Adj. R²  0.479   0.504   0.528   0.533  
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related services, they seem to do this in order to comply with tax rules. Since more strin-
gent tax rules appear to limit tax-induced earnings management, companies most likely 
switch to real activities management. However, they can still use accrual-based earnings 
management to either prevent an even further increasing tax bill or to persuade stakehold-
ers other than the tax authorities. The mostly negligible effects of country-level institu-
tions (Gov) provide initial evidence that spending on accounting-related services depends 
more strongly on particular tax and accounting rules than the general legal environment. 
We will further examine this notion in the next chapters.  
Overall, we find some support for H1a, which states that earnings quality, as measured by 
accrual-based and real activities, varies with the extent of spending on accounting-related 
Table 21 
continued 
Panel C: Taxation (TaxDiff|) 
  Model 1  Model 2 
  (a)  (b)  (a)  (b) 
             
RevShare  -0.00656   -0.00453        
  (-0.71)   (-0.45)        
RevShare × Gov     -0.00419        
     (-0.78)        
RevUnexp        -248.40363 *  -484.95913  
        (-1.77)   (-1.68)  
RevUnexp × Gov           314.64149  
           (1.03)  
Size  0.00031   -0.00221   0.00003   0.00129  
  (0.03)   (-0.18)   (0.00)   (0.15)  
RoA  -1.55735 **  -1.56922 *  -1.53323 **  -1.14505  
  (-2.14)   (-2.09)   (-2.18)   (-1.43)  
Lev  -0.17256   -0.18847   -0.18681   -0.17096  
  (-1.09)   (-1.10)   (-1.24)   (-1.16)  
Cycle  -0.00100 **  -0.00102 **  -0.00105 **  -0.00132 ** 
  (-2.17)   (-2.15)   (-2.38)   (-2.31)  
Growth  0.05620   0.02876   0.05347   -0.01926  
  (0.43)   (0.21)   (0.43)   (-0.13)  
Gov  0.00112   0.03141   -0.00196   -0.01488  
  (0.07)   (0.77)   (-0.16)   (-0.67)  
GDPgrowth  0.13036   0.15820   0.10252   0.05154  
  (0.85)   (1.02)   (0.89)   (0.52)  
Population  -0.00133   -0.00177   -0.00584   -0.00782  
  (-0.08)   (-0.11)   (-0.44)   (-0.63)  
Constant  0.32553   0.36134   0.36432   0.37802  
  (1.03)   (1.13)   (1.33)   (1.37)  
             
Fixed Effects  Year   Year   Year   Year  
N  126   126   126   126  
R²  0.241   0.256   0.298   0.342  
Adj. R²  0.138   0.146   0.202   0.246  
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services. Our results show that discretionary accruals and abnormal cash flows increase, 
i.e., earnings quality decreases. In light of prior literature, this indicates that companies 
use accounting-related services to achieve favorable results. Similarly, we find some ev-
idence in support of H1b, which states that tax expenses vary with spending on accounting-
related services. As we document a weak negative relation, companies’ spending appears 
to be mainly driven by compliance concerns. Taken together, the evidence suggests that 
companies do indeed manage their earnings to achieve a “smoother” and steadier stream 
of income, which is preferred by investors (e.g., Graham et al. 2005) as well as a result 
of aligned tax and financial reporting rules (e.g., Gassen and Fülbier 2015).  
5.3 Effects of Country-level Governance 
Prior literature in financial economics (e.g., Leuz et al. 2003) provides evidence on a 
mitigating effect of country-level governance on earnings management. Potential impli-
cations for the spending on accounting-related services are twofold. Increased institu-
tional quality, i.e., country-level governance mechanisms, lower the demand for external 
approval or assistance in performing statutory tasks, like the preparation of tax returns or 
audit services. Then again, stronger (public) oversight and increased liability for possible 
errors could lead to more spending in order to comply with laws and regulations. Addi-
tionally, one can think of more extensive and complex regulations which, per se, would 
require more external input. 
Models 1(b) and 2(b) in Table 21 show contradicting results for the two measures of 
spending on accounting-related services. For RevShare (Model 1), the incremental effect 
has the same sign as the coefficient of RevShare, indicating a reinforcing effect between 
governance and spending on accounting-related services. However, in the case of RevUn-
exp, the incremental effect of governance mitigates the effects of spending on accounting-
related services for all three measures of benefits. A possible explanation for this surpris-
ing result may be that both measures for spending on accounting-related services grasp 
different facets of cross-country and temporal variation. 
With regard to the hypotheses, we document significant but inconclusive results for real-
activities management (Panel B) where the coefficients on the interaction terms (Costs × 
Gov) are significant for RevShare and RevUnexp but inconsistent with regard to the signs. 
Results are not significant in the other specifications (accrual-based earnings manage-
ment, Panel A and taxation, Panel C). Taken together, we find weak support for H2a, 
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which states a mitigating effect of country-level governance on the relation between earn-
ings quality and spending on accounting-related services. Due to the opposing results for 
the two cost measures, it is difficult to trace back whether stricter country-level govern-
ance lowers the degree of real activities management or if companies switch to real ac-
tivities management if their discretion for accrual-based earnings management is re-
stricted by the legal environment. However, we reject H2b, as we do not find any evidence 
for a mitigating effect of country-level governance on our tax measure. 
5.4 Disentangling Accounting- and Tax-related Effects 
Accounting-related services combine general accounting, auditing, and tax advisory ser-
vices. Prior results provide mixed evidence on the relation with more financial reporting-
or tax-oriented measures. Hence, the next steps aim at capturing cross-country and tem-
poral variation in accounting and tax regulation. As such, we separate the country-level 
governance measure, Gov, into two measures for the perceived quality of the financial 
reporting (FinRep) and taxation system (Tax). 
Table 22 contains the results for the modified model. As shown in Models 1(a) and 2(a) 
of Panels A and C, FinRep has a negative relation with accrual-based earnings manage-
ment and taxation, respectively. That said, it is only slightly significant for RevShare in 
the first case. The negative but insignificant relation with the proxy for real activities 
management (Panel B) indicates a potential trade-off between the two directions of earn-
ings management in countries with better financial reporting quality. Tax is not significant 
for either measure of the potential benefit. Hence, more complicated tax laws, i.e., a lower 
quality taxation system, do not impact earnings management or taxation outcomes, per 
se. Regarding our variables of interest, the two measures for spending on accounting-
related services, the inferences drawn from the standard model, remain unchanged. The 
magnitude and significance levels for |DAcc| and |abCFO| are comparably less pro-
nounced, but increase for TaxDiff. 
The incremental effects of FinRep and Tax, expressed by the interaction terms in Models 
1(b) and 2(b), are insignificant in any specification. Hence, the observed relation between 
earnings quality as well as taxation is not mitigated by higher quality financial reporting 
or taxation systems. Based on the significant positive relation for RevUnexp, with accrual-
based earnings management and real activities management as well as the negative and 
significant relation for taxation, we find no evidence supporting H3a and H3b, respectively. 
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Table 22: 
Regression results including separate financial accounting- and tax-related measures 
Table depicts the results from the following OLS regression: 𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 ∙ 𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑 + 𝛽𝛽2 ∙ 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑 + 𝛽𝛽3 ∙ 𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑 + 𝛽𝛽4 ∙ 𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑 × 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑 + 𝛽𝛽5 ∙ 𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑 × 𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑+ � 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 ∙ 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝑗𝑗 + 𝛽𝛽6 ∙ 𝑜𝑜𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐺𝐺𝑑𝑑ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽7 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + � 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘 ∙ 𝑌𝑌𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑 + 𝜀𝜀 
Benefitit is the measure for potential benefits of accounting-related services. Costsit is either the share of 
revenues from accounting-related services to GDP (RevShare) in Model 1 or the discretionary measure 
for unexpected revenues (RevUnexp) in Model 2. FinRep is the z-transformed value of the Financial Re-
porting Quality Indicator from the World Economic Forum. Tax is the sum of the z-transformed yearly 
values of the World Bank’s Doing Business Tax Indicators (time to prepare tax returns, number of tax 
payments, and total tax rate as percentage of commercial profits). The interaction terms (β4 and β5) are 
only included in Models 1b and 2b. FirmControlj encompasses the country-year level median values for 
the natural logarithm of total assets (Size), the operating income divided by lagged total assets (RoA), the 
relation of long-term liabilities to long-term liabilities and equity (Lev), the length of the operating cycle 
in days (Cycle), and the year-to-year growth rate of revenues (Growth). GDPgrowth is defined as the year-
to-year change in GDP and Population is the natural logarithm of a country’s total population. Year-fixed 
effects are included. Robust standard errors are clustered by country. t-values in parenthesis. ***, ** and 
* denote significance at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level, respectively. 
Panel A: Earnings Management (|DAcc|) 
  Model 1  Model 2 
  (a)  (b)  (a)  (b) 
             
RevShare  0.00195   0.00147        
  (0.58)   (0.43)        
RevShare ×      0.00415        
FinRep     (1.26)        
RevShare × Tax     0.00093        
     (0.67)        
RevUnexp        116.63163 **  129.99799 ** 
        (2.76)   (2.26)  
RevUnexp ×           44.02798  
FinRep           (0.50)  
RevUnexp × Tax           43.75363  
           (1.11)  
Size  -0.00300   -0.00396   -0.00432 *  -0.00506 * 
  (-0.77)   (-1.00)   (-1.90)   (-2.08)  
RoA  -0.05931   -0.04749   -0.07455   -0.06612  
  (-0.22)   (-0.17)   (-0.28)   (-0.28)  
Lev  0.00044   0.01351   0.01255   0.01300  
  (0.01)   (0.32)   (0.35)   (0.35)  
Cycle  -0.00034   -0.00036   -0.00034   -0.00034  
  (-1.23)   (-1.39)   (-1.23)   (-1.17)  
Growth  0.02546   0.04788   0.02945   0.02990  
  (0.57)   (1.43)   (0.73)   (0.90)  
FinRep  -0.01257 *  -0.04098 *  -0.00882 *  -0.00704  
  (-2.01)   (-1.85)   (-1.89)   (-1.52)  
Tax  0.00031   -0.00532   0.00249   0.00308  
  (0.07)   (-0.50)   (0.77)   (0.98)  
GDPgrowth  0.04909   0.02033   0.05036   0.04712  
  (0.97)   (0.38)   (1.13)   (1.18)  
Population  0.00279   0.00322   0.00376   0.00444  
  (0.68)   (0.79)   (1.34)   (1.47)  
Constant  0.15913   0.16970   0.17475 **  0.17691 ** 
  (1.48)   (1.70)   (2.35)   (2.23)  
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Table 22: 
continued 
  Model 1  Model 2 
  (a)  (b)  (a)  (b) 
             
Fixed Effects  Year   Year   Year   Year  
N  126   126   126   126  
R²  0.267   0.308   0.361   0.368  
Adj. R²  0.160   0.192   0.267   0.262  
 
 
           
Panel B: Real Activities Management (|abCFO|) 
  Model 1  Model 2 
  (a)  (b)  (a)  (b) 
             
RevShare  0.00298   0.00196        
  (0.96)   (0.65)        
RevShare ×      0.00553 **       
FinRep     (2.30)        
RevShare × Tax     -0.00062        
     (-0.56)        
RevUnexp        111.11612 **  138.21118 ** 
        (2.53)   (2.41)  
RevUnexp ×           -73.95054  
FinRep           (-0.91)  
RevUnexp × Tax           19.93924  
           (0.49)  
Size  -0.00424   -0.00489   -0.00458 **  -0.00418 ** 
  (-1.28)   (-1.24)   (-2.32)   (-2.35)  
RoA  0.47348 **  0.48104 **  0.44309 **  0.38947 ** 
  (2.73)   (2.58)   (2.60)   (2.37)  
Lev  0.04618 *  0.07031 **  0.05369 **  0.05323 ** 
  (1.93)   (2.45)   (2.40)   (2.44)  
Cycle  -0.00063 **  -0.00064 **  -0.00060 **  -0.00055 * 
  (-2.25)   (-2.53)   (-2.27)   (-2.11)  
Growth  0.02067   0.05037   0.02568   0.03617  
  (0.39)   (0.88)   (0.52)   (0.81)  
FinRep  -0.01082   -0.04868 ***  -0.00745   -0.00761  
  (-1.68)   (-3.23)   (-1.35)   (-1.43)  
Tax  0.00062   0.00344   -0.00085   -0.00006  
  (0.17)   (0.51)   (-0.27)   (-0.02)  
GDPgrowth  -0.06599   -0.11070 *  -0.05570   -0.04790  
  (-1.07)   (-1.80)   (-1.14)   (-1.01)  
Population  0.00051   0.00054   0.00217   0.00235  
  (0.13)   (0.17)   (0.75)   (0.80)  
Constant  0.24082 **  0.25670 **  0.23672 ***  0.22516 *** 
  (2.38)   (2.79)   (3.17)   (3.06)  
             
Fixed Effects  Year   Year   Year   Year  
N  126   126   126   126  
R²  0.543   0.606   0.588   0.593  
Adj. R²  0.476   0.540   0.528   0.525  
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The effect of spending on accounting-related services does not vary with differences in 
the quality of accounting and tax regulation.  
Table 22: 
continued 
Panel C: Taxation (TaxDiff|) 
  Model 1  Model 2 
  (a)  (b)  (a)  (b) 
             
RevShare  -0.00815   -0.00398        
  (-0.95)   (-0.49)        
RevShare ×      0.01605 **       
FinRep     (2.32)        
RevShare × Tax     -0.01329 **       
     (-2.83)        
RevUnexp        -268.00903 **  -393.82909 ** 
        (-2.36)   (-2.28)  
RevUnexp ×           617.44081  
FinRep           (1.69)  
RevUnexp × Tax           -275.00322  
           (-1.43)  
Size  0.00038   -0.01334   0.00040   -0.00464  
  (0.03)   (-0.94)   (0.04)   (-0.41)  
RoA  -1.68989 **  -1.51594 **  -1.60316 **  -1.23543  
  (-2.38)   (-2.63)   (-2.22)   (-1.69)  
Lev  -0.17163   -0.22609   -0.18632   -0.18188  
  (-1.14)   (-1.51)   (-1.25)   (-1.29)  
Cycle  -0.00078 *  -0.00087 **  -0.00086 **  -0.00120 ** 
  (-1.95)   (-2.19)   (-2.20)   (-2.29)  
Growth  0.10222   0.19170   0.08912   0.02433  
  (0.84)   (1.52)   (0.74)   (0.17)  
FinRep  0.01428   -0.09560 *  0.00632   0.01344  
  (0.89)   (-2.06)   (0.42)   (0.84)  
Tax  -0.00030   0.09488 ***  0.00272   -0.00427  
  (-0.03)   (3.06)   (0.29)   (-0.40)  
GDPgrowth  0.15911   0.14806   0.12658   0.06628  
  (1.08)   (0.79)   (1.10)   (0.66)  
Population  -0.00093   0.00926   -0.00556   -0.00440  
  (-0.06)   (0.72)   (-0.42)   (-0.37)  
Constant  0.31015   0.32284   0.33610   0.41657  
  (0.87)   (1.17)   (1.12)   (1.41)  
             
Fixed Effects  Year   Year   Year   Year  
N  126   126   126   126  
R²  0.261   0.393   0.309   0.362  
Adj. R²  0.152   0.291   0.208   0.255  
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6 Robustness Checks 
6.1 Alternative Measures for Benefits 
Measuring the potential firm-level benefits of spending on accounting-related services is 
tricky, especially as our costs measures are estimated on the country-level. Therefore, we 
use an additional set of proxies for accrual-based earnings management which was orig-
inally developed to capture these effects on a country- (Leuz et al. 2003) or industry-level 
(Burgstahler et al. 2006). These measures comprise: 
(1) Variation of operating income to the variation of cash flows (EM1): A country’s me-
dian ratio of the standard deviation of operating income to the standard deviation of cash 
flows. A lower standard deviation implies earnings smoothing, that is, companies reduce 
the variability of reported earnings. Following Burgstahler et al. (2006), we multiply this 
measure with -1, such that higher values indicate more earnings smoothing, i.e., lower 
earnings quality. Cash flow is calculated indirectly by subtracting the accrual component 
(as defined above) from operating income. Operating income is defined as net income 
before taxes, financial result, and special items.  
(2) Change in accruals to change in cash flows (EM2): Pearson correlation between the 
year-to-year change in accruals and cash flows for the pooled set of all firm-year obser-
vations in each country. Due to the nature of accrual accounting, the correlation, on aver-
age, should be negative. It is also multiplied by -1 so that higher values indicate more 
earnings smoothing, i.e., a lower earnings quality (Burgstahler et al. 2006). Both measures 
are computed as described above. 
(3) Absolute accruals to absolute cash flows (EM3): Country-median of the absolute 
value of accruals divided by the absolute value of cash flows. A higher level of accruals 
as compared to cash flows indicates more potential accounting discretion to improve earn-
ings and, hence, lower earnings quality. 
(4) Relation of small profits to small losses (EM4): Country-level median value of the 
number of firms reporting a small profit divided by the number of firms with small losses. 
A profit (loss) is defined as small if it is lower than or equal to 1% (greater than or equal 
to -1%) of after tax income scaled by lagged total assets. Managers are more likely to use 
accounting rules to convert small losses into small profits (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997). 
Higher values indicate more earnings management, i.e., lower earnings quality. 
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Table 23: 
Regression results for the alternative earnings quality and taxation measures 
This table depicts the results of the following OLS regression: 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 ∙ 𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑 + 𝛽𝛽2 ∙ 𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑 + 𝛽𝛽3 ∙ 𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑 × 𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑 + � 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 ∙ 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝑗𝑗𝑑𝑑+  𝛽𝛽4 ∙ 𝑜𝑜𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐺𝐺𝑑𝑑ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑 + 𝛽𝛽5 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑 + � 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘 ∙ 𝑌𝑌𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑 + 𝜀𝜀 
AltBenefitit is the measure for potential benefits of accounting-related services. EM1 to EM4 are the four 
measures for earnings management from Leuz et al. (2003) and Burgstahler et al. (2006). |abProd| are 
abnormal production costs (Roychowdbury 2006; Cohen et al. 2008). TaxSD is the country-year standard 
deviation of companies’ effective tax rates. Costsit is either the share of revenues from accounting-related 
services to GDP (RevShare) or the discretionary measure for unexpected revenues (RevUnexp). Gov is the 
z-transformed average value of six World Bank governance indicators. The interaction term (β3) is only 
included in Models 1b and 2b. FirmControlj encompasses the country-year level median values for the 
natural logarithm of total assets (Size), the operating income divided by lagged total assets (RoA), the 
relation of long-term liabilities to long-term liabilities and equity (Lev), the length of the operating cycle 
in days (Cycle), and the year-to-year growth rate of revenues (Growth). GDPgrowth is defined as the year-
to-year change in GDP and Population is the natural logarithm of a country’s total population. Year-fixed 
effects are included. Robust standard errors are clustered by country. t-values in parenthesis. ***, ** and 
* denote significance at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level, respectively. N = 126. 
             
  RevShare  RevShare × Gov  RevUnexp  
RevUnexp 
× Gov  R²  
Adj. 
R² 
Panel A: Earnings Management 
                 
EM1  -0.01031            0.815  0.790 
  -0.00911   -0.00247         0.816  0.789 
        -215.31008      0.818  0.793 
        281.07823      0.864  0.844 
EM2  -0.05165 *           0.152  0.037 
  -0.06451 **  0.02645         0.171  0.049 
        -257.83915      0.120  0.000 
        796.34418      0.150  0.025 
EM3  0.00832            0.679  0.636 
  0.00667   0.00340         0.683  0.636 
        178.53965 *     0.683  0.640 
        290.91726 **  -149.47299 **  0.687  0.641 
EM4  -0.10216            0.140  0.021 
  -0.05384   -0.09686         0.151  0.026 
        -6960.12532 ***     0.225  0.118 
        -11777.92440 **  6411.63803   0.254  0.144 
Panel B: Real Activities Management 
                 
|abProd| 0.00517            0.385  0.301 
  0.00330   0.00385         0.401  0.313 
        137.72432 **     0.401  0.320 
        239.15095 **  -134.90714   0.412  0.326 
Panel C: Taxation 
                 
TaxSD  0.00202            0.371  0.285 
  0.00535   -0.00686 *        0.481  0.405 
        -114.86613      0.411  0.331 
        -223.62278   144.65677   0.439  0.356 
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General model specifications are the same as in previous analyses. Panel A of Table 23 
shows results for the four alternative measures. At first sight, these may seem to contradict 
previous results. Negative results for EM1 are insignificant. Even though results are sig-
nificantly negative for EM2, the measure does not seem to be well-fitted for our purposes, 
as indicated by an (adjusted) R² of 5% or less. Results for EM3 and EM4 completely 
oppose each other. Overall, as in the main model, results for RevUnexp are more pro-
nounced than for RevShare, indicating that the discretionary measure of spending on ac-
counting-related services is better suited to account for cross-country and temporal dif-
ferences. Results for EM3 confirm those of our main analysis. However, we acknowledge 
that the evidence on accrual-based earnings management is rather inconclusive. 
Additionally, we employ the absolute abnormal production costs (|abProd|) as an alter-
native measure for real earnings activities management. Based on Roychowdhury (2006) 
and Cohen et al. (2008)27, we calculate |abProd| as the residual from the following indus-
try-year regressions based on two-digit SIC codes with at least six observations: 
𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝑑𝑑−1 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 ∙ 1𝐹𝐹𝑑𝑑−1 + 𝛽𝛽2 ∙ 𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝑑𝑑−1 + 𝛽𝛽2 ∙
∆𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑑𝑑,𝑑𝑑−1𝐹𝐹𝑑𝑑−1 + 𝛽𝛽3 ∙
∆𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑑𝑑−1,𝑑𝑑−2𝐹𝐹𝑑𝑑−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑑𝑑 (15) 
With CFO = Cash flow from operations estimated as the described above, Revt = sales 
(revenues), A = total assets, Prod = Cost of production as the sum of cost of goods sold, 
and the year-to-change change in inventory. Following Burgstahler et al. (2006), we com-
pute cost of goods sold as the revenues minus operating income, since the actual costs of 
goods sold are not widely available for the firms in our sample. 
Results are shown in Panel B of Table 23. Signs and magnitudes of coefficients are com-
parable to the main analysis. RevShare remains insignificant. Even though significance 
levels for RevUnexp slightly decrease compared to our main analysis, the results are qual-
itatively unchanged. 
Finally, we use the variation of effective corporate tax rates (TaxSD) as an alternative tax-
related measure (e.g., Goncharov and Jacob 2014). TaxSD is defined as the yearly stand-
ard deviation of the effective corporate tax rate for all companies in a country. The results 
  
                                                 
27  In contrast to Roychowdhury (2006) and Cohen et al. (2008), we do not calculate a variable for discre-
tionary expenses which are defined as the sum of R&D, advertising and SG&A expenses. Due to the 
differing reporting regimes and statements structures for European (private) firms the necessary data is 
not widely available. 
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Table 24: 
Tests for Endogeneity 
Panel A shows the results of the following OLS regression with lagged independent variables: 𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 ∙ 𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑−1 + 𝛽𝛽2 ∙ 𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑−1 + 𝛽𝛽3 ∙ 𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑−1 × 𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑−1 + � 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 ∙ 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝑗𝑗𝑑𝑑−1   + 𝛽𝛽4 ∙ 𝑜𝑜𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐺𝐺𝑑𝑑ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑−1 + 𝛽𝛽5 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑−1 + � 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘 ∙ 𝑌𝑌𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑 + 𝜀𝜀 
Panel B shows the results of the following OLS regression in which all variables are defined as year-to-
year changes: 
∆𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑/𝑑𝑑−1 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 ∙ ∆𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑,𝑑𝑑−1 + 𝛽𝛽2 ∙ ∆𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑,𝑑𝑑−1 + 𝛽𝛽3∆(𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑,𝑑𝑑−1 × 𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑,𝑑𝑑−1)+ � 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝑑𝑑 ∙ ∆𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝑗𝑗𝑑𝑑,𝑑𝑑−1 + 𝛽𝛽4 ∙ ∆𝑜𝑜𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐺𝐺𝑑𝑑ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑,𝑑𝑑−1 + 𝛽𝛽5 ∙ ∆𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑,𝑑𝑑−1+ � 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘 ∙ 𝑌𝑌𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑 + 𝜀𝜀 
Benefitit is the measure for potential benefits of accounting-related services. Costsit is either the share of 
revenues from accounting-related services to GDP (RevShare) in Model 1 or the discretionary measure 
for unexpected revenues (RevUnexp) in Model 2. Gov is the z-transformed average value of six World 
Bank governance indicators. The interaction term (β3) is only included in Models 1b and 2b. FirmControlj 
encompasses the country-year level median values for the natural logarithm of total assets (Size), the op-
erating income divided by lagged total assets (RoA), the relation of long-term liabilities to long-term lia-
bilities and equity (Lev), the length of the operating cycle in days (Cycle), and the year-to-year growth rate 
of revenues (Growth). GDPgrowth is defined as the year-to-year change in GDP and Population is the 
natural logarithm of a country’s total population. Year-fixed effects are included. Robust standard errors 
are clustered by country. t-values in parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % 
level, respectively. N = 126. 
             
  RevShare   
RevShare 
× Gov  
RevUnexp 
  
RevUnexp 
× Gov  
R² 
  
Adj. 
R² 
Panel A: Lagged independent variables 
                 
|DAcc|  0.00247            0.279  0.170 
  0.00111   0.00265 *        0.335  0.227 
        106.73960 ***     0.393  0.302 
        137.45968 ***  -39.49612 *  0.400  0.302 
|abCFO|  0.00267            0.470  0.390 
  0.00153   0.00222         0.492  0.409 
        77.94218 **     0.496  0.420 
        118.08053 **  -51.60499   0.502  0.421 
TaxDiff  -0.00683            0.196  0.075 
  -0.00482   -0.00390         0.208  0.079 
        -241.62005      0.247  0.134 
        -495.29518   326.14443   0.290  0.174 
Panel B: Difference estimation 
                 
|DAcc|  -0.00652            0.439  0.355 
  -0.00735   -0.00170         0.443  0.352 
        -136.59182      0.427  0.340 
        -184.05117   100.92274   0.434  0.342 
|abCFO|  0.00218            0.436  0.351 
  0.00232   0.00028         0.436  0.344 
        124.43110      0.442  0.358 
        167.85941   -92.35071   0.446  0.355 
TaxDiff  -0.00003            0.409  0.320 
  0.00129   0.00268         0.419  0.325 
        6.60153      0.409  0.320 
        -28.61191   74.88171   0.414  0.318 
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reported in Panel C of Table 23 are basically consistent with the main analysis; the sign 
for RevShare changes, and the coefficient remains insignificant. 
6.2 Endogeneity Concerns 
In our last set of analyses, we address potential endogeneity concerns discussed in Section 
4.5. First, we repeat the main analysis with one year lagged independent variables to mit-
igate concerns of reversed causality. Using the data from the prior year appears plausible 
since important parts of the financial accounting and taxation cycle are performed at or 
after (fiscal) year end. Notable examples are the preparation of financial statements or 
filing of tax returns. In the course of these processes, companies may apply different 
earnings management strategies to achieve desired outcomes. Additionally, audit services 
usually refer to the prior years’ financial statements, providing further backing for the use 
of lagged variables. However, we caution that the previous thoughts do not apply to real 
activities management. Any such actions (e.g., boosting or slowing sales, increasing or 
decreasing production) must be performed in a timely manner. Therefore, using lagged 
values likely introduces bias. Nevertheless, we report the results for the sake of complete-
ness. Panel A of Table 24 exhibits that results are qualitatively similar to our main anal-
ysis. 
Second, we use a difference estimation, which is not based on the yearly levels of all 
variables, but rather on their respective year-to-year changes. The results for |abCFO| in 
Panel B of Table 24 are, though not significant, consistent with our main analysis. For 
TaxDiff, the signs change in some specifications. Results for |DAcc| are completely re-
versed. We have no plausible explanation for these results.  
7 Concluding Remarks 
This study aims to extend the knowledge on the relationship between costs and benefits 
of accounting-related services. Fees associated with accounting-related services consti-
tute costs for the hiring company. These costs are usually rooted in a company’s obliga-
tion to adhere to all (tax and accounting) regulations it is subject to. However, companies 
face different incentives when using accounting-related service. The concept of compli-
ance costs as proposed by Johnston (1963) distinguishes between unavoidable (manda-
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tory) and avoidable (voluntary) compliance costs. Prior literature provided extant evi-
dence on the potential positive (knowledge spillover) and negative (impaired independ-
ence) implications of (non-)audit service fees. We extend this literature by focusing not 
solely on audit fees but on any form of spending geared towards auditors, tax advisors, 
accountants, or their respective firms. 
Since firm-level data on costs of or spending on accounting-related services is not widely 
available, we refer to country-level revenues earned from accounting, audit, and tax ad-
visory services as a proxy. To circumvent potential size bias, we scale these revenues by 
GDP. Additionally, we estimate the unexpected part of these revenues which cannot be 
explained by a country’s level or change of economic development.  
We hypothesize that the degree to which companies benefit from accounting-related ser-
vices varies with country-level spending on those services. Furthermore, drawing from 
financial economics literature, we expect that these benefits are mitigated by country-
level governance mechanisms as well as the quality of accounting and tax regulation. Our 
results show a significantly negative relation between (discretionary) spending on ac-
counting-related and earnings quality. However, lower earnings quality does not translate 
into lower tax rates. Taken together, the primary results indicate that firms use accrual-
based earnings as well as real activities management to create a less bumpy, smoother 
earnings path. This result is in line with prior literature highlighting the different financial 
reporting and tax incentives of private companies as opposed to listed firms (e.g., Gassen 
and Fülbier 2015). Furthermore, we find modest evidence on the mitigating effect of 
country-level governance mechanisms on the relation between spending on accounting-
related services and earnings quality.  
Our study is subject to some caveats. First, revenues from accounting-related services 
most likely underestimate the actual costs by a large margin. In-house effort to prepare 
financial statements and tax returns is not included. In a review of tax compliance costs, 
Eichfelder and Vaillancourt (2014) show that external costs (i.e., the focus of our study) 
amount to only about a quarter of total costs and, thus, are relatively dwarfed by time and 
staff costs. Moreover, we are unable to quantify the psychological cost of compliance. 
These could result from the stress of not fully understanding legislation with which a 
preparer or taxpayer has to comply (Chittenden et al. 2003). Therefore, the narrower, 
more conservative focus of our data works against any findings. Second, it is difficult to 
disentangle the effects of accounting, auditing, and tax regulation. Most of the literature 
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(e.g., Goncharov and Jacob 2014) and available data sources (e.g., World Economic Fo-
rum, World Bank) focus on corporate taxation. Even though the assumption that (large) 
companies bear the majority of accounting-related costs seems reasonable, individuals 
may also have a fairly high interest in minimizing their tax payments with professional 
help. Additionally, higher costs can be the result of increased regulatory scrutiny (e.g., 
tax audits), stricter regulation (e.g., mandatory audit requirements), more complex rules, 
or voluntary demand for accounting services aiming to maximize company profits. Over-
all, these effects are countervailing. We use a range of tests and control variables to ad-
dress these concerns. Third, the calculation of all measures is based on the sample of firms 
retrieved from the Amadeus database. As described, the availability of the necessary fi-
nancial data is restricted to a certain set of larger companies and varies between countries 
due to differing disclosure requirements. We caution that the results may, therefore, not 
be fully representative of the overall population of firms. Smaller companies and individ-
uals, in particular, probably face diverging incentives, e.g., stemming from the missing 
need to (fully) disclose their financials. If they represent a significant share of the overall 
revenues from accounting services and rely on accounting service and tax advisory pro-
viders mainly to comply with tax regulations, this would bias our results downwards and, 
hence, work against any findings. 
Future research could use more sophisticated measures to disentangle the effects of fi-
nancial reporting (accounting), auditing, and tax regulation. Regulatory changes (e.g., 
staggered adoption of the new accounting and audit directives), in particular, could pro-
vide interesting settings to isolate and measure the actual costs of (new) accounting reg-
ulations. Also, more nuanced changes, such as tax reforms in nine of our 18 sample coun-
tries (Sundvik, 2016), provide a good starting point for further elaborations on this issue. 
Furthermore, our main results indicate a complementary relationship between accrual-
based earnings management and real activities management in our sample. Since this 
study is mainly based upon data from private firms, future research could look into this 
issue more broadly. Starting with the differing reporting incentives of private firms, it 
would be interesting to see whether the trade-off relation between both measures of earn-
ings quality documented for listed companies (e.g., Zang 2012) could also be observed 
for (European) private firms. 
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Appendix 
Variable  Description and Data Sources 
RevShare  Relation of revenues earned from accounting, auditing, and tax advisory services 
to GDP. Revenues are converted to US $ using the latest available yearly conver-
sion rate from the International Monetary Fund’s exchange rate database. 
Data Sources: EuroStat Structured Business Statistics, World Bank World Devel-
opment Indicators 
RevUnexp  Unexpected portion of revenues earned from accounting, auditing and tax advisory 
services estimated using a methodology similar to those from Jones (1991). Ex-
planatory variables are GDP and GDP growth rate. All variables and the intercept 
are scaled by the total population at the beginning of the year. 
Data Source: EuroStat Structured Business Statistics, World Bank World Devel-
opment Indicators 
|DAcc|  Country-year mean value of absolute discretionary accruals calculated following 
Dechow et al. (1995). Expected portion of accruals is estimated cross-sectionally 
on the industry level. 
Data Source: Bureau van Dijk Amadeus Database 
EM1  Relation of the standard deviation of operating income to the standard deviation 
of cash flow from operations from Leuz et al. (2003). Operating income is defined 
as net income before financial result, taxes and special items. Cash flow from op-
erations is calculated by subtracting the accrual component from operating income 
using the retrograde method from Leuz et al. (2003) as described in the main text. 
Calculation based on the pooled sample of firm-year observation per country. Mul-
tiplied with -1 (Burgstahler et al. 2006). 
Data Source: Bureau van Dijk Amadeus Database 
EM2  Correlation between the year-to-year change in accruals and the year-to-year 
change in cash flow from operations from Leuz et al. (2003). Accruals and cash 
flow from operations are calculated as described for EM1. Expressed as firm-year 
mean value per country. 
Data Source: Bureau van Dijk Amadeus Database 
EM3  Absolute value of accruals divided by the absolute value of cash flow from oper-
ations from Leuz et al. (2003). Accruals and cash flow from operations are calcu-
lated as described for EM1. Calculation is based on the median of the pooled sam-
ple per country and year. Multiplied with -1. 
Data Source: Bureau van Dijk Amadeus Database 
EM4  Relation of firms with small losses to firms with small profits from Leuz et al. 
(2003). Based on the relation of pretax income to lagged total assets, small is de-
fined as a value between -0.01 and 0 for losses as well 0 and 0.01 for profits.  
Data Source: Bureau van Dijk Amadeus Database 
|abCFO| 
|abProd| 
 Country year mean value of absolute abnormal cash flow from operations or pro-
duction costs calculated following Roychowdhury (2006) and Cohen et al. (2008). 
Expected portion of cash flows and production is estimated cross-sectional on the 
industry level.  
Data Source: Bureau van Dijk Amadeus Database 
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Variable  Description and Data Sources 
TaxDiff  Country-year level mean value of the difference between statutory tax rate and 
effective tax rates paid by companies. Effective tax rates are calculated as tax ex-
penses divided by pretax income. 
Data Source: Bureau van Dijk Amadeus Database, European Commission (2016) 
TaxSD  Yearly standard deviation of the effective corporate tax rate for all companies in a 
single country. Effective tax rates are computed as outlined for TaxDiff. 
Data Source: Bureau van Dijk Amadeus Database 
Gov  z-transformed score of the average value of the six World Governance Indices: 
Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, Voice and Accountability, Political Stability, 
Government Effectiveness and Control of Corruption (Breuer and Salzmann 
2015).  
Data Source: Kaufmann et al. (2009) and http://www.govindicators.org 
FinRep  z-transformed value of the measure for financial reporting quality used by the 
World Economic Forum. Businesspersons were asked how they assess the quality 
of financial reporting in their country of origin on a scale from “1” (worst) to “7” 
(best). 
Data Source: World Economic Forum (2015) 
Tax  A score consisting of the sum of the yearly z-transformed values for time required 
to prepare tax filings (in hours), the number of taxes and the total corporate tax 
rate (as percentage of all commercial profits). 
Data Source: World Bank (2015)  
Size  Country-year median value of the natural logarithm of total assets for all sample 
firms.  
Data Source: Bureau van Dijk Amadeus Database  
RoA  Country-year median value of return on assets for all sample firms. Return on as-
sets in calculated as operating income divided by lagged total assets. 
Data Source: Bureau van Dijk Amadeus Database 
Lev  Country-year median value of the relation between non-current liabilities and the 
sum of equity and non-current liabilities.  
Data Source: Bureau van Dijk Amadeus Database 
Cycle  Country-year median value of the length of the operating cycle in days. Calcula-
tion as described in the text.  
Data Source: Bureau van Dijk Amadeus Database 
Growth  Country-year median value of the year-to-year growth rate of revenues.  
Data Source: Bureau van Dijk Amadeus Database 
Population  Natural logarithm of the total population per country and year. 
Data Source: World Bank World Development Indicators Database 
GDPgrowth  Year-to-year GDP growth rate calculated in current US $. 
Data Source: World Bank World Development Indicators Database 
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SURVIVORS 
Duration of the Peer Review Process in  
Leading Academic Accounting Journals 
 
A b s t r a c t  
The existing empirical literature on the peer review process in general and 
in accounting in particular has primarily focused on the fairness of the pro-
cess and reasons for rejections of submitted papers. There is little evidence 
on the factors which might influence the overall timeliness of peer review. 
First, I analyze the duration of peer-peer review for The Accounting Review 
(TAR), Journal of Accounting and Economics (JAE), and Journal of Ac-
counting Research (JAR) between 2001 and 2010. TAR and JAR provide 
similar duration, whereas the process is much slower in JAE. Furthermore, 
results indicate that journals use the peer review process to strategically 
respond to excess demand for journal publication space. The second anal-
ysis is based on a sample of hand-collected data from 477 articles published 
in The Accounting Review (TAR) between 1997 and 2009. I investigate the 
effect of informal feedback, article- and author-specific factors, as well as 
fairness indicators on the duration of the peer review process. The results 
suggest that peer review in TAR is not object to external influence. Notice-
ably, articles which get highly cited after publication pass the process sig-
nificantly faster, indicating a certain effectiveness of the process. Collabo-
ration between authors is a more important factor than informal feedback 
from colleagues, seminars, conferences, etc. If institutional bonds between 
editor and author(s) exist, the time spent under peer review apparently de-
creases. This result should be interpreted with caution, as it could simply 
reflect a self-selection of high-quality faculty. The results are robust to dif-
ferent definitions of author-specific attributes and the inclusion of submis-
sion year-, method-, and topic-fixed effects. 
Acknowledgements: I thank Rolf Uwe Fülbier, Martin Jacob, Malte Klein, Thomas R. Loy, Thorsten 
Sellhorn, participants at the British Accounting and Finance Association Annual Conference 2014 in 
London (UK), the European Accounting Association Annual Congress 2014 in Tallinn (Estonia) as well 
as the doctoral seminar at the University of Bayreuth for their valuable comments and suggestions. 
Christian Biller and Andreas Wanderer provided excellent research assistance. 
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1 Introduction 
A double-blind peer review is the distinguishing feature of academic journals. It is char-
acterized by anonymity of the authors to the referees and vice versa to ensure constructive 
direct feedback on the authors’ work and prevent impertinent influences (Bailey et al. 
2008b). The referees’ advice to the author and his final suggestion to the editor are crucial 
to a paper’s success. Publications in highly ranked journals have gained importance in 
various areas of academic life, e.g., with respect to cumulative dissertations, promotion 
to tenured positions (Dunn Jr. 2005; Read et al. 1998; Rouse and Shockley 1984), or the 
acquiring of research funding (Bence and Oppenheim 2004; Marston and Ayub 2000).28 
Mechanisms to evaluate and assure the quality of publications, like the peer review pro-
cess, consequently gained increased importance as well. However, there is little theoreti-
cal and empirical evidence on the overall duration of the peer review process and its re-
lated determinants. Prior literature primarily focused on reasons papers get rejected by 
journals (e.g., Stout et al. 2006) and certain attributes of fairness in the peer review pro-
cess (e.g., Laband and Piette 1994; Moizer 2009). Survey results of accounting academics 
reveal a modest to positive perception of peer review timeliness and quality for top- and 
second-tier journals (Adler and Liyanarachchi 2011; Bailey et al. 2008a). 
Therefore, this study is explorative in nature and its objective is twofold. First, to show 
differences in the duration of the peer review process over time and between journals. 
This analysis is based on a sample of 967 articles published in The Accounting Review 
(TAR), Journal of Accounting & Economics (JAE), and Journal of Accounting Research 
(JAR) over the 10-year period between 2001 and 2010. Second, it aims to analyze whether 
and to which extent author- and article-specific factors influence the duration of the peer 
review process. I further examine the effects of informal feedback (from colleagues, at 
workshops, conferences, etc.) and potential editor favoritism as an indicator for fairness. 
My study is based on a unique sample of hand-collected data from the cover sheets, es-
pecially the acknowledgements, of 477 articles published in The Accounting Review 
(TAR) between 1997 and 2009. Differences in the sampling times are due to data availa-
bility issues. 
                                                 
28  Taking all these factors into account, a top tier accounting publication increases the annual income of 
US professors by US $5,609 with a present value of US $145,000 for assistant professors (Asthana and 
Balsam 2017). Similarly, Swidler and Goldreyer (1998) estimate the present value of a top journal pub-
lication in the finance discipline to be between US $19,493 and US $33,754. 
PART C: SURVIVORS 
104 
The results show a median duration of the peer review process of 487 days. TAR and JAR 
are quite similar: 457.5 and 450.0 days, respectively. For JAE, the median duration is 
590.5 days. Overall, results imply that the duration of the peer review process strongly 
varies between journals and over time. Publication and duration trends are in line with 
the observations by Swanson (2004). Top accounting journals did indeed increase the 
available journal space to meet increasing publication demand from scholars. However, 
journals can increase authors’ costs of submission by prolonged review processes (Azar 
1996; Leslie 2005; Lee 2009). The observed increase in the duration of the peer review 
process may, hence, be a strategic reaction to address remaining excess demand. Besides 
these overall trends, certain other and article-specific factors seem to relate to the duration 
of the peer review process. Conference-based papers, in particular, benefit from an accel-
erated peer review process. Dissertation-based articles usually take longer (at least for 
JAE and JAR), most likely due to authors’ inexperience with the publication process. Co-
authorships are beneficial in TAR but show diminishing returns for JAE and JAR. 
For the second set of analyses, the results of my base model regression (without fairness 
indicators) suggest that the peer review process in TAR is certainly efficient, i.e., not 
fundamentally influenced by characteristics of the article or the authors. Noticeably, high-
quality articles, which received many citations following publication, pass the process 
significantly faster. Co-authorships have a significantly decreasing effect on the duration 
of the peer review process. Knowledge and skills necessary to conduct high-quality re-
search, hence, seem to be rooted in collaboration and division of labor between multiple 
authors rather than informal feedback from colleagues, seminars, conferences, etc. At first 
glance, this result may contradict common wisdom, as senior researchers strongly em-
phasize the importance of circulating manuscripts (e.g., for accounting (Demski and Zim-
merman 2000; Locker 1964; Zimmerman 1989), economics (Hamermesh 1992), market-
ing (Perry et al. 2003), finance (Green et al. 2002), or health (Swartz 1999)). Yet, informal 
feedback may be more important to receive unbiased feedback on the quality of a paper 
or research idea prior to submission (Brown 2005). Once a submission passes the desk 
rejection-hurdle, other factors seem to be more important for total duration.  
I additionally investigate the effect of fairness indicators. The analysis is based on a sub-
sample of articles from 2003 to 2009, for which the accepting editor is known. If institu-
tional bonds between the accepting editor and one of the authors exist, the time spent in 
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peer review apparently decreases. This result, however, should be interpreted with cau-
tion, as it could simply reflect a self-selection of high-quality faculty into high-quality 
journals (Fogarty and Yu 2010; Swanson et al. 2007). Furthermore, mentioning members 
of the editorial staff (e.g., associate editors) in the acknowledgements is associated with 
a significant decrease in peer review duration. Although this could induce strategic be-
havior by the authors, quality feedback from a member of the editorial team is also a 
possible criterion for improving the paper in a timely fashion. My results are robust to the 
inclusion of fixed effects for submission year as well as research method and topic.  
My study contributes to several aspects of current research, which sheds some light on 
the “black box” that is the peer review process. First, I provide evidence on the duration 
of the peer review process in top accounting journals for a most recent period. Second, 
mine is the first study to comprehensively address potential factors influencing the dura-
tion of the peer review process. Third, based on the several theoretical predictions for 
determinants of peer review duration and the incentives of the involved parties (authors, 
referees, editors), I use several new measures to operationalize author- and article-specific 
factors. Fourth, I build upon a unique, long time-series dataset, including a subsample of 
articles for which the accepting editor is known. Therefore, my study is the first to em-
pirically relate the issue of fairness, i.e., editor favoritism to peer review duration. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the prior literature. 
Research questions are explicated in Section 3. Research design, sample selection, and 
results for the two analysis can be found in Sections 4 and 5. Section 6 contains conclud-
ing remarks. 
2 Prior Literature 
The existing literature on the peer review process is usually classified into three main 
sections: quality, ethics, and efficiency (Armstrong 1997; Bailey et al. 2008b). A review 
process is of high quality if it successfully distinguishes promising papers from the bulk 
of submissions and supports further improvement of the selected papers. While there is 
general agreement on the latter part, peer review as a selection device faces skepticism. 
There is an apprehension that peer review harms innovative research, as referees focus 
too much on methodical issues and embedding previous research (Armstrong 1996). Ev-
idence on rejected papers, which would later get highly cited (Campanario 1996), and 
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random outcomes from repeated submissions of already published work (Peters and Ceci 
1982) provide evidence on this issue. 
Editors are thus reacting to criticism by shedding some light on the “black box” of the 
peer review process. Narratives on personal experiences across different disciplines (e.g., 
economics (McAfee 2010), management (Brief 2004; Clark et al. 2006; Harrison 2002), 
and accounting (Clarkson 2012)) have been established as its own strand of literature. 
Editors use this channel to provide guidelines and suggestions to make the process more 
beneficial for authors. Another approach to achieve this objective is evaluations of the 
reasons for rejections. Applying content analysis methodology to editorial letters and re-
view reports, previous studies identified a lack of contribution, methodological flaws, and 
research topics which did not suit a journal’s focus as the main reasons (Clark et al. 2006; 
Howard and Stout 2006; Stout et al. 2006). Czyzewski and Dickinson (1990) obtained 
similar results by surveying 350 accounting referees on their perception of the most im-
portant reasons. Brown (2005) investigates the editor’s decision for 305 papers submitted 
to The Accounting Review, taking the individuals, institutions, and conferences mentioned 
in the acknowledgements, as well as the author’s institutional background and experience, 
into account. He finds a highly significant influence of institutions but only weakly sig-
nificant results for the two attributes relating to the author.  
Research on ethics in the peer review process mostly focuses on aspects of fairness. In a 
survey of 505 North American accounting researchers, Bailey et al. (2008a) found that 
the majority of respondents have neither personally observed nor heard about selfish or 
cliquish acts in the peer review process. While there seems to be general agreement on 
the fairness of the process, authors primarily publishing in top journals are less convinced 
than their peers. Adler and Liyanarachchi (2011) obtained comparable results from 288 
authors who published in accounting journals in 2004 and 2005. Unsurprisingly, authors 
of accepted papers were significantly more satisfied than authors of rejected submissions. 
An alternative approach to address certain fairness issues is bibliometric analysis. One 
major topic is the editor’s discretion with respect to reviewer selection, the final decision 
on the acceptance of a submission, and the order of articles within the journal (Oswald 
2008). Smart and Waldfogel (1996) conduct a citation analysis of finance and economics 
journals on the latter issue. They find an editorial bias towards authors outside the top 
universities. Laband and Piette (1994) perform a citation analysis, too, but find evidence 
that articles have higher chances of publication if institutional bonds between the authors 
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and the editorial board of the journal exist. They are, however, cautious with the interpre-
tation of their results. While their results could indicate favoritism, they trace the reasons 
to the editor screening the market for research papers. The probability of finding a quality 
paper is higher in top schools, where most of the editorial board members come from, 
rather than outside of them. 
Based on this extant literature, many researchers developed rules and guidelines for au-
thors, referees, and editors to improve the process and assure comparable, qualitative, and 
effective peer reviews (Alexander 2013; Bailey et al. 2008a; Di Pietra 2013; Harrison 
2002; Loeb 1994; Moizer 2009; Ravenscroft and Fogarty 1998; Vaivio 2013). In contrast, 
most of the editors who publish accounting research do not see a need for a common code 
of conduct (Borkowski and Welsh 1998). 
The third strand of research addresses the efficiency of the peer review process, i.e., its 
timeliness and resource consumption (Bailey et al. 2008b). Several analytical studies 
model the behavior and incentives of editors, referees, and authors in the peer review 
process. Ellison’s (2002a) q-r-model notes the publication threshold as a function of orig-
inality (q) and methodological rigor (r). For papers with a lower q-factor, referees will 
demand a higher r-factor, thus prolonging the review process. Additional time spent in 
the review process equals costs for the authors, as they cannot work on the paper or submit 
it to another journal. This mechanism prevents journals from being drowned with low q- 
and r-papers or having to publish papers subpar to the standard of the journal (Azar 1996; 
Lee 2009). Consequently, innovative and methodically sound papers have shorter peer 
review durations. Leslie (2005) likewise identifies the peer review process duration as 
submission costs for the author. In his model, the authors’ decision to bear these costs is 
determined by the probability of acceptance. Even given a known publication threshold, 
the author must rely on a biased signal on the quality of her own work. However, authors 
could follow a “top-down” strategy, i.e., consecutively submit their paper to journals of 
different qualities, starting at the top. For this reason, Azar (2007) identifies the first-
response time as an important indicator of peer review effectiveness. As long as no initial 
decision is available, the authors must not submit the paper to another journal. Hence, 
longer first-response times increase the costs of the authors. 
Top accounting journals offer shorter first-response times than most finance and econom-
ics journals, indicating an effective peer review process (Azar 2004). More contemporary 
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survey results, however, indicate a slowdown in first-response times (Adler and Liyana-
rachchi 2011). Early evidence on the overall duration of the peer review, from submission 
to acceptance, was provided by Bowen and Sundem (1982) for nine accounting journals 
in 1980 as well as Trivedi (1993) and Yohe (1980) for many economics journals. For both 
disciplines the mean duration varied strongly between the journals. Ellison (2002b) doc-
uments a steady increase for the average peer review duration in economics journals as 
opposed to finance and accounting journals between 1970 and 1999. In an additional 
analysis, he identifies the increased competition for slots in top journals as well as longer 
papers as major drivers but notes that large parts of the increase in peer review duration 
cannot yet be explained. Based on the prediction of q-r-theory, Swanson (2004) denotes 
differences in the competition for publication slots in top journals across different busi-
ness disciplines. Publishing in a premier accounting outlet is, by his measure, much more 
competitive than in marketing or finance due to a comparably lower number of yearly 
articles and a high concentration of faculty represented in the journals (Swanson et al. 
2007). While these results cast some doubt on the fairness of the review, they fit with the 
underlying theory as higher referee demands (r), leading to longer review times adding 
additional costs, which are less incriminating for authors at top schools.  
Survey results on timeliness, as perceived by the authors, yield different results. In gen-
eral, American scholars are more satisfied with the timeliness of peer review in top jour-
nals than in other academic outlets. Authors who primarily publish in top journals, on the 
other hand, perceive the process there to be slow (Bailey et al. 2008a). For an international 
sample, Adler and Liyanarachchi (2011) find top journals in the mid-range regarding per-
ceived timeliness and quality of peer review. Overall, prior literature documents differ-
ences in the timeliness of peer review across disciplines and journal types. Respective 
incentives and factors have been partially determined in empirical or theoretical studies. 
However, to my knowledge, a comprehensive empirical study incorporating these factors 
has not yet been conducted. 
3 Research Questions 
Accounting academics show a modest satisfaction with the timeliness of the peer review 
process in top- and second-tier journals (Adler and Liyanarachchi 2011; Bailey et al. 
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2008a). However, Ellison (2002b) documents a decreasing trend in the peer review dura-
tion for accounting compared to economic journals between 1970 and 1999. Based on 
this contradictory evidence, the first research question reads: 
RQ1:  Do differences in the duration of the peer review process between the top account-
ing journals, or over time, exist?  
As shown in the previous section, prior literature has paid much attention to the occur-
rences within the peer review process. I argue that the submission of a paper is merely 
the end of a greater process. Assuming the threshold of quality for a submitted paper to 
not be immediately rejected is constant, the duration of the peer review is likely to reflect 
a paper’s level of maturity. To mitigate the rejection risk, authors will tend to initially 
submit a paper of highest possible quality. High quality can, according to Ellison (2002a), 
be obtained by the degree of innovation (q) and/or methodological rigor (r). An unbiased 
assessment (Leslie 2005) regarding the two dimensions of one’s own work depends on 
the experience and knowledge within the team of authors or can be obtained from infor-
mal feedback by colleagues, workshop participants, etc. While the theoretical reasoning 
is well established, to this date I am not aware of any comprehensive study providing 
evidence on the impact of and relations between those factors. Consequently, my second 
research question reads: 
RQ2:  Is the duration of the peer review process influenced by article- and author-spe-
cific factors or the extent of informal feedback authors receive prior to or during 
the peer review process? 
Building upon the existing literature on ethics in the peer review process (e.g., Laband 
and Piette 1994; Moizer 2009), my third research question reads: 
RQ3: Is the influence of article- and author specific factors as well as informal feedback 
conditional to an unbiased (i.e., fair) peer review process? 
4 Data 
Following the suggestion by Hamermesh (1994), I utilize the dates of initial submission 
and acceptance available on the single published articles. In recent years, publishers offer 
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information on the publication history directly on the web sites of the journals. If availa-
ble, the latter option was preferred. Furthermore, for the second analysis (determinants 
and fairness of the peer review process), the articles need to comprehend acknowledge-
ments to derive information on informal feedback and other paper-specific attributes (dis-
sertation, etc.). To check whether these three items are available, I performed a pre-test 
based on the leading North American general accounting journals (Bonner et al. 2006; 
Merchant 2010; Oler et al. 2010): Journal of Accounting and Economics (JAE), Review 
of Accounting Studies (RASt), The Accounting Review (TAR), and Contemporary Ac-
counting Research (CAR). The results are mixed. I further added Accounting, Organiza-
tion, and Society (AOS), and the European Accounting Review (EAR) as leading Euro-
pean journals (Bonner et al. 2006; Lowe and Locke 2005). Most of the journals have 
changed their policies either once over time or do not offer the required information. In 
detail, JAE offers information on the publication history in 1999 and since 2003. 
Acknowledgements are available for some articles in 1999 and again since 2013. JAR 
and TAR offer the data continuously since 2001 and 1979, respectively. For the remaining 
two journals (AOS, CAR, EAR), at least one item is missing over time.  
Based on these results, I selected TAR, JAE, and JAR as the sample for the first analysis 
(2001 to 2010). Furthermore, TAR provides an even longer time-series for the beginning 
and end date of the peer review process as well as the acknowledgements. For this reason, 
I additionally gather author- and article-specific data (determinants) for all TAR articles 
published between 1997 and 2009. I also selected TAR for the additional analysis on the 
fairness of the peer review process, as this data is available since 2003.29 By focusing on 
one journal, I can directly account for time trends and journal-specific factors (editorial 
policy, direction regarding methods, and content, etc.), which may vary over time. 
To gather information on the articles published in the sample period, meta-data on all 
articles published in the three journals was retrieved from Thomson Reuters Web of 
Knowledge. For analysis 1, the initial sample consisted of 1,268 articles (Table 25, Panel 
A) from TAR, JAE, and JAR published between 2001 and 2010. All articles that were 
not original research articles (e.g., discussions, book reviews) or not subject to a peer 
review (e.g., invited papers, editorials) were dropped. Additionally, the sample was 
cleaned from articles with missing data on the publication history (dates of submission 
                                                 
29  In 2012, JAR started to state the accepting editor in acknowledgement. TAR has kept its editor trans-
parency policy up until today. 
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and acceptance) and articles for which submission and acceptance were identical (peer 
review duration would be zero). The final sample consists of 967 articles. Most notably, 
the number of observations from TAR is nearly as high (472) as those of JAE and JAR 
combined (182 + 313 = 495). Breaking the sample down by year (Table 25, Panel B) 
shows that the share of research articles with available publication data is the lowest for 
JAE, where the years 2001 and 2002 are completely missing.30 TAR and JAR have a 
good coverage over the entire sample period. Hence, results for JAE should be interpreted 
cautiously. 
Analysis 2 features the determinants and fairness of the peer review process. The first 
part (determinants) is based on articles published in TAR between 1997 (Volume 70) and 
                                                 
30  For single articles, data is missing in all years but 2009. 
Table 25: 
Sample Selection of Analysis 1 
Panel A: Sample Selection         
  TAR  JAE  JAR  Total 
         
All articles 2001 – 2010  578  312  378  1,268 
./. Errata, Editorials, Book Reviews  83  4  13  100 
./. Discussions and Invited Papers  16  55  50  121 
./. Missing Data on Peer Review Process  6  71  1  78 
./. Duration = 0  1    1  2 
         
Total  472  182  313  967 
Panel B: Sample Coverage 
  TAR  JAE  JAR 
  All Sample %  All Sample %  All Sample % 
             
2001  28 28 100 %  10 0 0 %  35 35 100 % 
2002  45 39 87 %  16 0 0 %  49 48 98 % 
2003  42 42 100 %  33 26 79 %  28 28 100 % 
2004  45 45 100 %  22 21 95 %  24 24 100 % 
2005  47 47 100 %  26 15 58 %  23 23 100 % 
2006  42 42 100 %  30 16 53 %  28 28 100 % 
2007  42 42 100 %  29 25 86 %  31 30 97 % 
2008  51 50 98 %  37 36 97 %  38 38 100 % 
2009  66 66 100 %  24 24 100 %  30 30 100 % 
2010  71 71 100 %  26 19 73 %  29 29 100 % 
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up to and including 2009 (Volume 84). According to Thomson Reuters Web of 
Knowledge, a total of 617 articles have been published in this period. Book reviews, dis-
cussion articles, and replicas, as well as editorials and invited articles, were excluded, as 
these provide no original research and/or are not subject to a formal peer review process 
as outlined above. Of the remaining 493 articles, another 16 articles were dropped due to 
missing author-specific information. The final sample consists of 477 single research ar-
ticles. For the second analysis, which includes factors indicating the fairness of the peer 
review process, information on the editor who accepted the article is required. TAR pro-
vides this data since the second issue in 2003. Hence, the number of observations de-
creases by 170 to a final sample for the second analysis of 307 articles.  
5 Analysis 1: Duration of the peer review process in Leading 
Accounting Journals 
5.1 Publication Patterns and Trends 
Journal-specific factors in the publication and editorial process can potentially interfere 
with the duration of the peer review process. To accommodate this issue, Table 26 pre-
sents descriptive statistics on the overall publication of the three journals based on the 
sample articles.31 
Comparing the three journals (Panel A of Table 26) shows that TAR and JAR are com-
parable with regard to the number of issues and average length of an article. JAE shows 
a distinct pattern: a comparably low number of issues with shorter articles. However, the 
latter can be partly attributed to a changing page layout in recent years. The newer layout 
features thin margins and a tiny font, increasing the number of characters on one page 
compared to TAR and JAR. Over time, the three journals increased their output by raising 
the number of issues (+ 1.67 issues from 2001 to 2010) and average length of an article 
(+ 8,3 pages; 39.4%). However, the increase in article length mainly took place between 
2001 and 2004. Both factors as well as an increasing number of articles led to a strong 
increase in the total number of pages published. Between 2003 and 2010, the years with 
coverage for all three journals, the total number of pages increased by 65.6%. Overall, 
differences in the publication pattern between the journals are rather small but signal a 
                                                 
31  Please note, that the years 2001 and 2002 do not contain any articles from JAE. 
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strong time-trend. This finding coincides with Swanson’s (2004) notion that accounting 
journals did indeed increase the publication space. However, if his second result, namely 
a shortage of publication slots compared to demand by an increasing number of research-
ers, holds, one would expect an increase in the duration of the peer review process to raise 
authors’ costs of submission (Azar 1996; Leslie 2005; Lee 2009). 
Two distinct types of publications stem from dissertations and conferences held by the 
journals. Dissertation-based papers are – by design – prepared by a young and unexperi-
enced scholar who is making her first step in the publishing market. Additionally, topics 
and ideas used in dissertations could be more novel and experimental since the author has 
a comparably long time to work on her thesis. Taken together, one would assume that the 
combination of more of Ellison’s (2002b) q and an inexperienced author would translate 
into a longer duration of peer review process. To further investigation this notion, I code 
papers as dissertations based on whether the acknowledgements contains either the word 
“dissertation” or “thesis.” Column 2 in Panels A and B of Table 27 shows a breakdown 
Table 26: 
Number of Articles, Issues, Total Pages, and Article Length 
  Articles  Issues  Total Pages  Mean Pages 
Panel A: By Journals         
         
TAR  472  4.97  1,401.12  27.18 
JAE  182  2.13  741.09  24.73 
JAR  313  4.78  1,011.19  31.16 
         
Total  967  4.37  1,150.94  28.00 
Panel B: By Year         
  
       
2001  63  3.45  666.06  21.06 
2002  87  4.55  1,199.31  25.16 
2003  96  3.81  964.10  27.26 
2004  90  3.88  951.07  29.14 
2005  85  4.05  1,015.58  28.78 
2006  86  4.44  993.51  28.50 
2007  97  4.23  1,086.37  30.42 
2008  124  4.53  1,231.27  28.31 
2009  120  4.95  1,409.50  28.97 
2010  119  5.12  1,596.88  29.36 
         
Total  967  4.37  1,150.94  28.00 
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of dissertation-based papers for the journals and years. TAR published the most disserta-
tion-based papers (14%), followed by JAR (10%) and JAE (6%). However, these results 
may underestimate the absolute share dissertation-based papers since acknowledgements 
are not widely available for JAR and JAE. This, however, works against any findings 
with respect to process duration. Additionally, the absolute number as well as the share 
of dissertation-based papers declined over time, particularly in recent years. In contrast, 
the share of papers presented at the journals’ conferences is steady over time (Column 3 
in B of Table 27). Articles were coded as conference-based if they were included in a 
special conference issue of the journal. Other than JAR and JAE, TAR does not devote 
an annual special issue to conference papers (Column 3 in A of Table 27). JAR and JAE 
offer an accelerated peer review process to certain papers presented at their respective 
annual conferences. Hence, the overall results could be affected by a potentially fast re-
view process for 5 to 17% of the papers in the sample. This effect would be most notable 
for JAE, where conference papers account for 24% of all articles. 
Table 27: 
Articles from Conference Issues and based on Dissertations 
  All Articles  Dissertation  Conference Papers 
Panel A: By Journal         
         
TAR  473  65 14 %  0 0 % 
JAE  182  11 6 %  44 24 % 
JAR  313  32 10 %  50 16 % 
Panel B: By Year         
         
2001  64  14 22 %  0 0 % 
2002  87  12 14 %  8 9 % 
2003  96  11 11 %  14 15 % 
2004  90  7 8 %  15 17 % 
2005  85  14 16 %  4 5 % 
2006  86  10 12 %  7 8 % 
2007  97  11 11 %  11 11 % 
2008  124  15 12 %  13 10 % 
2009  120  9 8 %  10 8 % 
2010  119  5 4 %  12 10 % 
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5.2 Duration of the Peer Review Process 
Table 28 shows descriptive statistics for the duration of the peer review process for the 
three journals. On average, a paper takes nearly 534 days (~17.8 months) to make it 
through the peer review process. Even though it does not appear so when looking at the 
mean values, TAR and JAR share some commonalities. With a median duration of 457.5 
and 450.0 days, respectively, papers need approximately 15 months to successfully pass 
the review hurdle. The comparably high difference in mean values of 31.0 days is caused 
by an outlier, which circles for 2.593 days (86.4 months; 7.2 years). JAE has the slowest 
review process, averaging 640.9 days. With 590.5 days, the median value is also more 
than 140 days higher than for TAR and JAR. There are two potential explanations. First, 
JAE could offer a very challenging and critical peer review process which is time-con-
suming for authors and reviewers prolonging response times. Second, JAE could deliber-
ately extend the duration to raise authors’ costs of submission (Azar 1996; Leslie 2005; 
Lee 2009). Given the small number of publication slots, as discussed above, and the com-
parably high share of conference-based articles, the second explanation seems reasonable. 
A long review process is a potential avenue to address excess demand. Unfortunately, 
JAE does not offer an editorial report. Comparing the reported number of yearly submis-
sions with other journals could add further evidence to this notion. 
Figure 2 shows the kernel density distribution of the peer review process’ duration for the 
three journals with a bandwidth of 90 days. Grey lines signal year-end (360 days). Density 
expresses the share of papers accepted at a given period of time. For JAR (dotted line), 
Table 28: 
Descriptive Statistics on the Duration of the peer review process (in days) 
  TAR  JAE  JAR  Total 
   
 
 
 
   
N  472  182  313  967 
Mean  496.79  640.90  527.83  533.96 
SD  236.64  311.79  330.60  289.24 
Min  30.00  8.00  13.00  8.00 
1. Q  334.50  449.00  299.00  334.00 
Median  457.50  590.50  450.00  487.00 
2. Q.  608.00  794.00  707.00  669.00 
Max  1,614.00  1,682.00  2,593.00  2,593.00 
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density peaks early, even before one year. In contrast, JAE shows the highest density 
(highest share of accepted papers) after more than 500 days. TAR is stuck in the middle. 
The distribution on the right-hand side is also interesting. Whereas TAR is left-skewed 
with a comparably low number of papers behind the peak, JAR has a slight plateau start-
ing around the 500 days-mark.  
Figure 3 provides another perspective. The Kaplan-Meier Failure Estimate plot (band-
width: 90 days) shows the cumulative share of “failures” at a given point in time. In the 
case at hand, “failure” actually means “success,” i.e., acceptance of the paper. Looking at 
the one-year mark (first grey line), the “acceptance rate” is below 20% for JAE, around 
25% for TAR, and near 45% for JAR. However, TAR is faster in the second year of 
reviews. As an author, chances of an acceptance after 500 days in TAR’s peer review 
process are higher than for her colleague at JAR. It is the reverse in the first year. How-
ever, the results for JAR may be strongly driven by 50 conference-based papers with an 
accelerated review. Nonetheless, the results indicate that an acceptance is more likely in 
the second than in the first year – if there is an acceptance at all.  
Figure 2: 
Kernel Density Plot for the Duration of the peer review process 
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Focusing on temporal changes in the duration of the peer review process yields mixed 
results. Figure 4 depicts the median duration for the three journals based on year of pub-
lication. The timeliness order obtained from the descriptive statistics is stable over time 
and unchanged since 2004. Most notably, JAR bisected its median duration between 2001 
and 2004, switching from slowest to fastest journal. However, median duration increased 
by more than 100 days since reaching its minimum in 2004. TAR shows fluctuating du-
rations for the first three years, followed by a nearly constant duration for the three-year 
period from 2004 to 2006. Since then, median duration increased to more than 500 days 
in 2010. As expected, JAE has the longest duration of the entire eight-year period. Inter-
estingly, it shows a similar decreasing tendency, as JAR from 2003 to 2005 is nearly on 
par with TAR. Starting in 2006, duration increased again before slightly declining in 2009 
and 2010. Taken together, JAR and JAE seem to have taken measures against extreme 
durations in the first half on the sample period, with some positive effects. However, the 
achievements diminished in recent years. In contrast, TAR initially had a more constant 
policy but faces higher durations at the end of the sample period.  
Figure 3: 
Kaplan-Meier Failure Estimates for the Duration of the peer review process 
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Table 29 provides the results of four split-sample analyses. Results for the time-split sam-
ple in Panel A confirm inferences from prior analyses. Mean duration decreases most 
strongly for JAR (-112. 59 days) in the 2006 to 2010 period compared to 2001 to 2005. 
This result may be mostly attributable to the strong decline at the beginning of the sample 
period. However, average duration significantly increased for TAR (+75.15 days), con-
trasting the stable-looking graph in Figure 4. JAE also shows a 41-day increase. Given its 
overall long duration, this result is hardly surprising. For dissertation-based papers (Panel 
B), the expected low experience, high q-effect can be observed for two out three journals. 
Results are most pronounced for JAE (+124.15 days), where dissertation-based papers on 
average spend more than two years under review (~ 758 days). Interestingly, dissertation-
based papers are slightly faster than other papers in TAR (-1.7 days). Conference-based 
papers (Panel C) usually enjoy an accelerated peer review process, which translates into 
shorter duration, as observed for JAE (-132.08 days; 4.4 months) and particularly JAR (-
239.37 days; 7.98 months). Finally, Panel D shows results for co-authorship patterns. In 
all journals, single-authored papers take the longest time in the peer review process. Ob-
viously, it is more challenging for a one person to cope with reviewer and editorial com-
ments in a timely manner than for a team. However, the results suggest that having a team 
Figure 4: 
Median Duration of the peer review process over Time 
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is not always beneficial in terms of speeding up the process. Indeed, papers with two co-
authors enjoy the benefit of a faster review process in all three journals. The effect is most 
pronounced in JAE (approx. –120 days) as compared to JAR (approx. –21 days) and TAR 
(approx. –3 days). Larger teams with three or more authors only do better in TAR. There, 
the process shortens by ~20 days on average. In JAE and JAR, larger teams face strongly 
increasing durations (JAE: approx. +39 days; JAR: approx.: +89 days). Either larger 
teams tend to submit more rigorous research facing many comments, or the coordination 
for a larger team is time-consuming and decreases the productivity.  
Overall, the results imply that the duration of peer review process strongly varies between 
journals and over time. In the second half of the sample period, the order of the journals 
and trends for duration converged. The strong increase in publication space (as measured 
Table 29: 
Differences in peer review duration 
  n Mean  n Mean  Difference 
Panel A: Time-split Sample          
  2001-2005  2006-2010   
          
TAR  201 453.64  271 528.79  75.15 *** 
JAE  62 613.86  120 654.87  41.01  
JAR  158 583.58  155 470.99  -112.59 *** 
Panel B: Dissertation          
  No  Yes    
          
TAR  408 496.75  65 495.02  -1.74  
JAE  171 633.39  11 757.55  124.15  
JAR  281 523.99  32 561.53  37.54  
Panel C: Conference Issues          
  No  Yes    
          
TAR  ./. ./.  ./. ./.  ./.  
JAE  138 672.83  44 540.75  -132.08 ** 
JAR  263 566.07  50 326.70  -239.37 *** 
Panel D: Co-Authorships          
  1 Author  2 Authors  3+ Authors 
          
TAR  108 507.38  164 504.32  201 484.30 
JAE  27 726.33  69 604.36  86 643.38 
JAR  51 503.04  114 482.04  148 571.64 
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by number of articles or the total number of pages) does not translate into a shorter dura-
tion of the peer review process for JAE and JAR. TAR shows a steady trend upwards. 
Both trends are in line with the observations by Swanson (2004). Top accounting journals 
did indeed increase the available journal space to meet increasing publication demand 
from scholars. However, journals can increase authors’ costs of submission by prolonged 
review processes (Azar 1996; Leslie 2005; Lee 2009). The observed increase in the du-
ration of the peer review process may, hence, be a strategic reaction to address remaining 
excess demand. Even though Swanson (2004) and Swanson et al. (2007) document excess 
demand for top tier accounting publications, it is hard to find direct empirical evidence 
on this issue. The share of papers not submitted because of increased monetary (submis-
sion fee) and non-monetary costs (peer review duration) as well as potentially increasing 
rejection rates and longer turnaround times (until rejection) are unobservable since the 
necessary data is not publicly available. However, annual statistics on rejection rates and 
turnaround statistics made public by some journals (e.g., TAR, cf. Kachelmeier (2009); 
DeFond 2016)) could be used in future research to address this issue. Besides the overall 
trends mentioned before, certain article-specific and other factors seem to relate to the 
duration of the peer review process. Conference-based papers, in particular, benefit from 
an accelerated peer review process. Dissertation-based papers usually take longer (at least 
for JAE and JAR), most likely due to authors’ inexperience with the publication process. 
Co-authorships are beneficial in TAR but show diminishing returns for JAE and JAR. 
6 Analysis 2: Determinants and Fairness in the peer review process 
of The Accounting Review 
6.1 Research Design 
6.1.1 Model specification and expectations for the base model 
To address research questions two and three, two methodological approaches are possi-
ble. Applying a survey approach, the subjective intentions and the perceived importance 
of the different factors affecting the peer review process could be addressed (Adler and 
Liyanarachchi 2011; Bailey et al. 2008a). Yet, I am rather interested in whether these 
factors actually have any impact on the duration of review process. As such, I follow 
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Brown (2005) and Ellison (2002a) by applying a quantitative approach based primarily 
on hand-collected data. 
The dependent variable in my model is the duration of the peer review process in months 
(ACCDUR). It is calculated as Year&Month of acceptance − Year&Month of submis-
sion.32 An alternative measure would be the duration of the entire publication process 
(PUBLDUR)33 from submission to the final publication in the printed journal or, in case 
of an online-first policy, on the website of the journal (Amat 2008; Bowen and Sundem 
1982). This measure, however, is noisy, as the process of qualitatively improving the 
papers ends with the acceptance. Possible editorial changes and other reasons, such as 
limited journal publication space that causes long(er) output queues, subsequently do not 
have any impact on the quality of the paper. To control of extreme values, ACCDUR is 
winsorized at the 95%-level. 
As outlined above, the influential factors (independent variables) can be assigned to four 
classes: informal feedback, article- and author-specific factors, as well as fairness indica-
tors. Informal feedback can be understood as all comments, criticism, ideas, and sugges-
tions the author(s) receives from co-workers, colleagues, and students outside the “for-
mal” peer review process. Possible forms are presenting a paper at workshops, seminars, 
or conferences, as well as more immediate private conversations or written feedback (be-
yond any formal frame). To directly address these feedback channels, I include the num-
ber of workshops34 (EVNUMWS), conferences35 (EVNUMCONF), and individuals36 
(INDNUMCOM) listed in the acknowledgements. According to the empirical results of 
Brown (2005), I expect a negative relation between the number of sources of informal 
feedback and the duration of the peer review process. 
                                                 
32  Because TAR includes the months of submission and acceptance but no exact dates, submission and 
acceptance are assumed to be dated on the first day of the month.  
33  Azar (2007) further separates the process into four consecutive stages: (1) “reject-and-revision time” as 
the time spent searching for a journal which does not desk-reject the paper, (2) “first response […] time” 
as the time for the first editorial (revise-and-resubmit) decision in the journal which will later publish 
the paper, (3) “revision time” as time between first editorial response and final acceptance, and (4) 
“forthcoming-article delay” as time between acceptance and final publication. For this study, I use ag-
gregated measures as the data necessary to separate the stages (1), (2) and (3) are not available. There-
fore, ACCDUR = (2) + (3) and PUBLDUR = (2) + (3) + (4). 
34  Includes all events labeled as research or doctoral workshops or seminars.  
35  Includes all events those names included one of the words conference, colloquium, symposium, meet-
ing, (doctoral) consortium, forum or congress.  
36  Includes all individuals or groups of individuals (e.g., “Ph.D. students at ABC University”) for whom 
no specific function (e.g., editor, associate editor, research assistant, participant in an experiment, etc.) 
was mentioned. 
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Regarding the second class, article-specific factors, the first variable is the number of 
authors (AUTHORS). Prior literature has shown a steady increase in co-authorship pat-
terns in accounting (Englebrecht et al. 2008) and other disciplines (e.g., Hartley 2003). 
Teams of authors could benefit from division of labor and specialized knowledge of the 
individual team members. Ceteris paribus, this should have a positive effect on the qual-
ity of the initially submitted paper. Within the process, team members can simultaneously 
address remarks and concerns of referees and editors. Assuming this effect to superpose 
time lags due to potential coordination efforts between authors, co-authorship should lead 
to shorter response times.  
I include the length of an article (LENGTH) measured by the number of pages.37 Assum-
ing a constant effort of the concerned editors, referees, and authors, the duration of the 
peer review process should increase with the length of paper (Ellison 2002b). This meas-
ure, however, could be partly endogenous. Referees and editors could demand additional 
arguments, analyses, or tests, which lead to longer articles. The comparatively normal 
distribution of the variable LENGTH (see Table 31) mitigates this concern. 
Ellison’s (2002a) q-r-theory predicts a time-dependent increase in peer review duration 
for articles treating a comparable (methodological and/or topical) main idea. He traces 
this back to a diminishing degree of innovation (q), as the main idea evolves while refer-
ees become more concerned with methodological rigor (r). Current research (Flickinger 
et al. 2014) addresses this rigor-versus-relevance-issue by applying extensive content-
analysis methodology on a sample of 38 articles. For a larger scale study like the one at 
hand, this approach is not suitable. Therefore, I operationalize some indicators to account 
for possible differences in the q- and r-dimensions of the articles. The first indicator is 
the length of an article’s title (TITLECHAR), measured by the number of characters (in-
cluding spaces). If ongoing research activity around a main idea induces more detailed 
research questions and methods, authors may want to signal that their work is part of a 
certain research stream. At the same time, it is necessary to convey information on the 
incremental novelty of paper, thus prolonging the title.38 Shorter titles, therefore, tend to 
                                                 
37  This argument neglects possible changes in page layout, e.g., font size, paragraph spacing or margins. 
While manually collecting the data, I did not notice any significant changes concerning this matter, 
though. 
38  Just one example: Botosan’s (1997) seminal article on the impact of disclosure on the cost of capital 
had a title length of 47 characters. A younger study (Kothari et al. 2009), in which a broader scope 
regarding content and method is applied, has a title with 162 characters. 
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indicate more innovative articles, which pass the peer review process faster. The second 
measure is the number of references cited in the article (PAPERSCITED) as obtained 
from Thomson Reuters Web of Knowledge. Articles building upon a new idea are unlikely 
to resort to a large literature base, hence containing comparatively small numbers of ref-
erences. Contrariwise, a lower number of cited references could also be the consequence 
of a highly specialized research area. Besides that, the number of references cited is most 
likely higher for longer articles. To account for this issue, the number of cited references 
is scaled by LENGTH. Overall, however, there is no expected outcome for this variable. 
As it should become apparent that a clear empirical distinction between the innovative 
and methodological rigor of articles is at least difficult to realize, the final two factors 
focus on the overall quality of an article. The first quality measure is the number of cita-
tions an article received after its publication (CITES).39 The total number of citations for 
each article was obtained from Thomson Reuters Web of Knowledge. As the measure is 
based on the total number of citations, that is, all citations an article received since pub-
lication, it may be biased towards older papers. However, prior research has shown that 
articles get most of their citations within a few years after publication (Bricker 1988).40 
At hand, the sample period ends in 2009. The interim three-year period should mitigate 
concerns about a potential asymmetry in temporal distribution of the citations. The num-
ber of citations is a noisy ex post measure of peers’ reception on article quality (Smart 
and Waldfogel 1996). In contrast, the second proxy, whether an article is based on a dis-
sertation or not, builds upon the notion that a paper based on a diligently prepared disser-
tation should at least meet the high quality standards of the underlying thesis. It is there-
fore expected to have a decreasing effect on the time spent in peer review. The corre-
sponding dummy variable DISSERTATION takes the value “1” if the acknowledgements 
contain an indicator that the article is based on a Ph.D. thesis, and “0” otherwise. 
The third class of influential factors is author-specific, especially experience, affiliation, 
and nationality. Experienced academics are more productive in terms of publications than 
                                                 
39  In contrast to Brown‘s (2005) second analysis, I do not use the number of citations as the dependent 
variable. CITES is a measure of quality, which is exogenous to the underlying research project and the 
peer review process. Moreover, papers do not get cited for having short peer review durations but for 
their q- and/or r-quality. Reversed causality, hence, might not be an issue. 
40  Bricker (1988) observes an average citation age between 9 and 11 years, depending on the sample. He 
assumes a possible upward bias in the average age as accounting was still a young discipline in the 
sample period (1960-1985). 
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their younger colleagues (Diamond Jr. 1984; Hasselback et al. 2012).41 This induces a 
learning curve effect which makes it easier for senior researchers to adjust to the expec-
tation of the referees. Alongside their trained research and writing skills, they most likely 
gained some experience from being referees, editors, or members of editorial boards 
themselves. Author experience (AUEXP) is therefore expected to have a decreasing effect 
on peer review duration, as documented by prior research (Yegros and Amat 2009). 
AUEXP is calculated as Year of Submission−Year of Ph.D. Graduation.42 The year of 
Ph.D. graduation for each author was obtained from the Accounting Research Rankings 
of Brigham Young University.43 For co-authored papers, the arithmetic mean of all au-
thors was used. Another indicator for authors’ ability and skillset could be his affiliation 
with a highly-ranked university for two reasons. First, capable faculty has an incentive to 
recruit other skillful researchers and, conversely, good researchers may want to profit 
from network and non-pecuniary benefits arising from an affiliation with a top school. 
Second, prior research documents the prevalence of some schools for publishing in major 
accounting journals (Fogarty and Yu 2010; Swanson et al. 2007), whereupon the affilia-
tion with a top-rank research university or a private school is more important in account-
ing than in other business disciplines (Swanson et al. 2007). As such, I include five vari-
ables which capture the share of authors from top 3, 5, 10, 20, and 50 universities, based 
on Accounting Research Ranking 2012 for all universities, topics, and methods of the 
Brigham Young University44 (AFFILUT3, ~5, ~10, ~20, ~50). A secondary effect of the 
high concentration of universities and business school in accounting journals is an un-
derrepresentation of non-US authors (Jones and Roberts 2005). Potential reasons, like 
language barriers or unfamiliarity with the conventions of the US publication system, 
could play a role, though its effect should be rather small in today’s globalized world. 
Survey results of US and non-US academics by Adler and Liyanarachchi (2011) contra-
dict this argument, as non-US authors are less satisfied with the timeliness and quality of 
peer review in accounting journals. To control for this factor, the variable AUNONUS 
captures the share of authors which were not affiliated with a US university at the time of 
                                                 
41 This trend should reverse once academics reach a point in their careers when their focus shifts to other 
aspects of an academia, e.g., faculty service, teaching, or writing text books (Diamond Jr. 1984). 
42  Experience was expect to be “0” if submission preceded Ph.D. graduation. Brown (2005) as well as 
Yegros and Amat (2009) used the number of articles published by the authors in the journals investi-
gated as a proxy for author experience. Oster and Hamermesh (1998) argue empirically in favor of the 
number of citations one author’s work received as an adequate indicator for research productivity. 
43 Available online: https://goo.gl/f1e0UV (17.02.2017). 
44  Available online: https://goo.gl/nIz5x3 (17.02.2017). 
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publication. Although non-US authors could be affiliated with US institutions (false neg-
atives) and vice versa (false positives), I follow the existing literature (Jones and Roberts 
2005; Oswald 2008) because this approximate measure should be suitable as an indicator. 
Against the background of the reasons outlined above, I expect a prolonged peer review 
process for articles with a higher share of non-US authors. 
Furthermore, I include the number of companies (NUMCOMP) and institutions other 
than universities (NUMINST) as control variables to distinguish informal feedback from 
other forms of research support. Noticeable forms are monetary and non-monetary (e.g., 
providing data) support. Therefore, a dummy variable taking the value “1” if at least one 
of the authors acknowledges financial grants (FINSUPPORT) or provision of data 
(DATASUPPLIER) are included. Financial support, in particular, e.g., research grants, 
do have a significant influence on the quality of a paper, measured by the number of 
citations it receives (Rigby 2013). I therefore expect FINSUPPORT to be negatively con-
nected to the duration of the peer review process but have no unambiguous prediction for 
DATASUPPLIER. 
To increase robustness and eliminate alternative influential factors, I include fixed effects 
for research methods and topics as well as its submission year. The classification for re-
search methods and topics is based on the submission rules for the European Accounting 
Associations Annual Congress 2014. Regarding research methods, I distinguish analyti-
cal/modelling, case/field study, empirical archival, experimental, history, interdiscipli-
nary/critical, market-based, and survey; and for research topics, auditing, accounting ed-
ucation, financial analysis, financial reporting, accounting and governance, accounting 
and information systems, management accounting, public sector accounting, social and 
environmental accounting, as well as taxation.45 The assignment of methods and topics 
was independently conducted by two researchers. We randomly reassigned articles which 
were originally classified by the other. The small number of differences was discussed 
and cleared. Year-fixed effects, on the other hand, could be based on the year of submis-
sion, acceptance or publication of a paper. Because peer review, in many cases, spans 
more than one year, all three proxies are potentially noisy. Submission-year fixed effects 
are included since I assume the authors, editors, and referees incentives to be steady over 
                                                 
45  A further description of the research methods and topics can be found in the Appendix. 
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time. Other factors, e.g., workload of editors and referee or initial quality of the paper, 
should be determined at the beginning of the process, as well. 
6.1.2 Additional specification for fairness indicators 
A large fraction of prior research on the peer review process focuses on the fairness of 
the process (cf. Moizer (2009) provides an exhaustive survey of the relevant literature). 
One pivotal element is the (associate) editor, who can influence the outcome of the peer 
review process by selecting the referees, making the final decision about acceptance, etc. 
(Kachelmeier 2009; Thomas 2011). Survey results for accounting and finance faculty 
highlight editor favoritism, i.e., publishing sub-quality articles authored by colleagues or 
graduate students, as one of the major concerns regarding peer review (Bailey et al. 
2008a; Bailey et al. 2008b). Citation-based examinations for economics and finance jour-
nals document mixed results. Smart and Waldfogel (1996) found favoritism, but against 
their expectation to the benefit of authors outside of the top institutions. On the contrary, 
Laband and Piette (1994) provide evidence on the existence of “good” favoritism, 
whereby the editor uses his personal connections to scout high-quality (i.e., highly cited) 
papers. Against the background of these mixed results, I include a modified version of 
Laband and Piette’s (1994) editor-connection-variable in my regression. The dummy var-
iable EDDEPENNARROW takes the value “1” if one of the three following dummy var-
iables has a value of “1.” The three variables indicate whether the editor and one of the 
authors have the same Ph.D. granting institution (EDSAMEPHDINST) or were affiliated 
with the same university at the time of publication of the article (EDSAMEAFFILSUB) 
or the time of publication of the paper (EDSAMEAFFILPUB).46 Information on the Ph.D. 
granting institutions was obtained from Accounting Research Rankings of the Brigham 
Young University. Editors’ affiliations were derived from their official websites, CVs, or 
general Google searches. 
Additionally, I include the dummy variables THANKEDITOR, THANKSTAFF, and 
THANKREF, which take the value “1” if the acknowledgements contain any reference 
or thanks to an editor, editorial staff member (e.g., associate editor), or referee, respec-
tively. Referees and editorial staff members had to be explicitly mentioned. For the sub-
sample of articles with explicit information on the accepting editor, I accessorily cross-
                                                 
46  Laband and Piette (1994) extend this variables to all editors, associate editors and editorial board mem-
bers at the time of publication. My measure, in comparison, is more conservative. 
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checked if the editor was mentioned by name in the acknowledgements without a notifi-
cation on her status. Giving credit to the other parties involved in the peer review process 
could be an indicator for strategic or persuasive behavior of the authors. Although, quality 
feedback from a member of the editorial team is also a possible criterion for improving 
the paper in a timely fashion. As for all fairness variables, I have no expectation regarding 
the influence on the peer review duration. 
6.2 Results 
6.2.1 Publication Trends and Specific Attributes of Articles and Authors 
This paper extends the publication patterns and trends analyzed for the three top tier jour-
nals in Section 5.1 by focusing on the TAR-specific particularities. Prior literature docu-
ments that research faculty has grown faster than publication spots in the top journals for 
different business disciplines, i.e., accounting (Swanson 2004) and economics (Ellison 
2002b), up to end of the 1990s. Supporting this view, the number of articles published in 
TAR decreased from 26 in 1997 to 19 in 2000 (-27%, Table 30). This downward trend 
reversed afterwards with the number of articles more than trebling between 2000 and 
2009 (19 to 61, +220%).  
Table 30: 
General Publication Trends 
  # Issue  # Articles  # Pages  ∅ Pages/Article 
         
1997  4  26  521  20,0 
1998  4  24  485  20,2 
1999  4  22  451  20,5 
2000  4  19  412  21,7 
2001  4  28  607  21,7 
2002  4  38  928  24,4 
2003  4  42  1100  26,2 
2004  4  45  1145  25,4 
2005  5  45  1179  26,2 
2006  5  42  1121  26,7 
2007  6  40  1228  30,7 
2008  6  50  1521  30,4 
2009  6  61  1799  29,5 
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Similarly, the number of pages decreased by 21% until the year 2000 before growing 
more than four times (412 to 1,799 pages) by 2009. Changing from four to five yearly 
issues in 2005, and to six in 2007, is a result of the increased publication activity.47 The 
higher increase in the number of pages compared to the number of articles was basically 
driven by a steady increase in the average length of articles over the entire sample period 
(20.0 pages/article in 1997 to 29.5 in 2009, +48%). Overall, the upward trend in the num-
ber of articles published and their respective lengths would, ceteris paribus, lead to an 
increased review duration (Ellison 2002b). 
Figure 5 depicts the average duration of the peer review process based on either the year 
the paper was submitted to TAR (dark line) or the year it was published (bright line). 
Looking at the latter first, the duration varies between 12.3 and 21.6 months. Put differ-
ently, the peer review process on average takes one to two years. For the entire sample 
period, the mean (median) duration is 16 (15) months, with 50% of the articles passing 
the review between 10 and 20 months (Table 31). In detail, 14 papers passed through the 
                                                 
47  Notably, the number of articles did not and the number of pages only slightly increase when TAR 
switched from 4 to 5 issues per year in 2005 (45 articles/1,145 pages and 45 articles/1,179 pages in 2004 
and 2005, respectively). 
Figure 5: 
Average Duration of the peer review process 
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process in three months or less, whereas only two papers needed four year or more. Com-
ing back to the bright line in Figure 5, the second half of the 1990s is characterized by an 
increase in the average duration (1997-2000: -26.1%), before fluctuating around 15 
months for most of the 2000s (2000-2007: -4.1%) and strongly increasing again to 19 
months in 2009 (2007-2009: +24%). Focusing on the average duration based on the sub-
mission year, a similar picture evolves. Notably, strong decreases from 1993 to 1997 and 
2006 to 2009 are due to the small number of observations at the edges of the sample 
period.48 In line with results by Ellison (2002b) for the 1980-1999 period, a clear time-
trend cannot be observed, neglecting concerns about a slowdown in the publishing pro-
cess.49 Even more, the process in TAR is faster than in most other journals in economics 
and finance (Ellison 2002b), confirming the positive perception of peer review timeliness 
in top accounting journals (Bailey et al. 2008a). 
The average (median) article passing through the peer review process in TAR has 25.0 
(25.9) pages, is written by 2.2 (2.0) authors, has 1.6 (1.6) references per page, and 31.0 
(19.0) citations after publication (Table 31). On average, more seasoned authors from the 
US (0.1 (0.0) are non-US) with 8.05 (7.67) years of post-doctoral experience publish in 
TAR. Most of these variables are normally distributed. Citations, author experience, and 
nationality, however, are negatively skewed. 
For selected variables, temporal changes are shown in Table 32, Panel A. Most notably, 
the percentage of non-US researchers, as measured by their affiliation at the time of pub-
lication (AUNONUS), is increasing over time from 14.4 to 23.4% (Barth 2013). At the 
same time, extended collaboration becomes more important.  
  
                                                 
48  The oldest paper in the sample was submitted in August 1993 and accepted, after a 48 months peer 
review process, in August 1997. In stark contrast, the youngest paper in the sample was under review 
for only one month, being submitted in June and accepted in July 2008. 
49  An untabulated analysis of the mean time period between submission and final publication of an article 
(publication lag) yields similar results. The publication lag is positively and highly correlated to the 
duration of the peer review process (0.99 and 0.94 based on the submission and publication year, re-
spectively). Since Issue 4/2008 TAR follows an online first-policy. Papers are available online 3 to 4 
months prior to the printed issue, thus shortening the acceptance-publication-lag as this was the case in 
other disciplines (Amat 2008). 
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Table 31: 
Descriptive Statistics 
This table denotes descriptive statistics for the base sample of 477 articles in TAR from 1997 to 2009. 
DURACC is the submission-acceptance-timespan measured in months. CITES is the number of citation 
the paper received in other articles according to Thomson Reuters Web of Knowledge. AUTHORS denotes 
the number of co-authors. LENGTH is the number of pages of an article. TITLECHAR is length of an 
articles title measured by the number of characters. PAPERSCITED is the number of references in an 
article scaled by its length. DISSERTATION is a dummy variable taking the value “1” if the article is 
based on a dissertation. EVNUMCONF and EVNUMWS is the number of conferences and workshops 
the paper was presented at. INDNUMCOM is the number of individuals whom the author(s) thanked in 
the acknowledgements. NUMCOMP and NUMINST denote the number of companies or institutions the 
author(s) mentioned in the acknowledgements. FINSUPPORT and DATASUPPLIER are dummy varia-
bles taking the value “1” if the author(s) thanked institutions, individuals or companies explicitly for fi-
nancial support or providing data used in the article, respectively. AUNONUS is the percentage of au-
thor(s) who were affiliated with a university outside of the US at time of publication of the paper. AUEXP 
is the medium experience of the author(s) measured as the positive number of years between their Ph.D. 
graduation and the submission of the paper. AFFILUT3-50 is the percentage of authors affiliated with a 
top 3, 5, 10, 20 or 50 university at the time of publication based on the Accounting Research Ranking for 
all years, methods and topics of the Brigham Young University. THANKEDITOR is a dummy variable 
taking the value “1” if the author(s) thank the editor in the acknowledgements anonymously or by name. 
THANKREF is a dummy variable taking the value “1” if the author(s) thank at least one editor anony-
mously or by name. THANKSTAFF is a dummy variable taking the value “1” if the author(s) mention at 
least one member of the editorial staff (Associate Editor or equal) in the acknowledgements. 
Variable  n  Mean  SD  Min  1. Q  Median  3. Q  Max 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DurAcc  477  16.04  8.32  0.00  10.00  15.00  20.00  53.00 
Authors  477  2.20  0.87  1.00  2.00  2.00  3.00  5.00 
Length  477  25.87  6.86  8.00  21.00  25.00  30.00  60.00 
TitleChar  477  79.98  27.96  14.00  59.00  79.00  97.50  173.00 
PapersCited  477  1.61  0.61  0.40  1.14  1.57  1.96  3.70 
Cites  477  30.96  38.62  0.00  10.00  19.00  39.00  440.00 
Dissertation  477  0.17  0.38  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 
EvNumConf  477  0.58  0.82  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  4.00 
EvNumWs  477  5.23  3.92  0.00  2.00  5.00  8.00  24.00 
IndNumCom  477  9.22  6.34  0.00  4.00  8.00  13.00  31.00 
NumComp  477  0.10  0.37  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  3.00 
NumInst  477  0.09  0.36  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  3.00 
FinSupport  477  0.46  0.50  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  1.00 
DataSupplier  477  0.25  0.44  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  1.00 
AuNonUS  477  0.13  0.30  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 
AuExp  477  8.05  5.66  0.00  3.50  7.67  12.00  29.00 
AffilUT3  477  0.02  0.12  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 
AffilUT5  477  0.07  0.20  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 
AffilUT10  477  0.12  0.26  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 
AffilUT20  477  0.23  0.35  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.50  1.00 
AffilUT50  477  0.07  0.21  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 
ThankEditor  477  0.37  0.48  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  1.00 
ThankStaff  477  0.11  0.31  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 
ThankRef  477  0.87  0.33  0.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 
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The share of papers with one or two authors decreases from 71.8% (1997-2000) to 52.7% 
(2005-2009), whereas the stake of articles with three or more authors rises from 28.2% to 
47.3% (Table 32, Panel B). Put into context, together with the rising share of articles 
acknowledging data provided by third parties (DATASUPPLIER), international cooper-
ation could indicate more innovative research designs or international institutional set-
tings (q) but also point to a higher demand for rigorous methods (r), which require an 
appropriate dataset and division of labor. To further examine this point, I next refer to 
research methods and topics. 
Oler et al. (2010) provide an exhaustive overview on the research methods and topics in 
premier accounting research for the past 50 years. Empirical archival methods and the 
field of financial reporting gained a prevalent position in the discipline. The results for 
my 13-year sample period emphasize these notions. Regarding the research topics (Table 
33, Panel B), financial accounting is the predominant stream of research. Within this 
Table 32: 
Factors and Indicators mentioned in the Acknowledgements / Co-Authorship Patterns 
Panel A: Frequency of selected influential Factors and Indicators 
  1997-2000  2001-2004  2005-2009  Total 
  n %  n %  n %  n % 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Dissertation  16 17.8%  26 17.1%  40 17.0%  82 17.2% 
Financial Support  47 52.2%  69 45.4%  102 43.4%  218 45.7% 
DataSupplier  14 15.6%  51 33.6%  56 23.8%  121 25.4% 
AuNonUS  13 14.4%  23 15.1%  55 23.4%  91 19.1% 
ThankRef  78 86.7%  136 89.5%  203 86.4%  417 87.4% 
ThankEditor  1 1.1%  29 19.1%  147 62.6%  177 37.1% 
ThankEdStaff  17 18.9%  34 22.4%  1 0.4%  52 10.9% 
             
Panel B: Co-authorship Patterns 
  Number of Authors  
  1  2  3  4  5  Total 
             
1997-1999  24 33.8%  27 38.0%  16 22.5%  4 5.6%   0.0%  71 100.0% 
2000-2002  23 27.4%  38 45.2%  19 22.6%  4 4.8%   0.0%  84 100.0% 
2003-2005  31 23.5%  51 38.6%  45 34.1%  5 3.8%   0.0%  132 100.0% 
2006-2009  37 19.5%  63 33.2%  77 40.5%  12 6.3%  1 0.5%  190 100.0% 
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stream, the focus moved from the users (financial analysis, from 38.0% in 1997-2000  
period down to 24.2% in the 2005-2009 period) to the preparers (financial reporting, from 
14.1% up to 30.0%). Management accounting increased in importance (7.0% to 13.7%), 
while the share of taxation articles dropped (8.45% to 3.16%). The other topics did not 
vary over time. Methodically, empirical-archival and market-based studies dominate 
throughout the sample period with a combined mean share of 65.0% (Table 33, Panel A). 
The reduction in analytical/modelling articles (18.3% to 10.0%) went hand and hand with 
an increase in research methods, which are based on smaller samples, i.e., surveys (0.0% 
to 3.2%) and case/field studies (0.0% to 2.1%). Overall, the articles are characterized by 
a predominant financial accounting/archival combination, which may be demanding more 
methodological rigor (r). On the contrary, methods and topics became more diversified 
over years, indicating a constant supply of innovative ideas (q). 
 
  
Table 33: 
Research Methods and Topics over Time 
  1997-1999  2000-2002  2003-2005  2006-2009  Total 
Panel A: Research Methods 
         
 
 
Analytical/Modelling  18.31%  11.90%  11.36%  10.00%  11.95% 
Case/Field Study  0.00%  1.19%  3.79%  2.11%  2.10% 
Empirical Archival  26.76%  44.05%  28.03%  40.00%  35.43% 
Experimental  18.31%  19.05%  19.70%  17.37%  18.45% 
Interdisciplinary/Critical  0.00%  0.00%  0.76%  0.00%  0.21% 
Market Based  36.62%  22.62%  33.33%  27.37%  29.56% 
Survey  0.00%  1.19%  3.03%  3.16%  2.31% 
Panel B: Topics           
Accounting and Governance  14.08%  14.29%  10.61%  11.58%  12.16% 
Accounting Education  0.00%  2.38%  0.76%  0.00%  0.63% 
Accounting Information Sys.  1.41%  1.19%  0.00%  1.05%  0.84% 
Auditing  16.90%  14.29%  21.97%  14.21%  16.77% 
Financial Analysis  38.03%  32.14%  36.36%  24.21%  31.03% 
Financial Reporting  14.08%  17.86%  15.15%  30.00%  21.38% 
Management Accounting  7.04%  9.52%  10.61%  13.68%  11.11% 
Public Sector Accounting  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  1.58%  0.63% 
Social & Environmental Acc.  0.00%  1.19%  0.76%  0.53%  0.63% 
Taxation  8.45%  7.14%  3.79%  3.16%  4.82% 
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Table 34: 
Time Trend on Conferences, Workshops/Universities and Individuals Acknowledged 
  1997-2000  2001-2004  2005-2009  Total 
  n %  n %  n %  n % 
Panel A: Conferences 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
0  60 66.7%  89 58.6%  133 56.6%  282 59.1% 
1  23 25.6%  43 28.3%  63 26.8%  129 27.0% 
2  7 7.8%  16 10.5%  31 13.2%  54 11.3% 
3   0.0%  3 2.0%  5 2.1%  8 1.7% 
4   0.0%  1 0.7%  3 1.3%  4 0.8% 
             
Total  90 100.0%  152 100.0%  235 100.0%  477 100.0% 
Panel B: Workshops 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
0  14 15.6%  14 9.2%  11 4.7%  39 8.2% 
1  12 13.3%  11 7.2%  23 9.8%  46 9.6% 
2  12 13.3%  16 10.5%  25 10.6%  53 11.1% 
3  6 6.7%  19 12.5%  20 8.5%  45 9.4% 
4  12 13.3%  10 6.6%  26 11.1%  48 10.1% 
5  6 6.7%  17 11.2%  22 9.4%  45 9.4% 
6  4 4.4%  16 10.5%  23 9.8%  43 9.0% 
7  8 8.9%  14 9.2%  14 6.0%  36 7.5% 
8  8 8.9%  4 2.6%  22 9.4%  34 7.1% 
9  2 2.2%  7 4.6%  19 8.1%  28 5.9% 
10   0.0%  7 4.6%  8 3.4%  15 3.1% 
11  2 2.2%  4 2.6%  6 2.6%  12 2.5% 
12   0.0%  2 1.3%  8 3.4%  10 2.1% 
13  2 2.2%  1 0.7%  2 0.9%  5 1.0% 
14  1 1.1%  4 2.6%  2 0.9%  7 1.5% 
15   0.0%   0.0%  3 1.3%  3 0.6% 
16   0.0%  1 0.7%   0.0%  1 0.2% 
17   0.0%  3 2.0%  1 0.4%  4 0.8% 
19   0.0%  1 0.7%   0.0%  1 0.2% 
21  1 1.1%   0.0%   0.0%  1 0.2% 
24   0.0%  1 0.7%   0.0%  1 0.2% 
             
Total  90 100.0%  152 100.0%  235 100.0%  477 100.0% 
Panel C: Individuals 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
0  8 8.9%  6 3.9%  12 5.1%  26 5.5% 
1  5 5.6%  5 3.3%  7 3.0%  17 3.6% 
2  6 6.7%  8 5.3%  13 5.5%  27 5.7% 
3  3 3.3%  10 6.6%  11 4.7%  24 5.0% 
4  7 7.8%  11 7.2%  14 6.0%  32 6.7% 
5  5 5.6%  8 5.3%  12 5.1%  25 5.2% 
6  10 11.1%  13 8.6%  10 4.3%  33 6.9% 
7  3 3.3%  9 5.9%  11 4.7%  23 4.8% 
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With regard to the fairness indicators, Table 32 (Panel A) signals social norms rather than 
strategic behavior by authors. The high percentage of acknowledgements to the referees 
(THANKREF, 87.4%) and constantly increasing references to the editor (THANKEDI-
TOR, 1.1% to 62.6%) can be interpreted as evidence for good scientific conduct and/or a 
social norm in evolution. Further evidence on this argument is the sharp decline in 
acknowledgements to the editorial staff (THANKEDSTAFF) in the 2005 to 2009 period, 
which coincides with Dan Dhaliwal taking over the Senior Editor role in 2006. 
Informal feedback may not be a social norm, but an important factor in scientific publish-
ing as well. As the data in Table 31 shows, for more than 75% of the papers, informal 
feedback was gathered from colleagues (INDNUMCOM) or at workshops 
(EVNUMWS), and more than 25% of the articles were presented at conferences before 
Table 34: 
continued 
  1997-2000  2001-2004  2005-2009  Total 
  n %  n %  n %  n % 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
8  7 7.8%  7 4.6%  29 12.3%  43 9.0% 
9  6 6.7%  9 5.9%  13 5.5%  28 5.9% 
10  4 4.4%  9 5.9%  7 3.0%  20 4.2% 
11  4 4.4%  7 4.6%  16 6.8%  27 5.7% 
12  7 7.8%  6 3.9%  8 3.4%  21 4.4% 
13  4 4.4%  5 3.3%  14 6.0%  23 4.8% 
14  3 3.3%  5 3.3%  4 1.7%  12 2.5% 
15   0.0%  7 4.6%  11 4.7%  18 3.8% 
16  3 3.3%  6 3.9%  9 3.8%  18 3.8% 
17   0.0%  1 0.7%  6 2.6%  7 1.5% 
18  1 1.1%  2 1.3%  3 1.3%  6 1.3% 
19  1 1.1%  3 2.0%  5 2.1%  9 1.9% 
20  1 1.1%  4 2.6%  3 1.3%  8 1.7% 
21  1 1.1%  1 0.7%  6 2.6%  8 1.7% 
22   0.0%  2 1.3%   0.0%  2 0.4% 
23   0.0%  3 2.0%  2 0.9%  5 1.0% 
24   0.0%  3 2.0%  4 1.7%  7 1.5% 
26   0.0%  1 0.7%   0.0%  1 0.2% 
27  1 1.1%   0.0%  4 1.7%  5 1.0% 
29   0.0%   0.0%  1 0.4%  1 0.2% 
31   0.0%  1 0.7%   0.0%  1 0.2% 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Total  90 100.0%  152 100.0%  235 100.0%  477 100.0% 
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or during the peer review process. Workshops are probably the most important source of 
informal feedback, as these offer longer presentation slots and direct feedback from a 
larger group (Brown 2005). Against this background, it is not surprising that articles on 
average (median) get presented at 5.2 (5.0) workshops but only at 0.6 (0.0) conferences. 
Direct feedback is obtained from 9.2 (8.0) individuals. 
The temporal development presented in Table 34 for conferences (Panel A), workshops 
(Panel B), and individuals (Panel C) reveals a steady increase in the importance of infor-
mal feedback. More and more papers get presented at conferences and workshops with 
the share of papers not presented declining from 66.7% to 56.6% and from 15.6% to 4.7%, 
respectively. Individuals acknowledged offers a similar trend (8.9% to 5.1%). Notably, 
whereas the number of papers with no presentation at a workshop is dominant for the 
1997-2000 period, the median value increased slightly from 4 (1997-2000) to 5 work-
shops (2001-2004, 2005-2009). The proportion of papers presented at two or more con-
ferences equally more than doubled from 7.8% to 16.6%. More demand is also expressed 
in the number of individuals thanked in most of the papers increasing from 6 (1997-2000, 
2001-2004) to 8 (2005-2009). The increased number of informal feedback sources 
acknowledged by the authors signals a better preparation of the paper for the review pro-
cess. Possible explanations could be either an increase in the hurdle for acceptance during 
the sample period, or research projects getting more complex, thus requiring more feed-
back on certain issues.  
For a first glance at potential factors influencing the duration of peer review process, 
Table 35 depicts correlations for most of the variables defined before. As expected, the 
number of citations (CITES) and authors (AUTHORS) as well as author experience 
(AUEXP) are significantly negatively correlated with DURACC. Contrariwise, gathering 
data from external sources (DATASUPPLIER) is significantly positively correlated to 
DURACC, i.e., these papers take longer to pass the process. Less surprising, co-authored 
articles correlate to authors’ experience (AUXP), LENGTH, and number of presentations 
at conferences (EVNUMCONF), implying the advantages of division of labor. Longer 
papers reference less prior research per page (PAPERSCITED) but are significantly more 
subject to informal feedback (EVNUMCONF, EVNUMWS, INDNUMCOM) indicating 
more complex research issues. Presentations at workshops and conferences may improve 
the visibility of a paper, as these are significantly positively correlated to CITES.  
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More experienced authors reference less papers and gather less informal feedback 
(EVNUMWS, INDNUMCOM) as well as financial support (FINSUPPORT). Overall, 
multicollinearity should not be an issue with exception to the variable DISSERTATION 
which, by design, strongly correlates with AUEXP and AUTHORS. 
6.2.2 Sources of Informal Feedback 
In this section, I give a more detailed view on the conferences, workshops, and individu-
als, as well as financial supporters and data suppliers mentioned in the acknowledge-
ments. All names of conferences, workshops, and individuals were manually coded and 
standardized. In case of doubt, I checked authors’ names in the Hasselback Directory of 
Accounting Faculty provided by the American Accounting Association (AAA)50 and the 
Accounting Research Ranking Database of Brigham Young University. Workshops, espe-
cially the names of universities and the mapping of (business) schools to universities, 
were obtained by Google searches. The same procedure is applied to conferences. In cases 
of doubt, I kept the name and diction, as in the acknowledgements. For financial support-
ers and data suppliers, I combined all Big Four auditors, Arthur Andersen, and their re-
spective foundations. I further introduce a residual category (“undisclosed”) for anony-
mous mentions (e.g., “the firm”). 
In the acknowledgements, I identify 143 different conferences which were mentioned 522 
times in 477 articles. The distribution is heavily skewed, as the top 10 conferences’ com-
bined share is 64.1% of all mentions. The top five of the conferences are: AAA Annual 
Meeting (26.7%), EAA Annual Congress (5.3%), AAA Financial Accounting and Re-
porting Section Midyear Meeting (4.7%), AAA Management Accounting Section Mid-
year Meeting (4.4%), and AAA Auditing Midyear Meeting (3.8%). As TAR is a journal 
published by the AAA, the high concentration of AAA events is not surprising. However, 
the concentration could also indicate a certain (intentional) North-America bias. In con-
trast, potential authors may deliberately choose AAA events to gather editors’ attention. 
Overall, nine events hosted by scholarly associations dominate the top 10. Scholarly as-
sociation contain the AAA with six events as well as EAA, Accounting & Finance Asso-
ciation of Australia and New Zealand (AFAANZ), and Canadian Academic Accounting 
Association (CAAA), with one event each. 
                                                 
50  Available online: http://www.hasselback.org/index (13.10.2013). 
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The acknowledgements furthermore contained 2,224 references to 291 identified work-
shops. Workshops with six or more mentions (top 30) have a combined share of 81.9% 
on all references. Most attended are the workshops at Indiana University (2.1%), Univer-
sity of Washington, University of Iowa and Columbia University (2.0% each), Emory 
University and Cornell University (1.9% each), New York University, University of 
Michigan and Harvard University (1.7% each), Michigan State University (1.6%), Uni-
versity of Texas at Austin and Northwestern University (1.5% each), Stanford University, 
University of Notre Dame and Pennsylvania State University (1.4% each), and University 
of Chicago (1.3%). The first non-US university, Hong Kong University of Science and 
Technology, is ranked 11th (1.3%). Of the 16 universities mentioned above, 13 are part of 
the 40 highest ranked accounting institutions based on citations (Coyne et al. 2010), giv-
ing an indication of the institutional concentration in top accounting journals. 
Regarding individuals acknowledged for comments, discussions, and suggestions, 1,763 
distinct persons with 4,543 mentions in 477 articles were identified. Based on frequency, 
the top 20 account for only 26.5% of all mentions. The top 10 acknowledged individuals 
are: T. Shevlin (46), W. R. Kinney (31), M. W. Nelson (28), L. Koonce (27), J. M. Wahlen 
and G. L. Salamon (26 each), S. J. Kachelmeier (24), J. Zimmerman (23), L. A. Maines 
(22), S. Basu and L. S. Bamber (21 each), S. E. Salterio, J. H. Pratt, and S. P. Kothari, D. 
Dhaliwal and M. E. Bamber (19 each). Notably, only three of these sixteen persons are 
female. Furthermore, three (Shevlin, Dhaliwal, Kachelmeier) served as senior editors and 
three (Kinney, Nelson, M. E. Bamber) as editors for TAR in the sample period. In this 
analysis, I solely counted mentions without any explicit reference to an editorial function 
of the individual acknowledged.  
Furthermore, the authors thanked 73 different companies, institutions, or individuals for 
providing data used in their studies. The actual number is presumably higher because 
“Undisclosed” (14 mentions) is a residual category for anonymous mentions. Authors 
oftentimes use anonymous mentions to thank for proprietary or confidential data. Regard-
ing the companies acknowledged, security data providers and investment companies 
(I/B/E/S International Inc., First Call, Zacks Investment Research, Securities Data Coop-
eration and Charter Oak Investment Systems Inc.) dominate with 45.0% of all acknowl-
edgements, two Big N auditors (KPMG, Arthur Andersen) following far behind with 
1.9% and 1.2% of mentions, respectively. The high stake of I/B/E/S (33.3% of all men-
tions), in particular, indicates that DATASUPPLIER may proxy for specific research 
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questions or methods which require particular data (e.g., analyst forecasts provided by 
I/B/E/S). 
Research grants and financial support were provided by 170 single institutions. Primary 
sponsors of academic accounting research are the Big N auditors (five of top 21), research 
funds at the universities (11 of top 21), and governmental research councils (3 of top 21). 
Most of the institutions (Arthur Andersen, KPMG as well as the Universities of Alabama 
and Southern California are exceptions) kept up financial support over the entire sample 
period. Particularly, the Big N auditors, which on average sponsored nearly twice as many 
projects as universities (19.2% for 5 institutions versus 22.4% for 11 institutions), are 
important supporters of academic research in accounting.51 
The appendix contains the lists of top 10 conferences, top 30 universities, top 20 individ-
uals, top 10 data suppliers, and financial supporters mentioned in the acknowledgments. 
6.2.3 Multivariate Analysis 
I follow a two-part approach for my multivariate analysis. In the first part, I inquire the 
impact of article- and author-specific factors as well informal feedback on the duration of 
the peer review process. In next step (stage two), I use a smaller sample consisting of 
articles for which the accepting editor is known. In addition to reexamining the factors 
from the first stage, fairness indicators are included. 
The results for the first stage regression, including informal feedback and article-specific 
factors, can be found in Table 36. The regression is based on the complete sample of 477 
articles. For the base model (Model 1), the three variables CITES, AUTHORS, and 
DATASUPPLIER show a significant influence on the duration of the peer review pro-
cess. In line with the expectation, highly cited articles (CITES) pass the peer review pro-
cess significantly faster. The coefficient, however, is rather small, indicating a moderate 
effect on the overall duration. Co-authored articles (AUTHOR) seem to benefit from 
knowledge spillovers and division of labor effects. The negative arithmetic signs for TI-
TLECHAR and DISSERTATION are as expected. The number of referenced research  
  
                                                 
51  The pure number of mentions is a noisy indicator for the actual financial support as no conclusion 
regarding the granted amount is possible. It is therefore possible that governmental research councils, 
for example, sponsor less projects but grant higher amounts.  
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Table 36: 
Base Model Regression including informal feedback and article-specific factors 
The Table shows five different specifications for the base model regression with the Submission-Ac-
ceptance-Timespan measured in months as the dependent variable. CITES is the number of citation the 
paper received in other articles according to Thomson Reuters Web of Knowledge. AUTHORS denotes 
the number of co-authors. LENGTH is the number of pages of an article. TITLECHAR is length of an 
articles title measured by the number of characters. PAPERSCITED is the number of references in an 
article scaled by its length. DISSERTATION is a dummy variable taking the value “1” if the article is 
based on a dissertation. EVNUMCONF and EVNUMWS is the number of conferences and workshops 
the paper was presented at. INDNUMCOM is the number of individuals whom the author(s) thanked in 
the acknowledgements. NUMCOMP and NUMINST denote the number of companies or institutions the 
author(s) mentioned in the acknowledgements. FINSUPPORT and DATASUPPLIER are binary variables 
taking the value “1” if the author(s) thanked institutions, individuals or companies explicitly for financial 
support or providing data used in the article, respectively. Fixed effects include year of submission (SY) 
and research method (M) as well as topic (T), which are defined in appendix A. For each variable the 
estimation coefficient is stated in first row, the t-statistic is given in parentheses below. *, ** and *** 
denotes significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% interval, respectively. 
Variable  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
(Intercept)  17.371 ***  31.113 ***  17.742 ***  18.204  ***  32.479  *** 
  (7.51)   (6.87)   (7.71)   (7.32)   (7.06)  
Cites  -0.028 ***  -0.035 ***  -0.032 ***  -0.029  ***  -0.04  *** 
  (-3.01)   (-3.7)   (-3.41)   (-3.02)   (-4.03)  
Authors  -1.378 ***  -1.017 **  -1.579 ***  -1.393  ***  -1.253  ** 
  (-2.62)   (-2.08)   (-2.98)   (-2.62)   (-2.51)  
Length  0.024   0.107 *  -0.007   0.016   0.088  
  (0.43)   (1.81)   (-0.12)   (0.29)   (1.46)  
TitleChar  -0.001   0   -0.008   0.001   -0.006  
  (-0.05)   (-0.02)   (-0.59)   (0.07)   (-0.45)  
PapersCited  0.392   0.761   0.03   0.273   0.098  
  (0.64)   (1.33)   (0.05)   (0.44)   (0.16)  
Dissertation  -0.9   -0.749   -1.44   -0.87   -1.34  
  (-0.7)   (-0.63)   (-1.12)   (-0.67)   (-1.12)  
EvNumConf  0.236   0.155   0.193   0.238   0.039  
  (0.54)   (0.38)   (0.44)   (0.54)   (0.09)  
EvNumWs  -0.07   0.04   -0.045   -0.068   0.087  
  (-0.67)   (0.4)   (-0.43)   (-0.63)   (0.86)  
IndNumCom  0.095   0.081   0.084   0.095   0.074  
  (1.56)   (1.41)   (1.36)   (1.55)   (1.3)  
NumComp  -0.359   -0.335   -0.103   -0.319   -0.311  
  (-0.38)   (-0.38)   (-0.11)   (-0.33)   (-0.34)  
NumInst  0.451   -0.025   0.511   0.551   0.032  
  (0.46)   (-0.03)   (0.52)   (0.55)   (0.03)  
FinSupport  0.788   0.468   0.547   0.817   0.248  
  (1.12)   (0.7)   (0.77)   (1.14)   (0.37)  
DataSupplier  1.736 **  2.04 ***  1.207   1.761  **  1.688  ** 
  (2.2)   (2.75)   (1.44)   (2.17)   (2.1)  
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
n  477   477   477   477   477  
Fixed Effects  none   SY   M   T   SY M T  
adj. R²  0.034   0.181   0.051   0.034   0.202  
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(PAPERSCITED) has a moderate positive coefficient, indicating that articles in well-
documented fields of research (high r-factor) take longer to pass the process. Comparable 
circumstances could explain the significantly positive and strong coefficient on 
DATASUPPLIER. As indicated above, the variable is basically driven by providers of 
security and forecast data. Articles in this stream of research most likely have methodical 
features (r) which require more work in revising the paper before it is finally accepted. 
Including fixed effects for the submission year (Model 2), research method (Model 3), 
and topic (Model 4), as well as all three (Model 5), does not change the basic results. 
Notably, the inclusion of fixed effects increases the adjusted R² of the equation from 3.4% 
(Model 1) to 20.2% (Model 5). Submission year-fixed effects are the most important fac-
tor (Model 2).  
Surprisingly, two of the three measures for informal feedback (EVNUMCONF and 
INDNUMCOM) have a rather small but positive coefficient. This result is counter-intui-
tive but stable through all specifications. For the third variable (EVNUMWS), the arith-
metic sign depends on the included fixed effects. In Model 5, which is the highest speci-
fied one, it is also positive. Obviously, informal feedback is an important factor to im-
prove a paper and, thereby, the chances of publication on the academic market (Brown 
2005). My results, however, indicate that once a paper reached a certain level, the incre-
mental effect of further feedback is negligible or even negative. Alternatively, and in ac-
cordance with the notion of developing social norms, the incentives for attending at con-
ferences and workshops could move from feedback to socializing and networking (Perry 
et al. 2003). The small coefficient and the specification-dependent switch in the arithmetic 
sign support the basic argument. 
In the next step, the analysis is extended by two author-specific factors. Experience is 
measured by the years since Ph.D. graduation (AUEXP), affiliation by the share of au-
thors from top 3, 5, 10, 20, or 50 universities (AFFILUT3-50), and origin by the share of 
non-US authors (AUNONUS). The results are depicted in Table 37. For brevity, I will 
focus on the results of Model 5, which includes fixed effects for submission year, research 
method, and topic. Except for AUEXP, the arithmetic signs for the author-specific factors 
are as expected. A higher share of non-US authors is associated with an insignificantly 
longer peer review duration. In contrast, articles of authors affiliated with top schools 
pass the process faster. Whereas this effect is also insignificant, the coefficient is more  
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Table 37: 
Base Model Regression including informal feedback as well as author- and article-
specific factors 
The Table shows five different specifications for the base model regression with the Submission-Ac-
ceptance-Timespan measured in months as the dependent variable. CITES is the number of citation the 
paper received in other articles according to Thomson Reuters Web of Knowledge. AUTHORS denotes 
the number of co-authors. LENGTH is the number of pages of an article. TITLECHAR is length of an 
articles title measured by the number of characters. PAPERSCITED is the number of references in an 
article scaled by its length. DISSERTATION is a dummy variable taking the value “1” if the article is 
based on a dissertation. EVNUMCONF and EVNUMWS is the number of conferences and workshops 
the paper was presented at. INDNUMCOM is the number of individuals whom the author(s) thanked in 
the acknowledgements. NUMCOMP and NUMINST denote the number of companies or institutions the 
author(s) mentioned in the acknowledgements. FINSUPPORT and DATASUPPLIER are binary variables 
taking the value “1” if the author(s) thanked institutions, individuals or companies explicitly for financial 
support or providing data used in the article, respectively. AUNONUS is the percentage of author(s) who 
were affiliated with a university outside of the US at time of publication of the paper. AUEXP is the 
medium experience of the author(s) measured as the positive number of years between their Ph.D. grad-
uation and the submission of the paper. AFFILUT3-50 is the percentage of authors affiliated with a top 3, 
5, 10, 20 and 50 university at the time of publication of the article based on the Accounting Research 
Ranking 2012 (all methods, all topics, all years) of the Brigham Young University. Fixed effects include 
year of submission (SY) and research method (M) as well as topic (T), which are defined in appendix A. 
For each variable the estimation coefficient is stated in first row, the t-statistic is given in parentheses 
below. *, ** and *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% interval, respectively. 
Variable  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5  
                
(Intercept)  18.338  ***  31.175  ***  18.309  ***  19.247  ***  32.694  *** 
  (7.46)   (6.74)   (7.47)   (7.33)   (6.95)  
Cites  -0.028  ***  -0.035  ***  -0.032  ***  -0.029  ***  -0.04  *** 
  (-2.97)   (-3.64)   (-3.32)   (-2.99)   (-4)  
Authors  -1.335  **  -0.99  **  -1.63  ***  -1.366  **  -1.297  ** 
  (-2.5)   (-1.98)   (-3.01)   (-2.52)   (-2.54)  
Length  0.03   0.112  *  0.004   0.025   0.097  
  (0.54)   (1.87)   (0.07)   (0.44)   (1.59)  
TitleChar  0   0   -0.008   0.001   -0.007  
  (-0.03)   (-0.04)   (-0.64)   (0.07)   (-0.58)  
PapersCited  0.417   0.758   -0.021   0.303   0.06  
  (0.68)   (1.3)   (-0.03)   (0.48)   (0.1)  
Dissertation  -1.525   -0.958   -1.749   -1.481   -1.358  
  (-1.07)   (-0.72)   (-1.23)   (-1.03)   (-1.01)  
EvNumConf  0.17   0.098   0.15   0.173   -0.017  
  (0.38)   (0.24)   (0.34)   (0.38)   (-0.04)  
EvNumWs  -0.058   0.053   -0.041   -0.054   0.094  
  (-0.53)   (0.53)   (-0.38)   (-0.49)   (0.91)  
IndNumCom  0.091   0.082   0.08   0.09   0.074  
  (1.43)   (1.38)   (1.25)   (1.41)   (1.24)  
NumComp  0.076   -0.141   0.246   0.121   -0.127  
  (0.08)   (-0.15)   (0.24)   (0.12)   (-0.13)  
NumInst  0.467   -0.01   0.431   0.568   0.016  
  (0.47)   (-0.01)   (0.43)   (0.56)   (0.02)  
FinSupport  0.67   0.339   0.419   0.731   0.139  
  (0.93)   (0.5)   (0.58)   (1)   (0.2)  
                
PART C: SURVIVORS 
143 
distinct for the top schools and declines down the ranking (-2.723 for the top 3 schools to 
-1.173 for the top 50 schools), indicating either the signaling effect of affiliations, a pos-
sible self-selection of good authors to top schools, or bias (“favoritism”) of the editors 
towards their peers. As for EVNUMCONF in the previous and this specification, the 
arithmetic sign for AUEXP depends on the included fixed effects, indicating a weak and 
random influence. Experience therefore seems to be compensated by other factors. As a 
whole, author-specific factors explain about 8% in the variation of peer review duration. 
Adjusted R² is 28.2% for Model 5 in Table 37 compared to 20.2% Model 5 in Table 36. 
The results are, for the most part, robust through the other specification, i.e., no fixed 
effects (Model 1), submission year- (Model 2), research method- (Model 3), or topic- 
(Model) fixed effects. The basic results for informal feedback and article-specific factors 
remain unchanged.  
  
Table 37: 
continued 
Variable  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5  
                
DataSupplier  1.836  **  2.144  ***  1.334   1.879  **  1.846  ** 
  (2.31)   (2.86)   (1.58)   (2.3)   (2.27)  
AuNonUS  1.053   1.201   0.685   0.677   0.406  
  (0.83)   (1.02)   (0.53)   (0.52)   (0.33)  
AuExp  -0.079   -0.029   -0.025   -0.073   0.011  
  (-1.04)   (-0.4)   (-0.32)   (-0.94)   (0.14)  
AffilUT3  -4.804   -2.625   -4.665   -4.8   -2.723  
  (-1.52)   (-0.89)   (-1.45)   (-1.49)   (-0.9)  
AffilUT5  -0.831   -0.887   -0.492   -0.899   -0.818  
  (-0.46)   (-0.53)   (-0.27)   (-0.5)   (-0.49)  
AffilUT10  -1.748   -1.629   -2   -1.727   -2.058  
  (-1.22)   (-1.22)   (-1.39)   (-1.19)   (-1.52)  
AffilUT20  -1.191   -1.034   -1.637   -1.333   -1.574  
  (-1.15)   (-1.07)   (-1.57)   (-1.27)   (-1.6)  
AffilUT50  -0.661   -1.146   -0.378   -0.636   -1.173  
  (-0.38)   (-0.7)   (-0.21)   (-0.36)   (-0.71)  
                
n  477   477   477   477   477  
Fixed Effects  none   SY   M   T   SY M T  
adj. R²  0.031   0.238   0.047   0.031   0.282  
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Table 38: 
Subsample Regression including informal feedback and fairness indicators as well as 
article-specific factors 
The table shows five different specifications for the base model regression with the submission-acceptance-
timespan measured in months as the dependent variable. CITES is the number of citation the paper received 
in other articles according to Thomson Reuters Web of Knowledge. AUTHORS denotes the number of co-
authors. LENGTH is the number of pages of an article. TITLECHAR is length of an articles title measured 
by the number of characters. PAPERSCITED is the number of references in an article scaled by its length. 
DISSERTATION is a dummy variable taking the value “1” if the article is based on a dissertation. 
EVNUMCONF and EVNUMWS is the number of conferences and workshops the paper was presented at. 
INDNUMCOM is the number of individuals whom the author(s) thanked in the acknowledgements. 
NUMCOMP and NUMINST denote the number of companies or institutions the author(s) mentioned in 
the acknowledgements. FINSUPPORT and DATASUPPLIER are binary variables taking the value “1” if 
the author(s) thanked institutions, individuals or companies explicitly for financial support or providing 
data used in the article, respectively. EDSAMEAFFILCUR is a dummy variable taking the value “1” if the 
accepting editor at the time of acceptance was affiliated to the same university as one of the authors at time 
of publication. EDSAMEAFFILSUB is a dummy variable taking the value “1” if the accepting editor at 
the time of submission of the article was affiliated to the same university as one of the authors at the time 
of publication. EDSAMEPHDINST is a dummy variable taking the value “1” if the accepting editor and 
one of the author gained their Ph.D. at the university. EDDEPENNARROW is a dummy variable taking 
the value “1” if one the three dummy variables above has the value “1”. Fixed effects include year of 
submission (SY) and research method (M) as well as topic (T), which are defined in appendix A. For each 
variable the estimation coefficient is stated in first row, the t-statistic is given in parentheses below. *, ** 
and *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% interval, respectively. 
Variable  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
                
(Intercept)  31.928  ***  33.973  ***  33.954  ***  34.075  ***  34.012  *** 
  (6.56)   (6.7)   (6.69)   (6.77)   (6.75)  
Cites  -0.083  ***  -0.087  ***  -0.087  ***  -0.09  ***  -0.089  *** 
  (-5.22)   (-5.44)   (-5.44)   (-5.6)   (-5.57)  
Authors  -0.887   -0.808   -0.838   -0.76   -0.711  
  (-1.51)   (-1.37)   (-1.42)   (-1.3)   (-1.21)  
Length  0.06   0.065   0.06   0.053   0.063  
  (0.87)   (0.92)   (0.85)   (0.76)   (0.9)  
TitleChar  -0.014   -0.014   -0.014   -0.015   -0.015  
  (-0.98)   (-1.03)   (-1.03)   (-1.11)   (-1.1)  
PapersCited  0.094   0.26   0.252   0.047   0.114  
  (0.13)   (0.35)   (0.34)   (0.06)   (0.15)  
Dissertation  -1.777   -1.453   -1.545   -1.633   -1.511  
  (-1.25)   (-1.02)   (-1.09)   (-1.16)   (-1.07)  
EvNumConf  0.773   0.716   0.714   0.67   0.684  
  (1.65)   (1.53)   (1.52)   (1.44)   (1.47)  
EvNumWs  0.003   -0.005   0.002   -0.024   -0.028  
  (0.03)   (-0.05)   (0.01)   (-0.21)   (-0.25)  
IndNumCom  0.1   0.093   0.089   0.108   0.113  
  (1.47)   (1.35)   (1.28)   (1.56)   (1.62)  
NumComp  0.2   0.398   0.414   0.44   0.426  
  (0.17)   (0.34)   (0.35)   (0.38)   (0.37)  
NumInst  1.5   1.567   1.589   1.483   1.468  
  (1.29)   (1.34)   (1.36)   (1.28)   (1.27)  
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In summary, the results indicate a certain effectiveness of the peer review process in TAR. 
While good papers – as indicated by CITES – pass the process faster, more methodolog-
ically sophisticated papers in well documented research fields, on the author hand, take 
longer. Informal feedback has no impact on the duration of the peer review process. Ad-
ditionally, there are no significant indications of a potential country or top school bias. 
In the second step of the multivariate analysis, I further include variables for acknowl-
edgements to editorial team members (THANK*) and indicator variables for institutional 
bonds between authors and the accepting editor (EDSAME*). TAR provides information 
for the accepting editor since the second issue of 2003. As a result, I lose 170 observa-
tions. The final sample for the second stage consists of 307 articles for the 2003 to 2009 
period. To control for differences between the full sample and the subsample used for the 
following analysis, I rerun the full-specified model for informal feedback and article- 
 
Table 38: 
continued 
Variable  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
                
FinSupport  1.455  *  1.378  *  1.321  *  1.343  *  1.424  * 
  (1.87)   (1.76)   (1.69)   (1.73)   (1.83)  
DataSupplier  1.613  *  1.572  *  1.566  *  1.418   1.46  
  (1.75)   (1.7)   (1.7)   (1.54)   (1.59)  
ThankEditor     0.736   0.754   0.606   0.582  
     (0.8)   (0.82)   (0.66)   (0.63)  
ThankRef     -1.767   -1.771   -1.605   -1.605  
     (-1.41)   (-1.42)   (-1.29)   (-1.29)  
ThankStaff     -4.547  *  -4.537  *  -4.905  **  -4.856  ** 
     (-1.89)   (-1.88)   (-2.04)   (-2.02)  
EdSameAffilCur     -2.768           
     (-0.7)           
EdSameAffilSub        -0.491        
        (-0.1)        
EdSamePhDInst           -3.342  *    
           (-1.96)     
EdDepenNarrow              -2.682  * 
              (-1.9)  
                
n  307   307   307   307   307  
Fixed Effects  SY M T   SY M T   SY M T   SY M T   SY M T  
adj. R²  0.254   0.260   0.259   0.269   0.269  
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Table 39: 
Subsample Regression including informal feedback and fairness indicators as well as 
author- and article-specific factors 
The table shows five different specifications for the base model regression with the Submission-Ac-
ceptance-Timespan measured in months as the dependent variable. CITES is the number of citation the 
paper received in other articles according to Thomson Reuters Web of Knowledge. AUTHORS denotes 
the number of co-authors. LENGTH is the number of pages of an article. TITLECHAR is length of an 
articles title measured by the number of characters. PAPERSCITED is the number of references in an 
article scaled by its length. DISSERTATION is a dummy variable taking the value “1” if the article is 
based on a dissertation. EVNUMCONF and EVNUMWS is the number of conferences and workshops 
the paper was presented at. INDNUMCOM is the number of individuals whom the author(s) thanked in 
the acknowledgements. NUMCOMP and NUMINST denote the number of companies or institutions the 
author(s) mentioned in the acknowledgements. FINSUPPORT and DATASUPPLIER are binary varia-
bles taking the value “1” if the author(s) thanked institutions, individuals or companies explicitly for 
financial support or providing data used in the article, respectively. THANKEDITOR is a dummy variable 
taking the value “1” if the author(s) thank the editor in the acknowledgements anonymously or by name. 
THANKREF is a dummy variable taking the value “1” if the author(s) thank at least one editor anony-
mously or by name. THANKSTAFF is a dummy variable taking the value “1” if the author(s) mention at 
least one member of the editorial staff (Associate Editor or equal) in the acknowledgements. EDDEPEN-
NARROW is a dummy variable taking the value “1” if the accepting editor at the time of acceptance was 
affiliated to the same university as one of the authors at time of publication, the accepting editor at the 
time of submission of the article was affiliated to the same university as one of the authors at the time of 
publication or the accepting editor and one of the author gained their Ph.D. at the university. AUNONUS 
is the percentage of author(s) who were affiliated with a university outside of the US at time of publication 
of the paper. AUEXP is the medium experience of the author(s) measured as the positive number of years 
between their Ph.D. graduation and the submission of the paper. AFFILTOP10 is a dummy variable tak-
ing the value “1” if one of the authors was affiliated with a Top 10 university at the time of publication 
of the article based on the Accounting Research Ranking 2012 (all methods, all topics, all years) of the 
Brigham Young University. AFFILUT10-50 is the percentage of authors affiliated with a top 10, 20 and 
50 university at the time of publication of the article based ranking mentioned before. Fixed effects in-
clude year of submission (SY) and research method (M) as well as topic (T), which are defined in appen-
dix A. For each variable the estimation coefficient is stated in first row, the t-statistic is given in paren-
theses below. *, ** and *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% interval, respectively. 
Variable  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4  
             
(Intercept)  34.012  ***  34.132  ***  33.854  ***  34.441  *** 
  (6.75)   (6.71)   (6.66)   (6.75)  
Cites  -0.089  ***  -0.087  ***  -0.09  ***  -0.088  *** 
  (-5.57)   (-5.38)   (-5.51)   (-5.43)  
Authors  -0.711   -0.725   -0.56   -0.704  
  (-1.21)   (-1.22)   (-0.92)   (-1.18)  
Length  0.063   0.063   0.067   0.062  
  (0.9)   (0.89)   (0.94)   (0.88)  
TitleChar  -0.015   -0.015   -0.015   -0.016  
  (-1.1)   (-1.06)   (-1.1)   (-1.12)  
PapersCited  0.114   0.109   0.158   0.161  
  (0.15)   (0.15)   (0.21)   (0.22)  
Dissertation  -1.511   -1.426   -1.548   -1.332  
  (-1.07)   (-0.91)   (-0.99)   (-0.85)  
EvNumConf  0.684   0.707   0.646   0.636  
  (1.47)   (1.5)   (1.36)   (1.34)  
EvNumWs  -0.028   -0.036   -0.029   -0.021  
  (-0.25)   (-0.32)   (-0.25)   (-0.18)  
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specific factors. The results are virtually equal (Model 1 in Table 38). Notable differences 
relate to AUTHORS, which is no longer significant but retains a modest negative coeffi-
cient. EVNUMCONF and FINSUPPORT, on the other hand, are more important, and 
nearly or weakly significant in the subsample, respectively. Differences indicate some 
time-dependent variance regarding the influential effect of certain factors on the duration 
Table 39: 
continued 
Variable  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4  
             
IndNumCom  0.113   0.121  *  0.115   0.106  
  (1.62)   (1.71)   (1.62)   (1.48)  
NumComp  0.426   0.163   0.313   0.39  
  (0.37)   (0.14)   (0.26)   (0.33)  
NumInst  1.468   1.311   1.639   1.572  
  (1.27)   (1.1)   (1.35)   (1.3)  
FinSupport  1.424  *  1.242   1.258   1.211  
  (1.83)   (1.57)   (1.59)   (1.52)  
DataSupplier  1.46   1.692  *  1.729  *  1.717  * 
  (1.59)   (1.81)   (1.85)   (1.83)  
ThankEditor  0.582   0.483   0.608   0.645  
  (0.63)   (0.51)   (0.64)   (0.68)  
ThankRef  -1.605   -1.623   -1.742   -1.842  
  (-1.29)   (-1.3)   (-1.39)   (-1.46)  
ThankStaff  -4.856  **  -5.204  **  -5.395  **  -5.334  ** 
  (-2.02)   (-2.15)   (-2.22)   (-2.19)  
EdDepenNarrow  -2.682  *  -2.606  *  -2.806  *  -2.608  * 
  (-1.9)   (-1.83)   (-1.96)   (-1.83)  
AuNonUS     1.448   1.091   0.952  
     (1.51)   (1.09)   (0.95)  
AuExp     -0.005   -0.014   -0.003  
     (-0.06)   (-0.16)   (-0.04)  
AffilTop10        -1.126     
        (-1.28)     
AffilUT10           -1.982  
           (-1.53)  
AffilUT20           -1.414  
           (-1.22)  
AffilUT50           -0.983  
           (-0.5)  
             
n  307   307   307   307  
Fixed Effects  SY M T   SY M T   SY M T   SY M T  
adj. R²  0.269   0.267   0.269   0.268  
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of the peer review process. Moreover, this effect is emphasized by a higher adjusted R² 
for the base model (25.4% in the subsample versus 20.2% for the full sample). 
Extending the model by fairness indicators, however, offers some interesting insights. 
First, thanking referees and editorial staff may be a developing social norm in the ac-
counting community, but the negative arithmetic sign for THANKREF (not significant at 
conventional levels) and THANKSTAFF (significant at the 5%- or 10%-level) could in-
dicate that authors are more likely to thank their peers if they offered timely and construc-
tive feedback, making it easier for the authors to respond to their demands. In contrast, 
mentioning the editor (THANKEDITOR) is probably a more strategy driven behavior 
that has no influence on the peer review process. 
The variables EDSAMEAFFILCUR, EDSAMEAFFILSUB, EDSAMEPHDINST, and 
EDDEPENNARROW as an aggregate of the previous three measures are a more narrow 
definition of the “favoritism” measure developed by Laband and Piette (1994). In Table 
38, the results for the four measures are depicted in Models 2 to 5. While the affiliation 
status at the time of submission or publication of the article is of minor importance, insti-
tutional bonds stemming from the education of author and editor have a significant influ-
ence (Model 4). In light of an institutional concentration in premier accounting journals 
(Coyne et al. 2010) and the coincidental importance of the same institutions in doctoral 
education and research, as indicated by the workshop acknowledgements, results do not 
necessarily indicate favoritism but a functional screening of high-quality research by the 
editors (Laband and Piette 1994). Put differently, high-quality research by high-quality 
researchers from high-quality institutions selects itself into high-quality journals (Fogarty 
and Yu 2010; Swanson et al. 2007). Favoritism, however, cannot be ruled out as an alter-
native explanation (Lee and Williams 1999). 
Table 39 depicts the result for the extended model, including author-specific information. 
The results are comparable to those for the full sample. For non-US authors the peer re-
view process takes insignificantly longer, but regarding to more experienced authors, 
however, the coefficient is slightly negative but not significant in the subsample. These 
results are robust to subsequent controls for the rank of the authors’ affiliation as a binary 
variable for all papers with at least on author affiliated to a top 10 ranked university (AF-
FILTOP10 in Model 3) or, alternatively, as the share of authors affiliated to top 10, 20, 
and 50 universities (Model 4). 
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The results for my second stage analysis, which includes fairness indicators, confirms the 
earlier results from the full sample. Institutional bonds between editors and authors relate 
to differences in the duration of the peer review process. Based on the high concentration 
of top school and Ph.D. granting institutions observed in premier accounting journals, 
interpreting the result as evidence for “favoritism” would be an oversimplification.  
7 Concluding Remarks 
The first objective of my study is to analyze whether and how the duration of the peer 
review process between three leading North American accounting journals changed in 
recent years (RQ1). TAR and JAR offer comparable peer review durations, which shows 
a steadily increasing trend for the later years in the sample period. JAE exhibits the slow-
est peer review process over the entire sample period. The increase in peer review dura-
tion relates to an expansion of the journal sphere as measured by the number of papers 
published. Results indicate that journals may use the review process to raise the costs of 
submission for authors and, hence, account for excess demand in the scarce resource of 
journal publication space. 
The second objective is to examine whether the duration of the peer review process is 
influenced by article- and author-specific factors or the extant of informal feedback au-
thors utilized prior to or during the peer review process (RQ2). While the number of arti-
cles published in TAR, co-authorships, and sources of informal feedback acknowledged 
(conferences, workshops, and individuals) increased in the sample period, the average 
duration of the peer review process does not follow a constant trend over time. Structural 
shifts in the environment of academic accounting, therefore, do not seem to affect peer 
review. But the results indicate an ongoing orientation of research on more complex is-
sues which require extensive datasets and methodological rigor as expressed by the in-
crease in article length. Whereas these trends prolong the peer review process, authors 
benefit from knowledge spillovers and division of labor in collaborative projects, as co-
authored papers pass the process significantly faster. In conjunction with the results from 
analysis 1, this result is most likely not generalizable beyond TAR. Other attributes of 
authors or papers are no significant determinants of the peer review duration. Nonethe-
less, high-quality papers, i.e., more frequently cited ones, pass the process significantly 
faster, indicating its certain efficiency. 
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In a second step, I analyze whether the influence of article- and author specific factors as 
well as informal feedback is conditional to an unbiased (i.e., fair) process (RQ3). The 
results from the basic model remain basically unchanged, suggesting no conditional rela-
tionship between fairness indicators and the other specific factors. Notably, articles pass 
the process significantly faster if institutional bonds between the editor and one of the 
authors exist. One possible explanation for this result could be editor favoritism. The high 
concentration of authors and editors from top schools, in contrast, implies a self-selection 
effect as a more plausible reason for this finding.  
My results, however, should be interpreted with caution. As noted above, several article-
specific factors (length, title, etc.), could be endogenously affected by the peer review 
process. Furthermore, the duration of the peer review process itself could be dependent 
on journal policy. Based on the notion by Azar (2004; 2007) and Lee (2009) that longer 
(first) response time increase the costs of authors, editors could use this mechanism to 
screen out sub-quality submission. Results by Adler and Liyanarachchi (2011), however, 
suggest that editors in accounting journals use this mechanism selectively to increase the 
costs for authors of rejected papers, i.e., those suppressed in my study. 
Besides these concerns, my study is subject to several limitations. First, my research de-
sign primarily focuses on attributes of the article and authors, complemented by the affil-
iation status of the editor in the second stage analysis. Other important determinants, e.g., 
(first) response times, attributes of the referees, etc., are not publicly available and are, 
hence, not operationalized in this study. For similar reasons, other stages of the research 
process which may influence the maturity of a paper (e.g., preparation time, prior sub-
mission to other journals) cannot be included (Azar 2007; Guthrie et al. 2004). Second, 
the results by Ellison (2002b; 2011) additionally suggest that indirect effects of structural 
shifts within a discipline possibly effect the peer review process. Fogarty and Holder 
(2012), for example, document a decrease in new accounting faculty in the recent past. 
While I do not expect the change in accounting faculty to directly impact peer review 
duration, the indirect effect of a decrease in competition for the scarce resource top jour-
nal spots, could have one. Third, for my analysis, I exclusively focus on articles published 
in one top journal. This could induce two possible biases. On the one hand, not including 
rejected papers in the study may bias towards a longer duration, as papers are usually 
rejected in the early stages of peer review (Kachelmeier 2009). On the other hand, using 
data from a top journal may, in contrast, lead to underestimating peer review duration, as 
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these are perceived to be more timely (Adler and Liyanarachchi 2011). Fourth, the com-
parably small adjusted R² and the considerable explanatory power of the submission year-
fixed effects emphasize the foregoing mentioned concern with confounding factors. 
Weak proxies for author and article quality (exemplified by the DATASUPPLIER varia-
ble) as well as the rough classification of research methods and topics could be an addi-
tional factor pertaining this issue. Fifth, the focus on published articles bias the results. 
Papers which get rejected during the review process may face shorter review durations, 
even though they have comparable attributes to published articles. However, information 
on unpublished or rejected papers is not widely available. Sixth, potential lags in the re-
sponse times are not publicly available. Time taken by authors, reviewers, and editors 
may vary across submissions and are interrelated. Extensive comments or changes in de-
mand may increase response times by authors, and vice versa. Additionally, all parties 
involved could deliberately choose to extend response times. 
Against this background, future research could extent the analysis by including more jour-
nals or disciplines (e.g., economics, finance, management, marketing). Differences with 
regard to the cultural, methodological, and topical background of the journals as well as 
discrepancies between top and second tier journals could be possible starting points for a 
broader examination of peer review duration. The direct and indirect effects of structural 
changes in the accounting discipline on the publication process in general, and peer re-
view in particular, are further issues. From a methodological perspective, more precise 
measures for research method and topic seem to be crucial elements for a deeper under-
standing of the underlying factors. In particular, the possibly diverging effects between 
more innovation- (high q) and rigor-driven (high r) papers could be examined. 
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Appendix A: Acknowledgements 
Rank  Name  Frequency  Percentage 
       
Panel A: Top 10 Conferences 
  Top 10 Conferences Acknowledged     
1  AAA Annual Meeting  141  26.65% 
2  EAA Annual Congress  28  5.29% 
3  AAA FARS Midyear Meeting  25  4.73% 
4  AAA MAS Midyear Meeting  23  4.35% 
5  AAA Auditing Midyear Meeting  20  3.78% 
6  International Symposium on Audit Research  12  2.27% 
7  AFAANZ Annual Meeting  10  1.89% 
8  Boston Area Research Colloquium (BARC)  7  1.32% 
  Joint Conference of the Universities of British Columbia. Oregon. and Washington (UBCOW)  7  1.32% 
  CAAA Annual Meeting  7  1.32% 
  Conference on Financial Economics and Accounting  7  1.32% 
9  Tax Symposium  6  1.13% 
  Financial Management Association Annual Meeting  6  1.13% 
  Financial Economics and Accounting Conference  6  1.13% 
  Accounting Symposium  6  1.13% 
  Southeast Summer Accounting Research Colloquium  6  1.13% 
  Big 10 Conference  6  1.13% 
  Utah Winter Accounting Conference  6  1.13% 
10  AAA IAS Midyear Meeting  5  0.95% 
  AAA ABO Conference  5  0.95% 
       
  Total    64.08% 
  Distinct Conferences    143 
  Distinct Acknowledgements    522 
Panel B: Top 30 Universities/Workshops 
       
1  Indiana University  48  2.14% 
2  University of Washington  45  2.01% 
  University of Iowa  45  2.01% 
3  Columbia University  44  1.96% 
4  Emory University  43  1.92% 
5  Cornell University  41  1.83% 
6  New York University  38  1.69% 
  University of Michigan  38  1.69% 
7  Harvard University  37  1.65% 
8  Michigan State University  36  1.60% 
9  University of Texas at Austin  33  1.47% 
  Northwestern University  33  1.47% 
10  Stanford University  32  1.43% 
  University of Notre Dame  32  1.43% 
  Pennsylvania State University  32  1.43% 
11  University of Chicago  30  1.34% 
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Rank  Name  Frequency  Percentage 
       
12  University of Pennsylvania  28  1.25% 
  University of Southern California  28  1.25% 
  Georgia State University  28  1.25% 
  Hong Kong University of Science and Technology  28  1.25% 
  University of Arizona  28  1.25% 
  Washington University  27  1.20% 
13  University of Minnesota  26  1.16% 
14  University of Pittsburgh  25  1.11% 
  University of California, Berkeley  25  1.11% 
  University of Georgia  25  1.11% 
  University of Illinois  25  1.11% 
15  Baruch College-The City University of New York  24  1.07% 
  Florida State University  24  1.07% 
  Duke University  24  1.07% 
16  Arizona State University  23  1.02% 
17  University of Wisconsin-Madison  21  0.94% 
18  University of Rochester  20  0.89% 
  Texas A&M University  20  0.89% 
  University of Waterloo  20  0.89% 
19  University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign  19  0.85% 
  Massachusetts Institute of Technology  19  0.85% 
  University of Melbourne  19  0.85% 
  University of British Columbia  19  0.85% 
  University of Alberta  19  0.85% 
  Carnegie Mellon University  19  0.85% 
20  Ohio State University  18  0.80% 
  University of Maryland  18  0.80% 
21  University of Utah  17  0.76% 
  University of California, Los Angeles  16  0.71% 
  Georgetown University  16  0.71% 
  University of Colorado  16  0.71% 
  University of Oklahoma  16  0.71% 
22  George Washington University  15  0.67% 
  London Business School  15  0.67% 
  University of Connecticut  15  0.67% 
  Temple University  15  0.67% 
  Boston College  15  0.67% 
23  University of Texas at Dallas  14  0.62% 
  Rutgers University  14  0.62% 
  University of Toronto  14  0.62% 
  University of Houston  14  0.62% 
24  Washington University in St. Louis  13  0.58% 
  University of Missouri  13  0.58% 
  University of Texas  13  0.58% 
  Purdue University  13  0.58% 
  State University of New York at Buffalo  13  0.58% 
25  The Ohio State University  12  0.53% 
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Rank  Name  Frequency  Percentage 
       
  Southern Methodist University  12  0.53% 
  Rice University  12  0.53% 
  University of Florida  12  0.53% 
26  University of Oregon  11  0.49% 
  University of California, Irvine  11  0.49% 
  University of Alabama  11  0.49% 
  Yale University  11  0.49% 
  University of Kansas  11  0.49% 
  Syracuse University  11  0.49% 
27  University of Kentucky  9  0.40% 
  University of Wisconsin  9  0.40% 
  Brigham Young University  9  0.40% 
  Case Western Reserve University  9  0.40% 
28  University of North Carolina  8  0.36% 
  University of Nebraska  8  0.36% 
  University of Cincinnati  8  0.36% 
  Louisiana State University  8  0.36% 
  University of Illinois at Chicago  8  0.36% 
  Singapore Management University  8  0.36% 
  University of Missouri-Columbia  8  0.36% 
  Chinese University of Hong Kong  8  0.36% 
  University of New South Wales  8  0.36% 
  City University of Hong Kong  8  0.36% 
  Georgia Institute of Technology  8  0.36% 
  Texas Christian University  8  0.36% 
  Vanderbilt University  8  0.36% 
  Tilburg University  8  0.36% 
  Tulane University  8  0.36% 
29  Queens University  7  0.31% 
  University of North Texas  7  0.31% 
  The George Washington University  7  0.31% 
  London School of Economics and Political Sciences  7  0.31% 
  Dartmouth College  7  0.31% 
  Virginia Commonwealth University  7  0.31% 
  Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration  7  0.31% 
  University of Arkansas  7  0.31% 
  University of California, Riverside  7  0.31% 
  INSEAD  7  0.31% 
30  University of Auckland  6  0.27% 
  Hebrew University  6  0.27% 
  University of Colorado at Boulder  6  0.27% 
  National Taiwan University  6  0.27% 
  Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University  6  0.27% 
  Tel Aviv University  6  0.27% 
  Boston University  6  0.27% 
       
  Total    81.90% 
  Distinct Workshops    291 
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Rank  Name  Frequency  Percentage 
       
  Distinct Acknowledgements    2.224 
Panel C: Top 20 Individuals 
       
1  Shevlin, Terry  46  1.0% 
2  Kinney, William R.  31  0.7% 
3  Nelson, Mark W.  28  0.6% 
4  Koonce, Lisa  27  0.6% 
5  Wahlen, James M.  26  0.6% 
  Salamon, Gerald L.  26  0.6% 
6  Kachelmeier, Steven J.  24  0.5% 
7  Zimmerman, Jerold  23  0.5% 
8  Maines, Laureen A.  22  0.5% 
9  Basu, Sudipta  21  0.5% 
  Bamber, Linda Smith  21  0.5% 
10  Salterio, Steven E.  19  0.4% 
  Pratt, Jamie H.  19  0.4% 
  Kothari, S. P.  19  0.4% 
  Dhaliwal, Dan  19  0.4% 
  Bamber, Edward Michael  19  0.4% 
11  Shores, D.  18  0.4% 
  Peecher, Mark E.  18  0.4% 
  Luft, Joan L.  18  0.4% 
  Lipe, Marlys Gascho  18  0.4% 
  Barth, Mary E.  18  0.4% 
  Bowen, Robert M.  18  0.4% 
12  Bloomfield, Robert J.  17  0.4% 
13  Tubbs, Richard M.  16  0.4% 
  Libby, Robert  16  0.4% 
  Easton, Peter D.  16  0.4% 
  Beaver, William H.  16  0.4% 
14  Mills, Lillian F.  15  0.3% 
  Schipper, Katherine  15  0.3% 
  Hirst, D. Eric  15  0.3% 
  Kennedy, Jane Jollineau  15  0.3% 
  Brown, Lawrence D.  15  0.3% 
15  Sprinkle, Geoffrey B.  14  0.3% 
  Hopkins, Patrick E.  14  0.3% 
  Balakrishnan, Ramji  14  0.3% 
  Dijkman, Thomas R  14  0.3% 
  Evans, John H.  14  0.3% 
  Blacconiere, Walter G.  14  0.3% 
16  Rajan, Madhav V.  13  0.3% 
  Magee, Robert P.  13  0.3% 
  Miller, Gregory S.  13  0.3% 
  Hoffman, Vicky B.  13  0.3% 
  Johnson, Bruce  13  0.3% 
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  Burgstahler, David C.  13  0.3% 
17  Warfield, Terry D.  12  0.3% 
  Waymire, Gregory  12  0.3% 
  Wright, Arnie  12  0.3% 
  Sunder, Shyam  12  0.3% 
  Pownall, Grace  12  0.3% 
  Penman, Stephen H.  12  0.3% 
  Ohlson, Jim  12  0.3% 
  Lee, Charles M. C.  12  0.3% 
  Dechow, Patricia M.  12  0.3% 
  Baber, William R.  12  0.3% 
18  Matsunaga, Steven R.  11  0.2% 
  Rajgopal, Shivaram  11  0.2% 
  McKeown, James  11  0.2% 
  Reichelstein, Stefan  11  0.2% 
  Moser, Donald V.  11  0.2% 
  Francis, Jere R  11  0.2% 
  Feltham, Gerald A.  11  0.2% 
  Jorgensen, Bjorn N.  11  0.2% 
  Kadous, Kathryn  11  0.2% 
  Ali, Ashiq  11  0.2% 
  Dichev, Ilia D.  11  0.2% 
19  Sedor, Lisa M.  10  0.2% 
  Petroni, Kathy R.  10  0.2% 
  Jones, Christopher L.  10  0.2% 
  Core, John E.  10  0.2% 
  Ahmed, Anwer S.  10  0.2% 
20  Stuart, Nathan  9  0.2% 
  Sloan, Richard G.  9  0.2% 
  Shields, Mike  9  0.2% 
  Watts, Ross L.  9  0.2% 
  Miller, Jeffrey S.  9  0.2% 
  Omer, Tom  9  0.2% 
  Ryan, Stephen G.  9  0.2% 
  Matsumoto, Dawn A.  9  0.2% 
  Hodder, Leslie  9  0.2% 
  Huddart, Steven J  9  0.2% 
  Kaplan, Stee  9  0.2% 
  Ke, Bin  9  0.2% 
  Felix, Bill  9  0.2% 
  Christensen, Theodore E.  9  0.2% 
  Bedard, Jean C.  9  0.2% 
  Dopuch, Nick  9  0.2% 
       
  Total    26.5% 
  Distinct Individuals    1.763 
  Distinct Acknowledgements    4.543 
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  1997-2000  2001-2004  2005-2009  Total 
Company  n %  n %  n %  n % 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Panel A: Top Data Suppliers 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
I/B/E/S International Inc.  7 33.3%  22 36.1%  25 31.3%  54 33.3% 
Undisclosed  1 4.8%  7 11.5%  6 7.5%  14 8.6% 
First Call   0.0%  5 8.2%  4 5.0%  9 5.6% 
Zacks Investment Research  2 9.5%  2 3.3%  2 2.5%  6 3.7% 
Graham, John   0.0%  1 1.6%  3 3.8%  4 2.5% 
Arthur Andersen   0.0%  3 4.9%   0.0%  3 1.9% 
Metrick, Andrew   0.0%   0.0%  2 2.5%  2 1.2% 
Securities Data Corporation  2 9.5%   0.0%   0.0%  2 1.2% 
Keefe, Bruyette, and Woods  2 9.5%   0.0%   0.0%  2 1.2% 
Charter Oak Investment Systems Inc.   0.0%   0.0%  2 2.5%  2 1.2% 
KPMG   0.0%  1 1.6%  1 1.3%  2 1.2% 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Total            61.6% 
Distinct Data Suppliers            73 
Distinct Acknowledgements            162 
Panel B: Mostly Acknowledged Financial Supporters 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Deloitte & Touche  7 6.7%  10 6.9%  15 7.5%  32 7.2% 
PricewaterhouseCoopers  5 4.8%  7 4.9%  6 3.0%  18 4.0% 
KPMG  11 10.6%   0.0%  5 2.5%  16 3.6% 
Indiana University  6 5.8%  6 4.2%  3 1.5%  15 3.4% 
Social Sciences and Humanities 
Research Council of Canada 
 4 3.9%  2 1.4%  6 3.0%  12 2.7% 
University of Chicago  2 1.9%  4 2.8%  5 2.5%  11 2.5% 
Stanford University  1 1.0%  5 3.5%  5 2.5%  11 2.5% 
Arthur Andersen  3 2.9%  7 4.9%   0.0%  10 2.2% 
Ernst & Young  2 1.9%  5 3.5%  3 1.5%  10 2.2% 
University of Texas  1 1.0%  4 2.8%  5 2.5%  10 2.2% 
Cornell University  1 1.0%  1 0.7%  7 3.5%  9 2.0% 
University of Iowa  3 2.9%  2 1.4%  2 1.0%  7 1.6% 
University of Alabama  3 2.9%  4 2.8%   0.0%  7 1.6% 
University of Washington  2 1.9%  2 1.4%  3 1.5%  7 1.6% 
Eugene and Dora Bonham Memorial 
Fund 
 1 1.0%  2 1.4%  3 1.5%  6 1.3% 
University of North Carolina  2 1.9%  1 0.7%  3 1.5%  6 1.3% 
University of Southern California   0.0%  2 1.4%  4 2.0%  6 1.3% 
University of Texas at Austin  2 1.9%  2 1.4%  2 1.0%  6 1.3% 
Hong Kong Research Council  1 1.0%  2 1.4%  2 1.0%  5 1.1% 
American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants 
 2 1.9%  2 1.4%  1 0.5%  5 1.1% 
University of Pennsylvania  1 1.0%  2 1.4%  2 1.0%  5 1.1% 
Australian Research Council  1 1.0%  2 1.4%  2 1.0%  5 1.1% 
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  1997-2000  2001-2004  2005-2009  Total 
Company  n %  n %  n %  n % 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Total 48.9% 
Distinct Financial Supporters         170    
Distinct Acknowledgements            447 
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Appendix B: Research Topics & Methods 
Name  Description 
   
Panel A: Topics   
   
Auditing  Articles in the area of auditing and assurance. 
Accounting Education  Articles dealing with any educational aspects of accounting, 
for example related to professional accountants, students, and 
pupils, but also institutions of education. 
Financial Analysis  Articles in the area of financial accounting which focus on the 
users; it uses a set of methods to extract information from fi-
nancial statements and other sources information and relate it 
to value of equity and debt investment and to interests of 
other stakeholders. 
Financial Reporting  Submission in the area of financial accounting which focus on 
the preparers; it analyses the choices and methods concerning 
the preparation of financial statements, taking into account 
firm characteristics, accounting standards, as well as institu-
tions. 
Accounting and Governance  Articles, which relate to the interface between corporate gov-
ernance and accounting. 
Accounting and Information Systems  Articles in the area of the interface between accounting, infor-
mation technology and systems. 
Management Accounting  Articles in the area of management accounting and control 
systems. 
Public Sector  Articles on accounting in the public and voluntary sectors. 
Social and Environmental Accounting  Articles dealing with all aspects of social and environmental 
accounting. 
Taxation  Articles on the subject of taxation. 
Panel B: Methods   
   
Analytical/Modelling  Articles which discuss the definitions of and relationships 
among concepts; economic modelling is often used. 
Case/Field Study  Articles, which utilize the case study method or conduct field, 
study research through various methodologies (e.g. ethnogra-
phies). 
Empirical Archival  Articles which involve the testing of a statistical hypothesis to 
answer the research question (s); a database is normally used. 
Experimental  Articles, which utilize an experimental design to address the 
research, question(s). 
History  Articles which adopt an historical perspective, and investigate 
historical issues of accounting thought and practices. 
Interdisciplinary/Critical  Articles that draw on more than one discipline, ideally explor-
ing their interrelations, or that draw on any of the various 
strands of critical theory. 
Market Based  Articles, which examine the relation between financial state-
ment and other information and capital markets, including eq-
uity and debt markets. 
Survey  Articles, which utilize a survey methodology to address the 
research, question(s). 
   
  
REFERENCES 
161 
References 
Adler, R., and G. Liyanarachchi (2011) An empirical examination of the editorial review 
processes of accounting journals. Accounting & Finance 51(4), 837–867. 
Ahmed, K., Chalmers, K., and Khlif, H. (2013) A meta-analysis of IFRS adoption effects. 
The International Journal of Accounting 48, 173−217. 
Akerlof, A., and Shiller, R. J. (2009) Animal Spirits. How Human Psychology Drives the 
Economy, and Why It Matters for Global Capitalism. Princeton and Oxford: 
Princeton University Press. 
Alexander, D. (1993) A European true and fair view? European Accounting Review 2(1), 
59−80. 
Alexander, D. (2013) A critical review of the double-blind review – The second look. 
EAA Newsletter (2), 17–18. 
Alexander, D., and Eberhartinger, E. (2009) The True and Fair View in the European 
Union. European Accounting Review 18(3), 571−594. 
Amat, C. B (2008) Editorial and publication delay of papers submitted to 14 selected 
Food Research journals. Influence of online posting. Scientometrics 74(3), 379–389.  
Armstrong, J. S. (1996) Publication of research on controversial topics: The early 
acceptance procedure. International Journal of Forecasting 12(2) 299–302. 
Armstrong, J. S. (1997) Peer Review for Journals: Evidence on Quality Control, Fairness, 
and Innovation. Science and Engineering Ethics (3), 63–84. 
Asthana, S., and Balsam, S. (2017) The rewards for publishing in the USA. International 
Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Performance Evaluation 13(1), 65−98. 
Atwood, T. J., Drake, M. S., Myers, J. N., and Myers, L. A. (2012) Home Country Tax 
System Characteristics and Corporate Tax Avoidance: International Evidence. The 
Accounting Review 87(6), 1831−1860. 
Auyeung, P., and Sands, J. (1997) Factors Influencing Accounting Students’ Career 
Choice: A Cross-Cultural Validation Study. Accounting Education 6(1), 13−23. 
Azar, O. H. (1996) The Academic Review Process: How can we make it more efficient? 
The American Economist 50(1), 37–50. 
Azar, O. H. (2004) Rejections and the importance of first response times. International 
Journal of Social Economics 31(3), 259–274. 
Azar, O. H. (2007) The Slowdown in First-Response Times of Economic Journals: Can 
it be Beneficial? Economic Inquiry 45(1), 179–187.  
Bailey, C. D., Hermanson, D. R., and Louwers, T. J. (2008a) An examination of the peer 
review process in accounting journals. Journal of Accounting Education 26(2), 55–
72.  
Bailey, C. D., Hermanson, D. R., and Tompkins, J. G. (2008b) The Peer Review Process 
in Finance Journals. Journal of Financial Education 34(2), 1–27. 
REFERENCES 
162 
Baker, C. R., Mikol, A., and Quick, R. (2001) Regulation of the Statutory Auditor in the 
European Union: A Comparative Survey of the United Kingdom, France and 
Germany. European Accounting Review 10(4), 763−786. 
Barrick, M. R., and Mount, M. K. (1991) The Big Five Personality Dimensions and Job 
Performance: A Meta-Analysis. Personnel Psychology 44, 1−26. 
Barrick, M. R., Mount, M. K., and Judge, T. A. (2001) Personality and Performance at 
the Beginning of the New Millennium: What Do We Know and Where Do We Go 
Next?. International Journal of Selection and assessment 9(1/2), 9−30. 
Barth, M. (2013) A Message from the President. American Accounting Association 
Accounting Education News (Fall), 2–3. 
Basu, S. (2012) How Can Accounting Researchers Become More Innovative? Accounting 
Horizons 26(4), 851–870. 
Becker, A., and Messner, M. (2005) After the Scandals: A German-Speaking Pespective 
on Management Accounting Research and Education. European Accounting Review 
14(2), 417−427. 
Bedeian, A. G. (2003) The Manuscript Review Process: The Proper Roles of Authors, 
Referees, and Editors. Journal of Management Inquiry 12(4), 331–438.  
Bell, T., Doogar, R., and Solomon, I. (2008) Audit labor usage and fees under business 
risk auditing. Journal of Accounting Research 46(4), 729–760. 
Bence, V., and Oppenheim, C. (2004) The Influence of Peer Review on the Research 
Assessment Exercise. Journal of Information Science 30(4), 347–468.  
Bonner, S. E., Hesford, J. W., Van der Stede, W. A., and Young, S. M. (2006) The most 
influential journals in academic accounting. Accounting, Organizations and Society 
31(7), 663−685. 
Boot, A. (2000) Relationship banking: What do we know?. Journal of Financial 
Intermediation 9, 7–25. 
Borges, N. J., and Savickas, M. L. (2002), Personality and Medical Specialty Choice: A 
Literature Review and Integration. Journal of Career Assessment 10(3), 362−380. 
Borkowski, S. C., and Welsh, M. J. (1998) Ethics and the Accounting Publishing Process: 
Author, Reviewer, and Editor Issue. Journal of Business Ethics 17, 1785–1803. 
Botosan, C. A. 1997. Disclosure Level and the Cost of Equity Capital. The Accounting 
Review 72(3), 323–449. 
Bowen, R. M., and Sundem, G. L. (1982) Editorial and Publication Lag in the Accounting 
and Finance Literature. The Accounting Review 62(4), 778–784. 
Bradford, C. (2004) Does size matter? An economic analysis of small business 
exemptions from regulation. Journal of Small and Emerging Business Law 8, 1−37. 
Brennan, N. M., and Merkl-Davies, D. (2013) Accounting narratives and impression 
management, in: Jack, L., Davison, J., and Craig, R. (Eds.), The Routledge 
Companion to Accounting Communication, 109−132. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge. 
Breuer, W., and Saltzmann, A. J. (2015) National culture and corporate governance, in: 
Boubaker, S., Nguyen, B. D., and Nguyen, D. K. (Eds.), Corporate Governance, 
Recent Developments and New Trends, 369–397. Heidelberg et al.: Springer. 
REFERENCES 
163 
Bricker, R. J. (1988) Knowledge Preservation in Accounting: A Citational Study. Abacus 
24(2), 120–131. 
Brief, A. P. (2004) Editor's Comment: What I don't like about my job. Academy of 
Management Review 29(3), 339–340. 
Brown, L. D. (2005) The Importance of Circulating and Presenting Manuscripts: 
Evidence from the Accounting Literature. The Accounting Review 80(1), 55–83. 
Brüggemann, U., Hitz, J.-M., and Sellhorn, T. (2013) Intended and unintended 
consequences of mandatory IFRS adoption: A review of extant evidence and 
suggestions for future research. European Accounting Review 22(1), 1–37. 
Bundessteuerberaterkammer (2016) Berufsstatisik 2015. Available online: 
http://www.bstbk.de/export/sites/standard/de/ressourcen/Dokumente/01_bstbk/beru
fsstatistik/Jahresbericht_2015_Berufsstatistik.pdf. 
Burgstahler, D. and Dichev, I. (1997) Earnings management to avoid earnings decreases 
and losses. Journal of Accounting and Economics 24(1), 99−126. 
Burgstahler, D., Hail, L., and Leuz, C. (2006) The Importance of Reporting Incentives: 
Earnings Management in European Private and Public Firms. The Accounting 
Review 81(5), 985−1016. 
Bushman, R., Engel, E., and Smith, A. (2006) An Analysis oft he Relation between the 
Stewardship and Valuaton Roles of Earnings. Journal of Accounting Research 44(1), 
53−83. 
Busse von Colbe, W. (1996) Accounting and the Business Economics Tradition in 
Germany. European Accounting Review 5(3), 413−434. 
Caliendo, M., and Kopeinig, S. (2008) Some practical guidance for the implementation 
of propensity score matching. Journal of Economic Surveys 22(1), 31−72. 
Campanario, J. M. (1996) Have Referees Rejected some of the Most-Cited Articles of All 
Times? Journal of the American Society for Information Science 47(4), 302–310. 
Carcello, J. V., Copeland, Jr., J. E., Hermanson, R. H., and Turner, D. H. (1991) A Public 
Accounting Career: The Gap Between Student Expectations and Accounting Staff 
Experience. Accounting Horizons 5(3), 1−11. 
Carnegie, G. D., and Napier, C. J. (2010) Traditional Accountants and Business 
Professionals: Portraying the Accounting Profession after Enron. Accounting, 
Organizations and Society 35(3), 360−376. 
Chhaochharia, V., and Laeven, L. (2009) Corporate governance norms and practices. 
Journal of Financial Intermediation 18, 405–431. 
Chi, W., Lisic, L. L., Pevzner, M. (2011) Is enhanced audit quality associated with greater 
real earnings management?. Accounting Horizons 25(2), 315−335. 
Chittenden, F., Kauser, S., and Poutziouris, P. (2003) Tax regulation and small business 
in the USA, UK, Australia and New Zealand. International Small Business Journal 
21(1), 93−115. 
Christensen, B., Olson, A., and Omer, T. (2015) The role of audit firm expertise and 
knowledge spillover in mitigating earnings management through the tax accounts. 
The Journal of the American Taxation Association 37(1), 3–36. 
REFERENCES 
164 
Christensen, H., Hail, L., and Leuz, C. (2013) Mandatory IFRS reporting and changes in 
enforcement. Journal of Accounting and Economics 56, 147−177. 
Chua, W. F. (1986) Radical Developments in Accounting Thought. The Accounting 
Review 61(4), 601−632. 
Clark, T., Floyd, S. W., and Wright, M. (2006) On the Review Process and Journal 
Development. Journal of Management Studies 43(3), 655–664. 
Clarkson, P. M. (2012) Publishing: Art or Science? Reflections from an Editorial 
Perspective. Accounting & Finance 52(2), 359–376. 
Coase, R. H. (1937) The Nature of the Firm. Econometrica 4(16), 386−405. 
Cobb-Clark, D. A., and Schurer, S. (2012) The Stability of Big-Five Personality Traits. 
Economics Letters 115(1), 11−15. 
Coenenberg, A. G., Haller, A., and Marten, K.-U. (1999) Accounting Education for 
Professionals in Germany – Current State and New Challenges. Journal of 
Accounting Education 17(4), 367−390. 
Cohen, D. A., Dey, A., Lys, T. (2008) Real and accrual-based earnings management in 
the pre- and post-Sarbanes-Oxley periods. The Accounting Review 83(3), 757−787. 
Cohen, J., and Hanno, D. M. (1993) An Analysis of Underlying Constructs Affecting the 
Choice of Accounting as a Major. Issues in Accounting Education 8(2), 219−238. 
Coyne, J. G., Summers, S. L., Williams, B., and Wood, D. A. (2010) Accounting Program 
Research Rankings by Topical Area and Methodology. Issues in Accounting 
Education 25(4), 631–654.  
Czyzewski, A. B., and Dickinson, H. D. (1990) Factors leading to the rejection of 
accountants' manuscripts. Journal of Accounting Education 8(1), 93–104. 
Dalton, D. W., Buchheit, S., and McMillan, J. J. (2014) Audit and Tax Career Paths in 
Public Accounting: An Analysis of Students and Professional Perceptions. 
Accounting Horizons 28(2), 213−231. 
Daske, H., Hail, L., Leuz, C. and Verdi, R. (2013) Adopting a Label: Heterogeneity in 
the Economic Consequences Around IAS/IFRS Adoptions. Journal of Accounting 
Research 51(3), 495−547. 
Daske, H., Hail, L., Leuz, C., and Verdi, R. (2013) Adopting a label: Heterogeneity in the 
economic consequences around IAS/IFRS adoptions. Journal of Accounting 
Research 51(3), 495−547. 
De Fruyt, F., and Mervielde, I. (1997) The Five-Factor Model of Personality and 
Holland’s RIASEC Interest Types. Personality and Individual Differences 23(1), 
87−103. 
De Fruyt, F., and Mervielde, I. (1999) RIASEC Types and Big Five Traits as Predictors 
of Employment Status and Nature of Employment. Personnel Psychology 52(3), 
701−727. 
De George, E. T., Ferguson, C. B. and Spear, N. A. (2013) How Much Does IFRS Cost? 
IFRS Adoption and Audit Fees. The Accounting Review 88(2), 429−462.  
Dechow, P. M., Sloan, R. G., and Sweeney, A. P. (1995) Detecting earnings management. 
The Accounting Review 70(2), 193−225. 
REFERENCES 
165 
DeFond, M. L. (2016) Annual Report and Editorial Commentary for The Accounting 
Review. The Accounting Review 91(6), 1817−1839. 
DeFond, M. L., and Jiambalvo, J. (1994) Debt covenant violation and manipulation of 
accruals. Journal of Accounting and Economics 17(1−2), 145−176. 
Demski, J. S. (2001) President's Message. American Accounting Association Accounting 
Education News (Fall), 1–2. Available online: http://aaahq.org/pubs/AEN/2001/ 
Fall2001.pdf.  
Demski, J. S., and Zimmerman, J. L. (2000) On “Research vs. Teaching”: A Long-Term 
Perspective. Accounting Horizons 14(3), 343–352. 
den Hertog, J. (2010) Review of economic theories of regulation. Tjalling C. Koopmans 
Research Insitute Discussion Paper Series Nr. 10-18. 
Di Pietra, R. (2013) Reviewing and Being Reviewed: developing our paper with 
“anonymous co-authors”. EAA Newsletter (2), 13–16. 
Diamond Jr., A. M. (1984) An Economic Model of the Life-Cycle Research Productivity 
of Scientists. Scientometrics 6(3), 189–196. 
Directive 78/660/EEC. Fourth Council Directive of 25 July 1978 based on the Article 54 
(3) (g) of the Treaty on the annual accounts of certain types of companies. Official 
Journal of the European Communities, L 222, 14.08.1978, 11−31. 
Directive 83/349/EEC. Seventh Council Directive of 13 June 1983 based on the Article 
54 (3) (g) of the Treaty on consolidated accounts. Official Journal of the European 
Communities, L 193, 18.07.1983, 1−17. 
Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2006 on 
statutory audits of annual accounts and consolidated accounts, amending Council 
Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC and repealing Council Directive 
84/253/EEC. Official Journal of the European Union, L 157, 09.06.2006, 87–107. 
Directive 2012/6/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2012 
amending Council Directive 78/660/EC on the annual accounts of certain types of 
companies as regards micro-entities. Official Journal of the European Union, L 81, 
21.03.2012, 3−6. 
Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on 
the annual financial statements, consolidated financial statements and related reports 
of certain types of undertakings, amending Directive 2006/43/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 
83/349/EEC. Official Journal of the European Union, L 182, 29.06.2013, 19–76. 
Doidge, C., Karolyi, G., and Stulz, R. (2007) Why do countries matter so much for 
corporate governance? Journal of Financial Economics 86, 1–39. 
Dunbar, A. E., and Phillips, J. D. (2001) The Outsourcing of Corporate Tax Function 
Activities. The Journal of the American Taxation Association 23(2), 35−49. 
Dunn Jr., R. (2005) The Age Bias in Academic Publishing. Challenge 48(5), 5–11. 
Dyreng, S. D., Hanlon, M., and Maydew, E. L. (2008) Long-run corporate tax avoidance. 
The Accounting Review 83(1), 61−82. 
REFERENCES 
166 
Eichfelder, S., and Vaillancourt, F. (2014) Tax compliance costs: A review of cost burdens 
and cost structures. Working Paper University of Magdeburg and University of 
Montréal. 
Ellison, G. (2002a) Evolving Standards for Academic Publishing: A q-r Theory. Journal 
of Political Economy 110(5), 994–1034.  
Ellison, G. (2002b) The Slowdown of the Economics Publishing Process. Journal of 
Political Economy 110(5), 947–993.  
Ellison, G. (2011) Is Peer Review in Decline? Economic Inquiry 49(3), 635–657. 
Englebrecht, T. D., Hanke, S. A., and Kuang, Y. (2008) An assessment of patterns of co-
authorship for academic accountants within premier journals: Evidence from 1979–
2004. Advances in Accounting 24(2), 172–181.  
European Commission (2015) Annual report on European SMEs 2014/2015. Available 
online: http://ec.europa.eu/DocsRoom/documents/11327/attachments/1/ 
translations/en/renditions/native. 
European Commission (2016) Taxation Trends in the European Union. Available online: 
https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/eco_analysis_report_2015
.pdf.  
European Parliament (2015) Tax policy in the EU. Issues and challenges. Available 
online: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2015/549001/ 
EPRS_IDA(2015)549001_EN.pdf. 
Evans, L., and Honold, K. (2007) The Division of Expert Labour in the European Audit 
Market: The Case of Germany. Critical Perspectives on Accounting 18(1), 61−88. 
Ewert, R., Wagenhofer, A., 2005. Economic effects of tightening accounting standards to 
restrict earnings management. The Accounting Review 80(4), 1101−1124. 
Federation of European Accountants (FEE), 2016. Audit exemption thresholds in Europe. 
Available online: http://www.fee.be/images/publications/auditing/ 
1605_Audit_exemption_thresholds_update.pdf. 
Financial Times (2016) Technology transforms Big Four hiring practice, 09.05.2016. 
Available online: https://www.ft.com/content/d5670764-15d2-11e6-b197-
a4af20d5575e.  
Finley, A., and Stekelberg, J. (2016) The economic consequences of tax service provider 
sanctions: Evidence from KPMG's deferred prosecution agreement. The Journal of 
the American Taxation Association 38(1), 57–78. 
Flickinger, M., Tuschke, A., Gruber-Muecke, T., and Fiedler, M. (2014) In search of 
rigor, relevance, and legitimacy: what drives the impact of publications? Journal of 
Business Economics 84(1), 99−128. 
Fogarty, T. J., and Holder, A. D. (2012) Exploring Accounting Doctoral Program 
Decline: Variation and the Search for Antecedents. Issues in Accounting Education 
27(2), 373–397. 
Fogarty, T. J., and Yu, W. (2010) The Sustainability of Success: Distinguishing the Lucky 
from the Good in the Stacked Deck of Academic Accounting. The Accounting 
Educators' Journal 20, 63–89. 
REFERENCES 
167 
Frankel, R., Johnson, M., and Nelson, K. (2002) The relation between auditors' fees for 
nonaudit services and earnings management. The Accounting Review 77(Suppl.), 71–
105. 
Fülbier, R. U., Hitz, J.-M., and Sellhorn, T. (2009) Relevance of Academic Research and 
Researchers’ Role in the IASB’s Financial Reporting Standard Setting. Abacus 
45(4), 455−492. 
Fülbier, R. U., and Klein, M. (2015) Inside the Black Box of IASB Standard-Setting: 
Evidence from Board Meeting Audio Playbacks on Amendments of IAS 19 (2011). 
Working Paper. 
Gassen, J. (2014) Causal inference in empirical archival financial accounting research. 
Accounting, Organizations and Society 39(7), 535−544. 
Gassen, J., and Günther, J. (2014) Evidenzbasierte Rechnungslegungsregulierung: Zur 
Gestaltung von Forschung im Rahmen des IASB Due Process [Evidence-based 
financial accounting regulation], in: Dobler, M., Hachmeister, C., Kuhner, C., and 
Rammert, S. (Eds.), Rechnungslegung, Prüfung und Unternehmensbewertung. 
Festschrift zum 65. Geburtstag von Wolfgang Ballwieser, 183−199. Stuttgart: 
Schäffer-Poeschel. 
Gassen, J., and Fülbier, R. U. (2015) Do creditors prefer smooth earnings? Evidence from 
European private firms. Journal of International Accounting Research 14(2), 151-
180. 
Genschel, P., and Jachtenfuchs, M. (2011) How the European Union constrains the state: 
Multilevel governancec of taxation. European Journal of Political Research 50(3), 
293−314. 
Germanou, E., Hassall, T., and Tournas, Y. (2009) Students’ Perception of Accounting 
Profession: Work Value Approach. Asian Review of Accounting 17(2), 136−148. 
Gipper, B., Lombardi, B. J., and Skinner, D. J. (2013) The politics of accounting standard-
setting: A review of empirical research. Australian Journal of Management 38(3), 
523−551. 
Goncharov, I., and Jacob, M. (2014) Why do countries mandate accrual accounting for 
tax purposes?. Journal of Accounting Research 52(5), 1127−1163. 
Graham, J. R., Harvey, C. R., and Rajgopol, S. (2005) The economic implications of 
corporate financial reporting. Journal of Accounting and Economics 40(1−3), 3−73. 
Graves, O. F., Nelson, I. T., and Davis, J. R. (1992) Accounting Student Characteristics: 
A Survey of Accounting Majors at Federation of Schools of Accountancy (FSA) 
Schools. Journal of Accounting Education 10(1), 25−37. 
Green, R., O'Hara, M., and Schwert, G. W. (2002) Joint Editorial. Journal of Finance 
47(2), 1031–1032. 
Griffin, P. A., Lont, D. H., and Sun, Y. (2009) Governane regulatory changes, 
International Financial Reporting Standards adoption, and New Zealand audit and 
non-audit fees: empirical evidence. Accounting & Finance 49(4), 697−724. 
Grimm, P. (2011) Social desirability bias, in: Kamakura, W. A. (Ed.), Wiley International 
Encyclopedia of Marketing 2, 258−259, Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley. 
Groves, W. A., Wasserman, T., and Grodner, A. (2006) Choosing a Proxy for Academic 
Aptitude. Journal of Economic Education 37(2), 131−147. 
REFERENCES 
168 
Guthrie, J., Parker, L. D., and Gray, R. (2004) Requirements and Understandings for 
Publishing Academic Research: An Insider View, in: Humphrey, C., and Lee, B. H. 
(Eds.), The Real Life Guide to Accounting Research: A Behind-the-Scenes View of 
Using Qualitative Research Methods, 411-432. Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
Hahn, R., and Hird, J. (1991) The costs and benefits of regulation: Review and synthesis. 
Yale Journal on Regulation 8(1), 233-278. 
Haller, A. (1992) The Relationship of Financial and Tax Accounting in Germany: A 
Major Reason for Disharmony in Europe. The International Journal of Accounting 
27, 310−323. 
Ham, R., Junankar, N., and Wells, R. (2009) Occupational Choice: Personality Matters. 
IZA Discussion Paper, No. 4105. Available online: http://nbn-
resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:101:1-2009051314. 
Hamermesh, D. S. (1992) The Young Economist's Guide to Professional Etiquette. 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 6(1), 169–179. 
Hamermesh, D. S. (1994) Facts and Myths about Refereeing. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 8(1), 153–163. 
Hanlon, M., and Heitzman, S. (2010) A review of tax research. Journal of Accounting 
and Economics 50(2−3), 127−178. 
Harrison, D. (2002) Obligations and Obfuscations in the Review Process. Academy of 
Management Journal 46(6), 1079–1084. 
Hartley, J. (2003) Single authors are not alone: Colleagues often help. Journal of 
Scholarly Publishing 34(2), 108–113. 
Hasselback, J. R., Reinstein, A., and Abdolmohammadi, M. J. (2012) Benchmarking the 
Research Productivity of Accounting Doctorates. Working paper. Available online: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1983386. 
Hay, D. (2013) Further Evidence from Meta.Analysis of Audit Fee Research. 
International Journal of Auditing 17(2), 162−176. 
Hay, D., Knechel, W. R., and Wong, N. (2006) Audit fees: A meta-analysis of the effect 
of supply and demand attributes. Contemporary Accounting Research 23(1) 141–
191. 
Healy, P., and Wahlen, J. (1999) A review of the earnings management literature and its 
implications for standard setting. Accounting Horizons 13(4), 365–383. 
Hellmann, A., Perera, H., and Patel, C. (2010) Contextual Issues of the Convergence of 
International Financial Reporting Standards: The Case of Germany. Advances in 
Accounting 26(1), 108−116. 
Hitz, J.-M., and Müller-Bloch, S. (2016) Why do firms downlist? Evidence on the costs 
of IFRS compliance and enforcement. Working paper. Available online: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2533959. 
Hofstede, G. (2001) Culture's Consequences: Comparing Values, Behaviors, Institutions 
and Organizations Across Nations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
Hofstede, G. and Bond, M. H. (1988) The Confucian Connection: From Cultural Roots 
to Economic Growth. Organizational Dynamics 16(4), 5-21. 
REFERENCES 
169 
Hogan, R., and Blake, R. (1999) John Holland’s Vocatioinal Typology and Personality 
Theory. Journal of Vocational Behavior 55(1), 41−56. 
Höglund, H., and Sundvik, D. (2016) Financial Reporting Quality and Outsourcing of 
Accounting Tasks: Evidence from Small Private Firms. Working Paper. Available 
online: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2889928. 
Holland, J. L. (1973) Making Vocational Choices: A Theory of Careers. Englewood Clifs, 
NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
Hope, O.-K., and Vyas, D. (2016) Private Company Finance and Financial Reporting. 
Working Paper. Available online: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2871542. 
Hope, O.-K., Thomas, W., and Vyas, D. (2011) Financial credibility, ownership, and 
financing constraints in private firms. Journal of International Business Studies 
42(7), 935–957. 
Hope, O.-K., Thomas, W., and Vyas, D. (2013) Financial reporting quality of U.S. private 
and public firms. The Accounting Review 88(5), 1715–1742. 
Hope, O.-K, Thomas, W. B., and Vyas, D. (2017) Stakeholder demand for accounting 
quality and economic usefulness of accounting in U.S. private firms. Journal of 
Accounting and Public Policy 36(1), 1−13. 
Hopwood, A. G. (2007) Whither Accounting Research?. The Accounting Review 82(5), 
1365−1374. 
Howard, T. P., and Stout, D. E. (2006) Reasons accounting case/instructional resource 
papers are rejected for publication. Journal of Accounting Education 24(1), 1–15. 
Hull, K. v. (1992) Harmonization of accounting standards. A view from the European 
community. European Accounting Review 1(1), 161–172. 
Hurtt, R. K. (2010) Development of a Scale to Measure Professional Skepticism. 
Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 29(1), 149−171. 
International Standard on Auditing 200. Overall Objectives of the Independent Auditor 
and the Conduct of an Audit in Accordance with International Standards on 
Auditing. Effective for Audits on Financial Statements for Periods beginning on or 
after December 15, 2009. 
Ittner, C. D. (2014) Strengthening causal inferences in positivist field studies. Accounting, 
Organizations and Society 39(7), 545−549. 
Jaafar, A., and Thornton, J. (2015) Tax havens and effective tax rates: An analysis of 
private versus public European firms. The International Journal of Accounting 50(4), 
435–457. 
John, O. P., Naumann, L. P., and Soto, C. J. (2008) Paradigm Shift to the Integrative Big-
Five Trait Taxonomy: History, Measurement, and Conceptual Issues, in: John, O. P., 
Robins, R. W., and Pervin, L. A. (Eds.), Handbook of personality: Theory and 
research, 114-158. New York, NY: Guilford Press. 
Johnston, K. S. (1963) Corporations Federal Income Tax Compliance Costs. A Study of 
Small, Medium-Size, and Large Corporations. Bureau of Business Research, 
Columbus, OH.  
Jones, J. T. (1991) Earnings Management During Import Relief Investigations. Journal 
of Accounting Research 29(2), 193−228. 
REFERENCES 
170 
Jones, M. J., and Roberts, R. (2005) International Publishing Patterns: An Investigation 
of Leading UK and US Accounting and Finance Journals. Journal of Business 
Finance & Accounting 32(5−6), 1107–1140. 
Kachelmeier, S. J. (2009) Annual Report and Editorial Commentary for The Accounting 
Review. The Accounting Review 84(6), 2047–2075. 
Kao, J. L., Li, Y., and Zhang, W. (2014) Did SOX Influence the Association between Fee 
Dependence and Auditors‘ Propensity to Issue Going-Concern Opinions? Auditing: 
A Journal of Theory & Practice 33(2), 165−185. 
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., and Mastruzzi, M. (2009) Governance Matters VIII: Aggregate 
and Individual Governance Indicators, 1996–2008. World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper No. 4978. 
Kavanagh, M. H., and Drennan, L. (2008) What Skills and Attributes Does an Accounting 
Graduate Need? Evidence from Student Perceptions and Employer Expectations. 
Accounting & Finance 48(2), 279−300. 
Kim, J.-B., Liu, X., and Zheng, L. (2012) The Impact of Mandatory IFRS Adoption on 
Audit Fees: Theory and Evidence. The Accounting Review 87(6), 2061−2094. 
Knechel, W. R., and Willekens, M. (2006) The role of risk management and governance 
in determining audit demand. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 33(9, 10), 
1344–1367. 
Konrad, A. M., Ritchie Jr., J. E., Lieb, P., and Corrigall, E. (2000) Sex Differences and 
Similarities in Job Attribute Preferences: A Meta-Analysis. Psychological Bulletin 
126(4), 593-641. 
Kornberger, M., Justesen, L., and Mouritsen, J. (2011) “When you make Manager, we 
put a big Mountain in front of you”: An ethnography of managers in a Big 4 
Accounting Firm. Accounting, Organizations and Society 36(8), 514-533. 
Kothari, S. P., Li, X., and Short, E. (2009) The Effect of Disclosures by Management, 
Analysts, and Busienss Press on Cost of Capital, Return Volatility, and Analyst 
Forecasts: A Study Using Content Analysis. The Accounting Review 84(5), 1639–
1670. 
Kovar, S. E., Ott, R. L., Fisher, D. G. (2003) Personality Preferences of Accounting 
Students: A Longitudinal Case Study. Journal of Accounting Education 21(2), 
75−94. 
Kreuter, F., Presser, S., Tourangeau, R. (2008) Social desirability bias in CATI, IVR, and 
web surveys. Public Opinion Quarterly 72(5), 847−865. 
Krippendorf, K. H. (2012) Content Analysis. An Introduction to Its Methodology, 3rd Ed. 
Los Angeles et al: Sage. 
Krishnan, G., and Visvanathan, G. (2011) Is there an association between earnings 
management and auditor-provided tax services? The Journal of the American 
Taxation Association 33(1), 111–135. 
Kuo, N.-T., and Lee, C.-F. (2016) A potential benefit of increasing book-tax conformity: 
evidence from the reduction of audit fees. Review of Accounting Studies 21(4), 
1287−1326. 
REFERENCES 
171 
Laband, D. N., and Piette, M. J. (1994) Favoritism versus Search for Good Papers: 
Empirical Evidence Regarding the Behavior of Journal Editors. Journal of Political 
Economy 102(1), 194–203.  
Lang, M., and Maffett, M. (2010) Economic effects of transparency in international equity 
markets: A review and suggestions for future research. Foundations and Trends in 
Accounting 5(3), 175-241. 
Larcker, D. F., and Rusticus, T. O. (2007) Endogeneity and Empirical Accounting 
Research. European Accounting Review 16(1), 207−215. 
Larcker, D. F., and Rusticus, T. O. (2010) On the use of instrumental variables in 
accounting research. Journal of Accounting and Economics 49(3), 186−205. 
Larson, L. M., and Borgen, F. H. (2002) Convergence of Vocational Interests and 
Personality Examples in an Adolescent Gifted Sample. Journal of Vocational 
Behavior 60(1), 91—112. 
Larson, L. M., Rottinghaus, J., and Borgen, F. H. (2002) Meta-analyses of Big Six 
Interests and Big Five Personality Factors. Journal of Vocational Behavior 61(2), 
217−239.  
Law, P., and Yuen, D. (2012) A Multilevel Study of Students’ Motivations of Studying 
Accounting. Implications for Employers. Education + Training 54(1), 50−64. 
Lee, S.-H. (2009) A theory of self-selection in a market with matching frictions: An 
application to delay in refereeing times in economics journals. Journal of Economic 
Behavior & Organization 72(1), 344–360.  
Lee, T. A., and Williams, P. F. (1999) Accounting from the Inside: Legitimizing the 
Accounting Academic Elite. Critical Perspectives on Accounting 10: 867–895. 
Leslie, D. (2005). Are Delays in Academic Publishing Necessary? The American 
Economic Review 95(1), 407–413. 
Leuz, C. (2007) Was the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 really this costly? A discussion of 
evidence from event returns and going-private decisions. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics 44(1−2), 146−165. 
Leuz, C., Nanda, D., and Wysocki, P. D. (2003) Earnings management and investor 
protection: an international comparison. Journal of Financial Economics 69(3), 
505−527. 
Leuz, C., Triantis, A., and Wang, T. Y. (2008) Why do firms go dark? Causes and 
economic consequences of voluntary SEC deregistrations. Journal of Accounting 
and Economics 45(2−3), 181−208. 
Levine, R. (2005) Finance and Growth: Theory and Evidence, in: Aghion, P., and 
Durlauf, S. N. (Eds.). Handbook of Economic Growth 1A, 865−934. Amsterdam: 
North Holland. 
Locker, K. O. (1964) Turning a Presentation into an Article. The Bulletin (June), 63–65. 
Loeb, S. E. (1994) Accounting Academic Ethics: A Code Is Needed. Issues in Accounting 
Education 9(1), 191–200. 
Lowe, A., and Locke, J. (2005) Perceptions of journal quality and research paradigm: 
Results of a web-based survey of British accounting academics. Accounting, 
Organizations and Society 30(1), 81−98. 
REFERENCES 
172 
Loy, T. and Heidrich, R. (2017) Wer prüft den deutschen Kapitalmarkt? Eine empirische 
Untersuchung der Transparenzberichte 2010 bis 2015. Die Wirtschaftsprüfung 70, 
forthcoming. 
Maijoor, S., and Vanstraelen, A. (2012) “Research Opportunities in Auditing in the EU” 
Revisited. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 31(1), 115−126. 
Marston, C., and Ayub. A. (2000) Relationship between publications in selected journals 
and Research Assessment Exercise rankings in 1996 for UK accountancy 
departments. Accounting Education 9(1), 93–102. 
McAfee, R. P. (2010) Edifying Editing. The American Economist 55(1), 1−8. 
McCrae, R. R., and Costa, T. (1987) Validation of the Five-Factor Model of Personality 
Across Instruments and Observers. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 
52(1), 81-90. 
McCrae, R. R., and Costa, T. (2003) Personality in Adulthood: A Five-factor Theory 
Perspective. New York, London: Guilford Press. 
Merchant, K. A. (2010) Paradigms in accounting research: A view from North America. 
Management Accounting Research 21(2), 116−120. 
Messner, M., Becker, C., Schäffer, U., and Binder, C. (2008) Legitimacy and Identity in 
Germanic Management Accounting Research. European Accounting Review 17(1), 
129−159. 
Moizer, P. (2009) Publishing in accounting journals: A fair game? Accounting, 
Organizations and Society 34(2), 285–304.  
Mount, M. K., Murray, R. B., and Stewart, G. L. (1998) Five-Factor Model of Personality 
and Performance in Jobs Involving Interpersonal Interactions. Human Performance 
11(2-3), 145-165. 
Neal, M., and Morgan, J. (2000) The Professionalization of Everyone? A Comparative 
Study of the Development of the Professions in the United Kingdom and Germany. 
European Sociological Review 16(1), 9−26. 
Nelson, I. T., Vendrzyk, V. P., Quirin, J. J., and Kovar, S. E. (2008) Trends in Accounting 
Student Characteristics: Results from a 15-Year Longitudinal Study at FSA Schools. 
Issues in Accounting Education 23(3), 373−389. 
Nieken, P., and Störmer, S. (2010) Personality as Predictor of Occupational Choice: 
Empirical Evidence from Germany. Diskussionspapiere des Schwerpunktes 
Unternehmensführung am Fachbereich BWL der Universität Hamburg, No. 8/2010, 
Available online: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1737770.  
Nobes, C. (1998) Towards a General Model of the Reasons for International Differences 
in Financial Reporting. Abacus 34(2), 162−187. 
Nobes, C. (2006) The survival of international differences under IFRS: towards a research 
agenda. Accounting and Business Research 36(3), 233−245. 
Nobes, C. (2011) IFRS Practices and the Persistence of Accounting System 
Classification. Abacus 47(3), 267−283. 
Nordenflycht, A. v. (2010) What Is a Professional Service Firm? Toward a Theory and 
Taxonomy of Knowledge-Intensive Firms. Academy of Management Review 35(1), 
155−174. 
REFERENCES 
173 
Oler, D. K., Oler, M. J., and Skousen, C. J. (2010) Characterizing Accounting Research. 
Accounting Horizons 24(4), 635−670. 
Oster, S. M., and Hamermesh, D. S. (1998) Aging and Productivity Among Economists. 
The Review of Economics and Statistics 80(1), 154–156. 
Oswald, A. J. (2008) Can We Test for Bias in Scientific Peer-Review? Institute for the 
Study of Labor (IZA) Discussion Paper 3665. Available online: 
http://ftp.iza.org/dp3665.pdf. 
Palmrose, Z.-V. (1986) Audit fees and auditor size: Further evidence. Journal of 
Accounting Research 24(1), 97–110. 
Paolillo, J. G. P., and Estes, R. W. (1982) An Empirical Analysis of Career Choice Factors 
among Accountants, Attorneys, Engineers, and Physicians. The Accounting Review 
57(4), 785−793. 
Perry, C., Carson, D., and Gilmore, A. (2003) Joing a Conversation. Writing for EJM’s 
editors, reviewers and readers requires planning, care and persistence. European 
Journal of Marketing 37(5/6), 652–667. 
Peters, D. P., and Ceci, S. J. (1982) Peer-review practices of psychological journals: The 
fate of published articles, submitted again. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 5, 
187–255. 
Peterson, R. A. (1994) A Meta-Analysis of Cronbach’s Alpha Coefficient. Journal of 
Consumer Research 21(2), 381−391. 
Pfaff, D., and Schröer, T. (1996) The Relationship Between Financial and Tax 
Accounting in Germany – The Authoritativeness and Reverse Authoritativeness 
Principle. European Accounting Review 5(Supplement), 963−979. 
Rammstedt, B., and John, O. (2005) Kurzversion des Big Five Inventory (BFI-K): 
Entwicklung Validierung eines ökonomischen Inventars zur Erfassung der fünf 
Faktoren der Persönlichkeit. Diagnostica 51(4), 195−206. 
Ravenscroft, S. P., and Fogarty, T. J. (1998) Social and Ethical Dimensions of the 
Repeated Journal Reviewer. Journal of Information Ethics 7(2), 45–66. 
Read, W. J., Rama, D. V., and Raghunandan, K. (1998) Are Publication Requirements 
for Accounting Faculty Promotions Still Increasing? Issues in Accounting Education 
13(2), 327–339. 
Richardson, P., Dellaportas, S., Perera, L., and Richardson, B. (2015) Towards a 
conceptual framework on the categorization of stereotypical perceptions in 
accounting. Journal of Accounting Literature 35(October), 28−46. 
Rigby, J. (2013) Looking for the impact of peer review: does count of funding 
acknowledgements really predict research impact? Scientometrics 94(1), 57–73. 
Robinson, J. R., Sikes, S. A., and Weaver, C. D. (2010) Performance Measurement of 
Corporate Tax Departments. The Accounting Review 85(3), 1035−1064. 
Rottinghaus, J., Lindley, L. D., Green, M. A., and Borgen, F. H. (2002) Educational 
Aspirations: The Contribution of Personality, Self-Efficacy, and Interests. Journal 
of Vocational Behavior 61(1), 1−19. 
REFERENCES 
174 
Rouse, R. W., and Shockley, R. A. (1984) Setting Realistic Expectations for Publishing 
in Leading Accounting Research Journals. Journal of Accounting Education 2(2), 
43–52. 
Roychowdhury, S. (2006) Earnings management through real activities manipulation. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 42(3), 335−370. 
Rubinstein, G. (2005) The Big Five Among Male and Female Students of Different 
Faculties. Personality and Individual Differences 38(7), 1495−1503. 
Said, J., Ghani, E. K., Hashim, A. and Nasir, N. M. (2004) Perceptions Towards 
Accounting Career Among Malaysian Undergraduates. Journal of Financial 
Reporting and Accounting 2(1), 17−30. 
Sandford, C., Godwin, M., and Hardwick, P. (1989) Administrative and compliance costs 
of taxation. Fiscal Publications. 
Sax, L. J., Gilmartin, S. K., and Bryant, A. N. (2003) Assessing Response Rates and 
Nonresponse Bias in Web and Paper Surveys. Research in Higher Education 44 (4), 
409−432. 
Schmitt, D. P., Allik, J., McCrae, R. R., and Benet-Martínez, V. (2007) The Geographic 
Distribution of Big Five Personality Traits. Patterns and Profiles of Human Self-
Description across 56 Nations. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 38(2), 
173−212. 
Schulenberg, J. E., Vondracek, F. W., and Crouter, A. C. (1984) The Influence of the 
Family on Vocational Development. Journal of Marriage and Family 46(1), 
129−143. 
Schulte Sasse, K., Thomson, M., and Watrin, C. (2017) Do European corporate groups 
with subsidiaries in tax havens avoid more taxes than others?. Working paper. 
Available Online: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2897655. 
Schipper, K. (1994) Academic Accounting Research and the Standard Setting Process. 
Accounting Horizons 8(4), 61−73. 
Shipman, J. E., Swanquist, Q. T., and Whited, R. L. (2017) Propensity Score Matching 
in Accounting Research. The Accounting Review 92(1), 213−244. 
Smart, S., and Waldfogel, J. (1996) A Citation-Based Test for Discrimination at 
Economics and Finance Journals. National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) 
Working Paper 5460. Available online: http://www.nber.org/papers/w5460.pdf. 
Smith, M. (2015) Research Methods in Accounting, 3rd Ed. Los Angeles et al.: Sage. 
Stout, D. E., Rebele, J. E., and Howard, T. P. (2006) Reasons Research Papers Are 
Rejected at Accounting Education Journals. Issues in Accounting Education 21(2), 
81–98. 
Stürmer, T., Joshi, M., Glynn, R. J., Avorn, J., Rothman, K. J., and Schneeweiss, S. (2006) 
A review of the application of propensity score methods yielded increasing use, 
advantages in specific settings, but not substantially different estimates compared 
with conventional multivariable methods. Journal of Clinical Epidemology 59(5), 
437−447. 
Sunder, S. (1988) Political Economy of Accounting Standards. Journal of Accounting 
Literature 7(1), 31−41. 
REFERENCES 
175 
Sundvik, D. (2016) Book-tax conformity and earnings management in response to tax 
rate cuts. Working paper. Available online: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2890806. 
Swain, M. R., and Olsen, K. J. (2012) From Student to Accounting Professional: A 
Longitudinal Study of the Filtering Process. Issues in Accounting Education 27(1), 
17−52. 
Swanson, E. P. (2004) Publishing in the Majors: A Comparison of Accounting, Finance, 
Management, and Marketing. Contemporary Accounting Research 21(1), 223–255. 
Swanson, E. P., Wolfe, C. J., and Zardkoohi, A. (2007) Concentration in Publishing at 
Top-Tier Business Journals: Evidence and Potential Explanations. Contemporary 
Accounting Research 24(4), 1255–1289.  
Swartz, K. (1999) Peer-Reviewed Journals and Quality. Inquiry 36(Summer), 119–121. 
Swidler, S., and Goldreyer, E. (1998) The Value of a Finance Journal Publication. The 
Journal of Finance 53(1), 351–363. 
Tajfel, H., and Turner, J. C. (1986) The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior. 
In Worchel, S., and Austin, W. G. (eds.), Psychology of Intergroup Relations. 
Chicago, IL: Nelson-Hall. 
Tan, L. M., and Laswad, F. (2009) Understanding Students’ Choice of Academic Majors: 
A Longitudinal Analysis. Accounting Education: an international journal 18(3), 
233−253. 
Thomas, S. P. (2011) Conceptual Debates and Empirical Evidence About the Peer 
Review Process for Scholarly Journals. Journal of Professional Nursing 27(3),  
168–173. 
Trivedi, P. K. (1993) An Analysis of Publication Lags in Econometrics. Journal of 
Applied Econometrics 8(1), 93–100. 
Usoff, C., and Feldmann, D. (1998) Accounting Students’ Perceptions of Important Skills 
for Career Success. Journal of Education for Business 73(4), 215−220. 
Vaassen, E. H. J., Baker, C. R., and Hayes, R. S. (1993) Cognitive Style of Experienced 
Auditors in the Netherlands. British Accounting Review 25(4), 367−382. 
Vaivio, J. (2013) Sustaining the unsustainable? A critical review of the double-blind 
review. EAA Newsletter (1), 18–19. 
Vieten, H. R. (1995) Auditing in Britain and Germany Compared: Professions, 
Knowledge and The State. European Accounting Review 4(3), 485−514. 
Wasserfallen, F. (2014) Political and Economical Integration in the EU: The Case of 
Failed Tax Harmonization. Journal of Common Market Studies 52(2), 420−435. 
Watts, R. L., and Zimmerman, J. L. (1983) Agency Problems, Auditing, and the Theory 
of the Firm: Some Evidence. Journal of Law and Economics 26(3), 613−633. 
Waymire, G. B. (2009) Exchange Guidance is the Fundamental Demand for Accounting. 
The Accounting Review 84(1), 53−62. 
Wheeler, (2001) The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator and Applications to Accounting 
Education and Research. Issues in Accounting Education 16(1), 125−150. 
REFERENCES 
176 
Wirtschaftsprüferkammer (2017) Mitgliederstatistik der WPK. Stand 1. Januar 2017. 
Available online: http://www.wpk.de/uploads/tx_templavoila/WPK-
Statistiken_Januar_2017.pdf. 
Wolk, H. I., Dodd, J. L., and Rozycki, J. J. (2013) Accounting Theory. Conceptual Issues 
in a Political and Economic Environment. 8th Ed. Los Angeles et al.: Sage. 
World Bank (2016) Doing Business 2016. Measuring Regulatory Quality and Efficiency. 
Washington, DC. Available online: http://www.doingbusiness.org/reports/global-
reports/doing-business-2016. 
World Economic Forum (2015). The Global Competitiveness Report 2015–16, Full Data 
Edition. Geneva. 
Yegros, A. Y., and Amat, C. B. (2009) Editorial delay of food research papers is 
influenced by authors’ experience but not by country of origin of the manuscripts. 
Scientometrics 81(2), 367–380. 
Yohe, G. W. (1980) Current Publication Lags in Economics Journals. Journal of 
Economic Literature 18(3), 1050–1055. 
Zang, A. Y. (2012) Evidence on the Trade-Off between Real Activities Manipulation and 
Accrual-Based Earnings Management. The Accounting Review 87(2), 675−703. 
Zimmerman, J. L. (1989) Improving a Manuscript's Readability and Likelihood of 
Publication. Issues in Accounting Education 4(2), 458–466. 
 
EIDESSTAATLICHE VERSICHERUNG 
177 
Eidesstaatliche Versicherung 
(§ 8 S. 1 Nr. 5 PromO): 
Hiermit erkläre ich, dass gegen mich wegen eines Verbrechens oder eines vorsätzlichen 
Vergehens weder ein Ermittlungs- noch ein Strafverfahren anhängig ist; ich bin wegen 
einer solchen Tat weder rechtskräftig verurteilt noch verbüße ich eine Freiheitsstrafe. 
(§ 8 S. 1 Nr. 6 PromO): 
Hiermit erkläre ich eidesstattlich, dass ich die Dissertation selbstständig verfasst und 
keine anderen als die von mir angegeben Quellen und Hilfsmittel benutzt habe. Ich habe 
die Dissertation nicht bereits zur Erlangung eines akademischen Grades eingereicht und 
habe auch nicht bereits diese oder eine gleichartige Doktorprüfung endgültig nicht be-
standen. 
(§ 8 S. 1 Nr. 8 PromO): 
Hiermit erkläre ich eidesstattlich, dass ich keine gewerbliche Promotionsvermittlung und 
-beratung in Anspruch genommen habe und auch nicht nehmen werde. 
(§ 8 S. 1 Nr. 9 PromO): 
Hiermit erkläre ich mich damit einverstanden, dass die elektronische Fassung meiner 
Dissertation unter Wahrung meiner Urheberrechte und des Datenschutzes einer geson-
derten Überprüfung unterzogen werden kann. 
(§ 8 S. 1 Nr. 10 PromO): 
Hiermit erkläre ich mich damit einverstanden, dass bei Verdacht wissenschaftlichen 
Fehlverhaltens Untersuchungen durch universitätsinterne Organe der wissenschaftli-
chen Selbstkontrolle stattfinden können. 
 
 
 
Bayreuth, den 28.02.2017 
  
 Marcus Bravidor 
 
